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For a quarter century, federally funded employment and training programs 
have proven their worth in helping the unemployed, unskilled and deficiently 
educated to compete in the labor market. Job training programs complement 
a host of federal efforts including education, housing, food assistance, 
economic development and income support programs to ameliorate the lives 
of the poor.
This book scrutinizes the activities funded under the Job Training Partner 
ship Act, which encompasses a variety of employment and training programs 
carried over from its predecessor, the Comprehensive Employment and Train 
ing Act. Complementary federal social programs are discussed only insofar 
as they relate to JTPA.
Threatened for a time in the early 1980s, employment and training programs 
had gained renewed support but not greater funding by 1987. Five years 
after the law's passage, it is timely to examine whether the experience of JTPA 
supports the congressional decision to overhaul GET A. The answer is an un 
equivocal maybe. JTPA is a resounding political and public relations success, 
in marked contrast to the unfairly maligned GET A. Business representatives 
and conservatives including President Reagan who castigated CETA now 
sing JTPA's praises. Though the president was initially a most reluctant sup 
porter of JTPA, his subsequent endorsement of the law has undermined the 
efforts of his subordinates and other conservatives who oppose the program.
A careful assessment of JTPA, however, reveals that its performance falls 
far short of the claims made by administration officials and many program 
managers. The Labor Department's reported results indicate performance 
superior to CETA, but the improvement may be illusory. Local administrators 
and training contractors select a more qualified clientele than CETA served, 
and are tempted to exaggerate results with impunity because federal and state 
monitoring of JTPA operations is at best cursory. Moreover, by offering briefer 
and less intensive training courses, JTPA does too little to improve the saleable 
labor market skills of enrollees.
Opening with a brief review of past federal training and employment 
assistance for the poor and unemployed, the authors analyze each major com 
ponent of JTPA, including year-round programs for adults and youth, sum 
mer jobs for youth, assistance for dislocated workers, the Job Crops for severely 
disadvantaged youth, and training programs for Indians and farmworkers.
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Inaugurated by the Kennedy administration, federal job training programs 
expanded dramatically during the succeeding two decades. Reversing this trend, 
President Reagan, upon assuming office, gained congressional approval for 
eliminating CETA's multibillion dollar public jobs program. In 1982, follow 
ing a protracted debate, Congress enacted the Job Training Partnership Act 
with sharply reduced appropriations. The law also strictly limited stipends for 
trainees, and transferred substantial administrative authority from the federal 
government to states and local business representatives. By 1987, the $3.7 
billion appropriation for JTPA was less than a fourth of inflation-adjusted CETA 
spending during the peak year under President Carter.
While JTPA greatly expanded the administrative authority of states and the 
business community, Congress clearly expected the federal government to guide 
and monitor the program. However, except for meager federal appropriations, 
the Reagan administration treats JTPA as a state responsibility, and the failure 
of states to fill the leadership vacuum hinders the program's effectiveness. 
Local programs have increased business involvement in management, but there 
is no persuasive evidence that employer participation has improved perfor 
mance. JTPA has made little progress in achieving better coordination with 
related social programs, dashing exaggerated congressional expectations that 
efficient interprogram cooperation could compensate for radical budget cuts.
The 620 local training agencies rely primarily upon classroom, on-the-job, 
and job search training. The limited evidence suggests that JTPA improves 
the employability of participants. However, pressures caused by the law's strict 
limitation on providing stipends to trainees, and stress on business rather than 
client needs, have impaired JTPA's effectiveness. The introduction of perfor 
mance standards was a positive step, but the Labor Department has inadequately 
supervised the system and placed too much emphasis on the standards, to the 
exclusion of other means of improving JTPA. Two-week job search courses, 
unlikely to effect more than fleeting improvement in the employability of par 
ticipants, have become increasingly common. The duration of classroom and 
on-the-job training is even shorter than the abbreviated CETA courses. Legal 
limitations on stipends and support services reinforce the inclination of local 
administrators to avoid serving individuals most in need. Finally, in the absence 
of adequate monitoring, local administrators and training contractors may suc 
cumb to the temptation to doctor results to report success.
Reacting to massive layoffs and plant closings in the 1980s, JTPA initiated 
a program for workers displaced through rapid economic change fostered by 
foreign economic competition. Federal assistance to dislocated workers is an 
important advance, but to date the program has been poorly managed. Because 
of federal and state negligence, dislocated worker projects have spent only
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two-thirds of the appropriated funds, leaving thousands who could have been 
helped without assistance. Administrators tend to exclude the least educated 
and older displaced workers who need help the most. Those who do enroll 
and require intensive training rarely receive it.
In contrast to other JTPA programs, the Job Corps a federally-administered 
residential training program for severely disadvantaged youth has remained 
relatively unchanged since JTPA's passage. Despite its high costs of nearly 
$16,000 per training year, observers across the political spectrum have 
acknowledged the program's achievements. Efforts are now underway to 
replicate the Job Corps model, which combines remedial education with voca 
tional training in a nonresidential program to reduce costs.
Two training programs designed specifically for disadvantaged farmworkers 
and Indians have been particularly neglected under JTPA. Budget cuts and 
inadequate technical assistance have limited the ability of local projects to ad 
dress the needs of these severely disadvantaged populations.
The concluding chapter discusses the reforms necessary to make JTPA a 
more effective program. The two top priorities are increased funding and more 
vigorous federal leadership. Present appropriations allow assistance to only 
about one in twenty eligible individuals. The Job Corps' outstanding record 
is attributable to and not in spite of federal administration and a generous 
but prudent investment. Following the Job Corps' practice, JTPA should em 
phasize assistance to individuals most in need, providing them with the basic 
education and quality training they require to compete in the labor market. 
Improving JTPA's operations does not require altering its administrative struc 
ture, and in fact such a realignment would impede necesary reforms. Con 
gress has historically devoted too much attention to the division of administrative 
responsibility, at the expense of emphasizing and overseeing program quality.
A Second Chance is the first comprehensive assessment of all of JTPA's 
components. The study draws on the work of various researchers who have 
examined different facets of the program, published and unpublished U.S. 
Labor Department and General Accounting Office reports, responses to the 
authors' questionnaires, and interviews with scores of program managers. The 
usual lament of researchers about the lack of data has substantial credence in 
the case of JTPA. Belying its professed dedication to eliminating governmen 
tal inefficiency, the Reagan administration drastically reduced the collection 
of information necessary to evaluate JTPA and thus help local managers im 
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On October 13, 1982 President Reagan signed into law the Job 
Training Partnership Act to help unskilled and deficiently educated 
poor individuals to compete in the labor market. The law replaced 
the much maligned Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(GETA) and continued  albeit with substantially less funding  
federal efforts to provide training for the poor which began in 1961. 
Federally financed training assistance reflects a national consensus 
that many people fail in or are being failed by the labor market not 
only in recessions, but even in prosperous times. In mid-1987, 
during the fifth year of the recovery from the 1981-2 recession, over 
7 million Americans were unemployed. This represents the highest 
level of joblessness in a sustained recovery period since the end of 
the Great Depression a half century ago.
Those in Need
Thirty-three million people experienced labor market problems at 
some time during 1985. Some had multiple difficulties: 21 million 
suffered unemployment, 14 million worked part time because they 
could not find full-time jobs, and 4 million full-time workers earned 
less than $6700  minimum wage earnings for a full year of work. 
Preliminary 1986 data indicate little change. Of those unemployed 
at some time during the prior year, 21.4 percent had family incomes 
below the poverty line. In contrast, the poverty rate for those 
without any unemployment was 5.4 percent. 1 Even those who work 
full time year-round are not assured a minimally acceptable living
1
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standard, as nearly two million such individuals were impoverished 
in 1985, up 44 percent from 1979.
The unemployment rate has crept upward over the past two 
decades, and economic and productivity growth has been sluggish 
since the 1973 OPEC oil embargo precipitated a major recession. 
The changing structure of American families has also augmented 
labor market hardships. While the entrance of more wives into the 
workforce has clearly benefited some families, increasing numbers 
of divorces and out-of-wedlock births have had a negative impact 
on family incomes. Single mothers and households of single persons 
and unrelated individuals tend to have significantly greater unem 
ployment and poverty problems than two-parent families.
A large proportion of unemployment and low earnings   as 
much as half or more over a decade-long period  is accounted for 
by a small proportion of individuals with lengthy unemployment 
spells or chronically low wages. 2 Deficient educational attainment is 
a major factor associated with employment problems. The mini 
mum education necessary to compete in the labor market has 
greatly increased in this century. However, according to a survey by 
the U.S. Department of Education, nearly 13 percent of adults in 
this country are functionally illiterate. 3 In 1984, adults with less 
than a high school education experienced over four times as much 
unemployment as those with four or more years of college, and the 
latter earned 2.5 times as much as the less educated group.4
Economic difficulties are also particularly concentrated among 
minorities, youth, and women who maintain families. The incidence 
of black unemployment and poverty is more than twice that of the 
rest of the population. While not quite as bleak, Hispanic unem 
ployment and poverty also far exceed that of the total population.
Of all age groups, youth are most vulnerable to unemployment. 
The level of teenage joblessness is about three times that of adults, 
and that of the 20-24 age group is 75 percent higher. Black youth 
joblessness is especially severe: only four of ten black teenagers are 
in the workforce, and of the remainder two of five are unemployed.
Unemployment in female-headed families is 70 percent higher 
than in married couple families, and the poverty rate is five times 
higher. More than half of the black and Hispanic women who
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maintain their families are poor. Almost one of every six families, 
and more than two of five black families, are headed by women.
The foregoing groups have traditionally experienced employment 
problems, but in recent years the problems of dislocated workers 
have also gained increasing attention. Increased foreign competi 
tion and a severe recession during the early 1980s eliminated large 
numbers of jobs in the goods-producing sector, especially in 
manufacturing. It is difficult to determine the exact causes of 
dislocation, but its unemployment impact is not in doubt. Between 
1981 and 1985, 10.8 million workers 20 years old and over lost their 
jobs due to layoffs from which they had not been recalled or to plant 
closings. A Bureau of Labor Statistics analysis of displaced workers 
who had three or more years job tenure found that only two-thirds 
were reemployed in January 1986. Eighteen percent were unem 
ployed, and the remaining 15 percent had dropped out of the labor 
force. As in the case of other jobless workers, the unskilled and 
deficiently educated displaced workers tended to fare worst. 5
The number of persons in need of job-related assistance repre 
sents a substantial proportion of the working age population. The 
following figures are not additive because of overlapping categories, 
but provide an idea of the dimensions of the problem:6
Characteristics Number
 (millions)
Total poor (16-64 years old) 17.8
Blacks (16-64) 4.4
Hispanics (16-64) 2.7
15-24 year olds 6.6
Single mothers (15-64) 3.3
High school dropouts (25-64) 23.6 
Dislocated workers (20-64) 3.1
Each of these groups may require different strategies to improve 
their employability. Young people, who tend to have little labor 
market experience, may benefit from learning basic job search skills. 
Disadvantaged youth without adequate skills can profit from 
programs providing high school equivalency or vocational training. 
The discrimination often faced by minorities may be overcome by
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partially subsidizing employers for on-the-job training costs and by 
government enforcement of equal opportunity laws. Women who 
maintain families frequently require child care assistance to success 
fully complete a training course. Displaced and older workers 
usually possess substantial work experience, and may only need job 
placement assistance. However, displaced employees who have 
worked for years in a now obsolete occupation may need to be 
retrained for an entirely new career.
The Expanding Federal Role
Although the federal government has promoted the welfare of the 
citizenry since the earliest years of the republic, sustained employ 
ment and training efforts focused on the disadvantaged emerged 
only a quarter century ago. Starting with a modest appropriation of 
$10 million under the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, annual 
appropriations increased a thousandfold within two decades before 
declining during the 1980s (figure l.l). 7
Figure 1.1
Federal employment and training financing and services have 
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Persistent unemployment in the early 1960s resulted in the 
enactment of the Manpower Development and Training Act of
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1962, the first major expansion of federal training efforts. MDTA 
initially provided retraining for experienced workers dislocated by 
automation, but was later redirected toward the poor.
In 1963, congressional attention turned toward youth as the first 
baby boomers reached age 16 and began entering the labor force. 
Congress expanded support for a federal vocational education 
program that dated back to 1917.
The Great Society
In 1964 the nation's attention focused on the plight of the poor in 
response to President Lyndon Johnson's declared "war on pov 
erty." Economists were predicting that projected federal budget 
surpluses would impede economic growth. What better way to 
spend the surpluses than to help build a better society? As part of its 
antipoverty efforts, the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act created 
two new youth employment programs: the Job Corps, a residential 
training program; and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, providing 
work experience. Work experience was also used to help needy 
adults, including public assistance recipients. Adopting the notion 
that the wearer, not the cobbler, knows where the shoe pinches, the 
legislation favored "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in 
setting program policy. The institutional result was the emergence 
of community action agencies and community-based organizations 
as advocates for the poor and deliverers of services, including 
employment and training assistance.
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate remained stuck between 5 
and 6 percent throughout 1963 and the first half of 1964 — a rate 
considered high at that time. Post World War II economic text 
books had preached that a tax cut — without an offsetting 
reduction in government expenditures — would help reduce unem 
ployment by stimulating demand for the purchase of goods and 
services. In 1964, Congress tested this theory, cutting federal 
personal and corporate income taxes by approximately $14 billion 
while moderately increasing expenditures. The action was strikingly 
successful. Unemployment declined to 5 percent by the end of the 
year, and further dropped to 4.5 percent by the summer of 1965 on 
the heels of a $5 billion excise tax cut, when deficit spending to 
finance the Vietnam War took over as the engine for job creation.
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By 1965, America's reemergent social conscience addressed the 
needs of the physically and mentally handicapped, millions of 
whom were unable to effectively compete in the labor market. The 
federal government had previously enacted a comprehensive reha 
bilitation program for World War II and Korean War veterans; 
new legislation expanded federal vocational rehabilitation efforts 
for other disabled persons.
In 1966, Congress experimented with small public jobs programs 
for adults not on welfare, the first such efforts since the Great 
Depression. New Careers trained the poor and undereducated for 
paraprofessional jobs, and Operation Mainstream employed older 
rural residents at conservation tasks. New Careers failed partly 
because the training required a long-term commitment and because 
of resistance by professionals protective of their jobs and status. 
Operation Mainstream limped along with limited funding until it 
mushroomed into a more comprehensive, multibillion dollar public 
service employment program five years later. Also in 1966, the 
Adult Education Act initiated federal educational assistance for 
high school dropouts and illiterate adults.
Attention turned in 1967 to welfare recipients. Despite strong 
economic growth since the early 1960s, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program recipients had almost doubled since 
the beginning of the decade. The cry was raised that if the program 
continued to grow at this rate, we would all be driven into the 
poorhouse. Congress responded with the Work Incentive Program, 
called WIN for short (the acronym WIP was shunned). Work 
experience and supportive services would enable welfare recipients 
to secure jobs, economic independence and — as some members of 
Congress hoped — "get 'em off our backs."
Government efforts notwithstanding, unemployment in many 
inner cities remained a serious problem. Dozens of riots broke out 
in the mid-1960s, from Watts to Detroit to the nation's capital. One 
result was the Concentrated Employment Program of 1967, which 
put antipoverty and training funds in the hands of mayors, county 
officials, and community-based organizations to boost job oppor 
tunities in poor neighborhoods.
Until 1968, the Great Society's employment and training initia 
tives had been designed almost entirely by federal agencies. With
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rising social unrest, the private sector began to pay increasing 
attention to inner city conditions. President Johnson, seizing upon 
this concern, created the National Alliance of Businessmen — the 
"men" was later dropped — to encourage employers to accept 
direct responsibility for combating discrimination and poverty.
However, by the last year of the Johnson administration, the 
political pressure to ameliorate the lot the of poor had crested. 
Economic growth and new government initiatives helped reduce 
poverty substantially in the 1960s, but dreams of total victory had 
proven illusory.
Nixon and the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act
The Nixon administration came to power with only one positive 
commitment in the employment and training field: to consolidate 
and at the same time decentralize the diverse programs which had 
emerged during the 1960s. Congress was prepared to accept this 
approach only if it was accompanied by a public sector job creation 
program. The administration, however, strongly opposed what it 
considered "make work" jobs.
The recession of 1970-1 and the approaching presidential elec 
tions generated sufficient political pressure to induce President 
Nixon to sign the 1971 Emergency Employment Act authorizing a 
public employment program. A $2.25 billion appropriation allowed 
state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to hire 
some 150,000 unemployed persons.
Nixon's support of public employment was short-lived. Follow 
ing his 1972 landslide reelection, Nixon attempted to dismantle the 
Great Society. Watergate intervened, however, and amid a period 
of disarray in the executive branch the Labor Department negoti 
ated directly with Congress to create the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (GETA). Enacted in December 1973, the CETA 
compromise called for locally-managed but federally-funded train 
ing and public sector job creation programs. After years of debate 
over the appropriate scope and locus of service delivery, Congress 
gave local governments broad discretion to tailor job training 
programs to community needs. CETA also authorized a standby
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public service employment program, to be implemented whenever 
national and local unemployment rates rose too high. Although 
most programs were to be managed at the local or state level, the 
federal government continued to operate the Job Corps for youth 
and programs for Indians and farmworkers.
CETA began under the least propitious circumstances, arriving 
simultaneously with the OPEC oil embargo which quadrupled 
crude oil prices and induced a recession. The new employment and 
training program was overwhelmed by unemployment, which 
climbed from a 5 percent rate at the beginning of 1974 to over 7 
percent by December. President Gerald Ford reluctantly agreed to 
a new public service employment program, shifting CETA's focus 
toward job creation rather than training. Unemployment peaked at
9 percent in the spring of 1975 and averaged 7.7 percent in the 1976 
election year. Ford acquiesced to a congressional extension of the 
public service employment program shortly before the election, but 
vetoed Democratic efforts to further increase funds for job creation.
A Major Expansion Under Carter
In 1977, the executive reins returned to the Democrats, who after 
eight years out of power vigorously promoted new employment and 
training initiatives. The Youth Employment and Demonstration 
Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA), expanded funding for public service 
jobs, and employment tax credits were quickly enacted. Together 
these programs constituted a major if short-lived commitment of 
resources to combat unemployment.
The New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977 offered employers incentives 
for expanding their workforce. In its brief two-year lifespan, over 
$4 billion in tax expenditures boosted overall employment. The 
program was not restricted to the disadvantaged.
The highest priority, however, was to ameliorate unemployment 
among poor youths. YEDPA was a combination of traditional 
work experience and skill training programs with experimental 
research projects. Another innovation directed primarily toward 
youths was the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit of 1978 (TJTC). Similar to 
the expiring New Jobs Tax Credit, TJTC offered employers a 
substantial tax credit for employing poor youths and other impov 
erished individuals.
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Another major employment initiative of the Carter administra 
tion was an expansion of public service employment under CETA 
from 300,000 to 750,000 job slots in nine months. The pressure to 
quickly fill these jobs resulted in isolated, though highly publicized, 
cases of careless management and enrollment of ineligible appli 
cants that were to haunt CETA for the rest of its limited life.
The last major employment and training development during the 
Carter administration was a 1978 revision of CETA. Amendments 
reduced the discretionary authority of state and local governments, 
confined eligibility for public service employment to the poor, and 
initiated a new training program which involved private sector 
representatives in program planning and implementation. The 
changes improved the operations of CETA and addressed concerns 
of financial mismanagement, but did little to boost the program's 
image.
The Job Training Partnership Act
In a clear break with past federal policy, President Reagan 
mounted a concerted effort to sharply cut employment and training 
spending along with other antipoverty programs. CETA public 
service jobs were eliminated in 1981 with little dissent, as exagger 
ated and highly publicized abuses had undermined the program's 
support. Negative images of public employment as "make-work, 
dead-end" jobs had triumphed. Reagan administration appointees 
ignored evidence that supported the program, and confidently 
predicted that the private sector would reabsorb displaced public 
service employees. However, later studies showed that these indi 
viduals experienced severe reemployment problems.8
CETA's scheduled September 1982 expiration prompted a 
lengthy debate over the act's remaining job training sections.9 By 
early 1982, three major proposals emerged. House Democrats 
favored a program similar to CETA, but with increased business 
involvement. The Reagan administration favored terminating the 
program and shifting the responsibility to states and localities. As 
an interim step, however, the administration supported a block 
grant arrangement with federal financing but state control over
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program operations. The Senate Republicans' compromise solution 
favored continued federal oversight with a substantial delegation of 
authority to states and business officials.
As the recession deepened and unemployment rose, Congress 
balked at the administration's proposal to end federal support of 
job training assistance. The debate then shifted to the design of a 
new program, centering on four contentious issues: how much 
should be spent; whether enrollees should be given cash assistance 
as well as training; the proper division of authority among federal, 
state and local government; and the degree of business involvement.
Although the jobless rate was approaching 9 percent, President 
Reagan's budget, introduced in January 1982, recommended $2.4 
billion for job training, only a fourth of the amount appropriated 
prior to his election. Senators Dan Quayle and Edward Kennedy 
proposed a bipartisan bill carrying a price tag of $3.8 billion. 
Representative Augustus Hawkins offered a $5.4 billion proposal, 
but a cost conscious House reserved only $3 billion for job training. 
In the final legislation, Congress evaded the funding issue by 
allocating "such sums as may be necessary" for JTPA. The only 
exception was the widely praised Job Corps program, budgeted at 
$618 million for fiscal 1983. Subsequently, Congress appropriated 
$3.7 billion for JTPA's first full year.
The House Democratic bill initially proposed reviving public 
service employment. Because of adamant administration opposi 
tion, the Democrats decided to strike the job creation proposal to 
facilitate passage of the training bill. Once this concession was made 
the issue of income support payments to trainees became para 
mount. The Democrats considered stipends to trainees and other 
support services, such as child care for mothers with young 
children, essential to sustain trainees with little or no outside 
income. But the administration countered that by devoting over 
half of its training budget to cash payments and support services, 
CETA became a disguised welfare program, and the president 
insisted on limiting outlays exclusively to training and administra 
tive expenditures. The bitter controversy peaked when the House 
threatened to enact a simple extension of CETA if the administra 
tion refused to compromise. Faced with nearly 10 percent unem 
ployment and congressional elections a month away, the adminis-
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tration relented. The compromise required that local job training 
sponsors spend at least 70 percent of their allocation for training. 
No more than 15 percent could be devoted to administration. A 
limit of 30 percent was applied to support services and administra 
tion combined. The limitations could be waived if a locality suffered 
high unemployment, faced unusually high child care or transporta 
tion costs, or offered lengthy training courses.
The appropriate division of responsibility between federal, state 
and local government has been debated since the federal govern 
ment first enacted job training legislation. Under the initial CETA 
legislation, local elected officials were largely responsible for pro 
gram administration. Rising unemployment and program abuses — 
greatly exaggerated by the media — stimulated greater federal 
intervention, but by the early 1980s the administration sought to 
eliminate federal responsibility entirely, prompting an ideological 
debate between advocates of sustained federal involvement and 
those who favored a passive federal role. The administration and 
Senate Republicans proposed to delegate most of the federal 
government's administrative authority to state governors. House 
Democrats favored continuing the CETA model, which divided 
administrative responsibility between federal and local authorities. 
Although the state role under CETA was minor, inexperience was 
not necessarily a drawback because governors were not stigmatized 
by CETA's widely publicized abuses. The National Governors' 
Association lobbied hard for expanded state responsibility. In 
response the local governments which had administered CETA — 
represented by the National Association of Counties, the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, and the National League of Cities — argued 
that President Reagan's federalist principles should naturally cause 
him to favor administration by the government closest to the 
people. Out of this struggle emerged a somewhat ambiguous 
compromise which ensured that the question of program authority 
would not be settled until JTPA got underway. Although significant 
responsibilities were retained at the federal level, the law delegated 
most oversight duties to state governors. To facilitate state author 
ity, 22 percent of the funds for JTPA's largest training program and 
all dislocated worker financing were allocated directly to the
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governors. Decisions on who should be served and how to serve 
them were left to local administrators, within the limits of the law.
Another thorny administrative issue concerned the role of busi 
ness representatives. Apart from offering on-the-job training, busi 
ness was hardly involved in federal employment and training 
programs until CETA's 1978 reauthorization created a Private 
Sector Initiative Program (PSIP) and established private industry 
councils (PICs) to advise local programs. Job placement rates were 
higher under PSIP than CETA programs administered by local 
governments, probably because PSIP served a more qualified 
clientele. However, the National Alliance of Business and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce argued that the PSIP experience proved the 
importance of business leadership in building a successful job 
training program. The idea found ready acceptance in an adminis 
tration which fervently believed that business was inherently more 
efficient than the government. However, the claims made on behalf 
of business involvement were not universally shared. Arguing that 
employers were primarily interested in maximizing profits and 
largely disinterested in hiring the poor, opponents contended that 
the potential benefits of business involvement were greatly exagger 
ated. Expanded business authority was also contested by the 
various interest groups representing local elected officials.
Each of the three major job training bills offered as a substitute 
for CETA in 1982 envisioned an enlarged employer role. However, 
the administration and Senate proposals went much further than 
the House Democratic bill, which would have largely retained the 
authority of local elected officials. The final JTPA compromise gave 
business greatly increased power at the local level, but attempted to 
ensure that employer representatives and elected officials would be 
equal partners in designing and administering local programs. The 
PICs were transformed from an advisory to a policymaking council 
with a required majority of business representatives. Local training 
plans had to be jointly approved by the PICs and local elected 
officials, with disputes resolved by the governor.
Despite the general emphasis on reduced spending, the addition 
of a new program for retraining dislocated workers was not 
controversial. The problem of dislocated workers was viewed as 
increasingly acute during the early 1980s because of increased
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foreign economic competition, the continued relative decline in 
manufacturing employment, and the deepening recession. Although 
many dislocated workers had previously possessed good jobs, the 
difficulty they experienced in regaining employment was thought to 
justify federal intervention.
Several other new features in JTPA were also added with 
relatively little controversy. The most important of these concerned 
performance standards, or numerical criteria used to assess local 
program success by gauging job placement rates, participants' 
earnings and training costs, among other factors. Performance 
standards had evolved under CETA, but JTPA instituted manda 
tory national targets. The law established monetary awards for 
successful programs and sanctions against localities which per 
formed poorly.
Congress also supported increased coordination between job 
training and related social programs. This objective was not new, 
but it did receive increased attention during the 1982 debate. JTPA 
incorporated amendments promoting coordination between JTPA 
and public employment offices and welfare programs. The law 
vested principal responsibility for coordination with the governor's 
office and allocated funds directly to governors for coordination 
activities under JTPA's principal training program.
Congress adopted two other significant administrative provisions 
designed to avoid problems which had plagued CETA. JTPA was 
authorized as a permanent program to eliminate wrenching qua 
drennial reauthorization debates. Second, to provide localities with 
adequate lead time to plan the coming year's expenditures, JTPA's 
operating year was scheduled to begin in the July following the start 
of the federal government's fiscal year in October. For example, 
JTPA program year 1988 begins July 1, 1988 and ends June 30, 
1989; the federal fiscal year 1988 begins on October 1,1987.* CETA 
local planners often were not informed of their allocation until the 
fiscal year was underway because Congress made belated decisions 
on appropriations.
Although JTPA's passage was marked by extended and heated 
debate, the political and economic climate during 1982 made it
*Following JTPA's practice, references to years in this study denote program years.
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reasonably certain that a federal job training program would be 
enacted. Rising unemployment and the approaching 1982 mid-term 
election placed enormous pressure on the nation's leaders. From a 
trough of 7 percent in mid-1981, the unemployment rate exceeded 
10 percent by the fall of 1982. Once Congress approved JTPA, 
President Reagan's initial opposition to continued federal support 
of training did not prevent him from claiming credit for a program 
he had long opposed.
Like GET A, JTPA encompasses a number of separate programs. 
The centerpiece of the law is Title II, which provides training grants 
to states, a summer jobs program for youth, and set-aside funds for 
education and older worker programs. Title III addresses the needs 
of workers dislocated due to foreign competition or technological 
change. Title IV continues a variety of GET A programs whose 
administration remains the direct responsibility of the federal 
government. These include the Job Corps as well as programs 







Title IIA Adult and youth programs 1,840 
State education coordination
and grants 147 
Training programs for older
individuals 55
Title IIB Summer youth programs (1988) 750 
Title III Dislocated worker programs 200
Title IV Federally administered programs 866 
Job Corps 656 
Native American programs 62 
Migrant and seasonal
farmworker programs 60 
Veterans' employment programs 10 
Technical assistance, research, 
______and pilot projects______________________79
Source: Congressional appropriations
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JTPA's character was more strongly influenced by the political 
and economic climate of the early 1980s than by drawing on the 
experience of two decades of federal employment and training 
programs. Studies of GET A demonstrated that the program was 
generally a success and not a debacle. 10 Rather than reforming 
CETA, however, Congress chose to overhaul the system. Most of 
JTPA's new elements — state and business leadership, the prohibi 
tion of public service jobs, and radically reduced income support 
payments — were inspired more by faith than evidence. The heart 
of the program, the type of training which enrollees receive, was 
virtually ignored during the legislative debate. Whatever the merits 






As its title connotes, the Job Training Partnership Act is designed 
to create a working partnership among the three levels of govern 
ment and the private sector. This approach is embodied in Title II 
programs, constituting about three-fourths of JTPA expenditures. 
The law provides different administrative arrangements for the 
dislocated worker program and, following CETA's practice, retains 
federal responsibility for directing the Job Corps and programs 
serving farmworkers, Indians and veterans.
Federal Administration
In comparison with earlier employment and training programs, 
the federal role in JTPA is circumscribed: principal administrative 
responsibility rests with the states. Nevertheless, despite Reagan 
administration efforts to completely turn over job training pro 
grams to the states and the business community, Congress clearly 
assigned the federal government a major role in JTPA. The primary 
federal responsibilities include financing, monitoring state and local 
compliance with the law, supplying technical assistance, assessing 
the program, and ensuring fiscal accountability.
JTPA was implemented under circumstances strikingly different 
from CETA. GET A had barely begun when it was faced with a 
major recession, while JTPA's implementation largely coincided 
with a lengthy economic recovery. Congress altered CETA exten 
sively during its early years, most notably by adding a major job 
creation program, while Congress did not amend JTPA until four
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years after its enactment — and then only in a minor fashion. 
Federal JTPA administrators have promulgated few rules, in 
contrast to the numerous regulations affecting CETA operations 
which reflected multiple and often transitory goals. As House 
Education and Labor Committee Chairman Augustus Hawkins, 
one of JTPA's principal architects, noted, "The federal government 
put the money on a stump and ran away." 1
Virtually all observers of JTPA agree that the Labor Department 
abjured leadership of the program. The department itself would not 
quarrel with this assessment, but regards its "hands-off" policy as a 
virtue. Since the Reagan administration believes that the intrusion 
of the federal government is counterproductive, limiting federal 
authority is a deliberately pursued end. This rigid ideological 
posture has demonstrably hampered program efficiency.
Misguided personnel actions compounded the department's pol 
icy of distancing itself from the administration of JTPA. When the 
program began operations in October 1983, the staff of the Labor 
Department's Employment and Training Administration consisted 
of 2000 persons, down from over 3300 in 1981. By mid-1984, the 
agency had only 1700 positions, 300 below the level authorized by 
Congress. The staff directly involved in JTPA operations declined 
from 1000 at the end of 1983 to 700 in 1987. Although Congress has 
periodically established higher limits on staff levels, insufficient 
oversight allowed the Labor Department to evade congressional 
strictures.
Serious congressional concerns about staff cutbacks prompted a 
U.S. General Accounting Office investigation which found that the 
reductions adversely affected departmental morale and efficiency. 
Lost expertise left ETA in a poor position to manage JTPA. 
Repeated reorganizations resulted in over 200 demotions, and when 
staff exercised their seniority rights, unqualified persons frequently 
ended up in technical positions. For example, the head of an ETA 
administrative office noted that about 80 percent of the staff 
members in one office had no prior training or experience for their 
jobs.2
JTPA's lackluster leadership was largely attributable to the 
Reagan administration's first Secretary of Labor, Raymond Dono- 
van, and his Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training,
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Albert Angrisani. Donovan's four-year tenure was marred by 
allegations of improper conduct prior to his assumption of office, 
although he was later cleared of the charges. Donovan retained little 
influence in his last two years after then-White House chief-of-staff 
James Baker publicly advocated his resignation in early 1983. 
Federal oversight of JTPA improved somewhat when Labor Sec 
retary William Brock and Assistant Secretary Roger Semerad 
assumed office in 1985. As an indication of their efforts, the Labor 
Department's 1987 budget request proposed doubling research and 
pilot project funding (Congress approved most of the request). The 
department also initiated steps to enhance policy guidance and the 
quality of JTPA evaluations.
However, federal technical assistance, data collection and re 
search, and monitoring of states and localities remain inadequate. 
The Labor Department continues to treat JTPA as a block grant 
program, neglecting its responsibilities under the act. Compliance 
reviews designed to monitor state and local conformity with JTPA 
provisions and regulations are superficial, focusing only on techni 
cal compliance with the law.3
Financing Job Training
JTPA is a much more modest program than CETA. Adjusting for 
inflation, JTPA's 1987 budget is only a third of CETA's $8.1 billion 
1980 appropriation. Even excluding CETA public service employ 
ment, the JTPA appropriation is only half as large as CETA in real 
terms. Budget cuts in the early Reagan years hit employment and 
training programs harder than any other social program. JTPA 
funding declined by another 15 percent in real terms during it's first 
three years, primarily due to cuts in the summer youth jobs and 
dislocated worker programs and the initial impact of the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1985 (table 2.1). How 
ever, Congress increased JTPA's 1987 budget by nearly $350 
million. Over the entire 1983-1987 period, inflation-adjusted JTPA 
funding has dropped by about 7 percent. The inability of the JTPA 
community to develop an efficient lobbying network is one reason 
behind inadequate funding. For example, only one of 650 witnesses 
before the relevant congressional appropriations committees advo 
cated increases in JTPA funding. The administration proposed to
Table 2.1 



























































































increase JTPA appropriations by nearly $800 million for 1988, 
primarily for assistance to dislocated workers.
Appropriations for employment and training would have been 
reduced even more drastically had Congress fully accepted budget 
proposals introduced during the first term of the Reagan adminis 
tration. As is true for other social programs, the administration has 
not moved as aggressively against job training assistance in its 
second term. However, until 1987 the administration continually 
pressed for large reductions in the Job Corps and the summer youth 
employment program.
Charges that JTPA administrators have failed to spend funds 
appropriated by Congress are valid for the dislocated worker program, 
although the states have begun to address the problem. Laggard 
spending for dislocated workers led Congress to acquiesce to Reagan 
administration budget cuts of more than 50 percent for 1986. However, 
the proportion of other appropriated funds spent during JTPA's first 
three years is not much different from CETA's initial experience, as 
follows:
Program Proportion of appropriated funds spent
CETA JTPA
Training adults and youth 94% 88% 
Summer youth employment 86 95 
Dislocated workers NA 66
A closer examination of the Title IIA program shows that state 
spending difficulties are not confined to the dislocated worker 
program. While overall Title IIA spending accounts for 88 percent 
of the appropriated funds, the states only spent 61 percent of their 
IIA allocations (the localities spent 95 percent). JTPA's record on 
spending summer youth program funds is better than CETA's, 
primarily because localities now have more advance notice on the 
amount of funding they will receive.
Although greater advance notice has promoted program stabil 
ity, the criteria chosen by Congress to distribute JTPA funds to 
states and localities has caused serious operational problems. The 
Labor Department allocates two-thirds of state and local funds 
based on the distribution of unemployment, and the remainder 
according to the distribution of the low income population. Two
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unemployment-based indices count equally in the formula. The first 
is the relative number of unemployed individuals living in areas 
with over 6.5 percent unemployment. Governors and local service 
delivery areas (SDAs) have considerable discretion in defining the 
boundaries of these areas, allowing them to engage in gerryman 
dering to maximize their allocation. The second unemployment 
factor in the formula is the relative number of individuals in the 
state or service delivery area in excess of a 4.5 percent unemploy 
ment rate. To prevent large year-to-year funding reductions due to 
fluctuations in unemployment rates, the states — but initially not 
the local service delivery areas — were guaranteed 90 percent of 
their allotment percentage from the previous year.
The JTPA distribution formula is flawed in several respects, but 
some of the deficiencies cannot be remedied without costly revisions 
to the Census Bureau's data collection system. JTPA eligibility is 
largely restricted to the poor, but the allocation method is heavily 
influenced by unemployment, which is not a prerequisite for 
program assistance. In fact, the overlap between these two groups is 
limited. In 1980, only a fifth of the unemployed were poor, and a 
similarly small proportion of the poor were unemployed. A major 
ity of the working-age poor were classified as outside the labor 
force. Consequently, regions with relatively high unemployment 
rates receive disproportionately greater JTPA funding, even if their 
share of the poverty population is relatively low (table 2.2).
Table 2.2
The Midwest receives more than its fair share of JTPA funds, 






















Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and Abt Associates Inc.
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For the same reason, urban areas (over 200,000 persons) receive 
much less than their fair share of Title II funds, rural locales receive 
proportionate assistance, while the suburbs are overfunded.4
The volatility of unemployment rates introduced much instability 
in year-to-year funding levels. The greatest fluctuations occurred 
during the transition from GET A to JTPA. Despite JTPA's much- 
reduced financing, the formula provided some states with more 
money than they received under CETA. The Midwest region 
improved its position relative to the rest of the country, while 
eastern states suffered the largest proportional reductions. 5 Large 
year-to-year changes continued under JTPA. Although overall Title 
IIA funding remained fairly constant from 1986 to 1987, 10 states 
received increases of over 10 percent due to the formula, and 15 
states lost the maximum of 10 percent permitted by law. Localities 
faced even larger yearly allocation fluctuations, ranging from a 52 percent 
loss to an 85 percent gain across service delivery areas in 1986.6 To 
limit reductions, Congress, in 1986, applied the 90 percent hold- 
harmless rule used for the states to the SDAs, starting with 1987.
The data used to determine the distribution of funds are flawed or 
dated. The Current Population Survey sample is adequate to yield 
reasonable unemployment estimates for the most populous states, 
but too small to reliably indicate unemployment at the SDA level. 
The 1980 census is used to determine the distribution of the 
economically disadvantaged population. While the census provides 
considerably more reliable estimates of the distribution of poverty 
than sample surveys, new data will not become available until 1992.
To promote geographical equity and year-to-year program sta 
bility, Congress could change the allocation formula by giving less 
weight to unemployment due to its volatility and the unreliability of 
the data, and by replacing the 4.5 and 6.5 percent thresholds in the 
current law with the total unemployment count. The distribution of 
poor persons, representing JTPA's clientele, should be accorded 
greater weight in the formula. While census poverty data tend to 
become dated as the decade progresses, they are a far more reliable 
measure of the distribution of poverty than the Current Population 
Survey data.
Governors are required to allocate 78 percent of their state Title 
IIA grant to the SDAs according to the formula; Congress allotted
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the remaining 22 percent to governors to promote both state 
leadership and coordination between JTPA and other social pro 
grams. The state share is divided into four "set-asides," as follows:
• 8 percent for coordination of education programs with JTPA;
• 6 percent for performance awards, technical assistance, and 
incentive awards to encourage assistance to individuals most in 
need;
• 5 percent for state administration; and
• 3 percent for older worker programs (figure 2.1).
Another critical federal responsibility is ensuring that JTPA 
funds are properly spent. The Single Audit Act of 1984 permitted 
local governments to submit a single audit of expenditures of all 
federal program funds. Under the new law, JTPA grants receive 
much less intense scrutiny than did CETA funds. While auditors 
reviewed all CETA finances, accountants operating under the Single 
Audit Act only investigate a sample of transactions involving 
federal funds. Because JTPA funds account for a fraction of total 
federal grants to localities, SDA transactions may not even be 
examined by auditors.
Figure 2.1
Allocation of Title IIA funds to states and service 
delivery areas (1987).
Administration ($92 million) —^-^—Older workers ($55 million) 
Incentive awards and technical 





Source: 1987 JTPA appropriation
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Although auditors have questioned or disallowed few JTPA 
expenditures, states and localities have expressed concern over 
audits and liability for disallowed costs. The Labor Department's 
refusal to issue JTPA audit guidelines has made states and localities 
apprehensive that they will be judged by ex post facto standards. 
The Employment and Training Administration contends that audit 
guidelines would amount to excessive "back door" regulation of 
JTPA, thereby inhibiting local autonomy. Ironically, ETA's deci 
sion has increased paperwork and discouraged local innovation in 
providing services. To protect themselves against possible disal 
lowed costs, states and SDAs compile extensive documentation 
justifying outlays. The Labor Department acknowledges these 
negative results but has not taken corrective action, despite the fact 
that state and local governments have urged the department to 
reverse its policies. 7
The General Accounting Office has also criticized the depart 
ment's failure to establish accounting and internal controls which 
ensure that funds are properly spent. GAO concluded that the 
Labor Department's exclusive reliance on state and local fiscal 
oversight does not meet the requirements of the Financial Integrity 
Act, an interpretation rejected by the department.8
Technical Assistance
The Labor Department abandoned attempts to improve federal 
technical assistance undertaken during CETA's last years, and 
reduced funding from $15 million in 1980 to $5.9 million for 1987. 
At a time when states and localities critically needed and sought 
help in implementing the new program, the Labor Department 
absolved itself of responsibility, impairing JTPA's effectiveness. The 
department regarded two decades of federal experience administer 
ing employment programs as irrelevant to JTPA, and responded to 
requests for even minimal information with a repeated refrain: 
"Read the law, ask the governor." Inadequate technical assistance 
was a serious problem during CETA, but the degree of federal 
neglect in the early years of JTPA was unprecedented. Despite some 
improvements, laissez-faire policies have continued under Secretary 
Brock, who told a group of local business leaders in 1985, "We can't 
tell you [how to improve JTPA]. You have to tell us."9
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Almost all technical assistance is provided through subcontrac 
tors (nearly two-fifths of the funds have been allocated to the 
National Alliance of Business alone) rather than directly by the 
department. This policy is deficient in several important respects. 
Subcontractors can offer advice but not definitive policy guidance. 
SDAs seeking assistance must contact a variety of organizations, 
and are typically charged a fee. Finally, the department's policy 
prevents the establishment of a permanent federal staff of technical 
assistance experts.
Data Collection and Analysis
To determine JTPA's effectiveness and improve performance, it is 
necessary to collect and analyze reliable program information. 
Federal performance on data collection has been severely deficient, 
impeding the implementation of viable performance standards and 
making objective assessments of JTPA difficult.
SDAs are required to complete a semiannual report on Title II 
expenditures and an annual report on participant characteristics 
and outcomes. The administrative data provide an overview of 
JTPA, but do not permit a detailed analysis of services and 
outcomes for various enrollees. For example, the data do not 
disaggregate the length of training received by dropouts and those 
with some college education. To provide more detailed information 
on JTPA operations, the Labor Department's job training longitu 
dinal survey collects more extensive data on over 12,000 partici 
pants from 141 of the 620 SDAs.
In 1986, the Labor Department improved the data collection 
system. During the first three years, the administrative surveys 
required no information on the postprogram experiences of JTPA's 
participants. In direct violation of the law (Section 106), the Office 
of Management and Budget prevented the Labor Department from 
collecting information on the posttraining experiences of enrollees 
until 1986. While augmenting the administrative surveys, the Labor 
Department scaled back the job training longitudinal survey. In 
1986 the department reduced the survey sample from 24,000 to 
12,000 participants, and eliminated a longitudinal survey of a 
10,000 person subsample.
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The overall data collection system has improved, but remains 
seriously deficient. As a General Accounting Office representative 
observed during a 1986 congressional hearing, "We have never been 
able to get adequate information at the local level to answer this key 
question: 'What kind of people get what kind of training and what 
kind of outcome do they have in the labor market?'" 10 One 
fundamental problem is that in the absence of standardized termi 
nology, meaningful comparisons among localities are impossible. 
The definitions of job placement and training duration are espe 
cially deficient, making it difficult to assess the quality or intensity 
of the services participants receive. The Labor Department draws 
no distinction between full or part-tune, or temporary or permanent 
jobs, and thus an SDA may report a trainee placed for one day as 
a successful termination. The length of training is determined by 
counting the number of calendar days between entering and leaving 
the program. Localities commonly retain individuals on the rolls for 
90 days after completion of training in a "holding status" in order 
to maximize the SDA's job placement rate. Until 1986 the SDAs 
were allowed to count the holding period as part of the training. 
Another important drawback is the failure of SDAs to record cost 
information which would permit cost-benefit analysis of various 
forms of assistance.' l
The halving of the job training longitudinal survey's sample size 
will render the survey less useful than previously, according to the 
GAO, precluding analysis for such important groups as high school 
dropouts. 12 Discarding the Census Bureau's longitudinal survey 
means abandoning the only source of information on the long-term 
experiences of JTPA participants. Moreover, despite a significant 
investment, the Labor Department has yet to release any informa 
tion from the survey, partly because the Census Bureau did not 
provide the department with the data until confidentiality concerns 
were resolved in 1987. The department expects to publish the initial 
findings from the survey in 1988.
On the positive side, the addition of a postprogram administra 
tive survey will improve JTPA's data collection somewhat. Three 
months after leaving the program, a sample of participants will be 
questioned about their employment status, weekly earnings, and 
number of weeks worked in the three-month period. However, three
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months is an insufficient period to gauge JTPA's impact, and the 
survey's reliability is diminished because the Labor Department 
does not plan to institute quality control reviews. Nor has the 
department allocated additional funds to SDAs to conduct the 
assessments. After a two-year grace period during which 6 percent 
set-aside funds (for performance awards and technical assistance) 
may be tapped for postprogram follow-ups, the SDAs will be 
required to utilize their limited administrative funds to cover the 
cost of the surveys.
Research and Evaluation
The Labor Department is required to submit to Congress an 
annual assessment of JTPA which incorporates research and eval 
uation findings. Until 1987, the department ignored this statutory 
requirement, and there is no record that Congress ever prompted 
the department to fulfill its responsibility. Adjusted for inflation, the 
employment and training research budget declined by three- 
quarters between 1980 and 1987 (figure 2.2). Responding to Secre 
tary Brock's recommendation, Congress boosted ETA's research 
support by 50 percent to $54 million for 1987. Brock proposed to 
further increase the research budget to $62 million for 1988.
Figure 2.2 
Funding of R&D dropped sharply under JTPA.
Research and evaluation 
Pilot and demonstration
1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
(proposed)
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Less than half of ETA's research and evaluation financing has 
been devoted to analyses of JTPA. Pilot and demonstration funding 
serves a variety of purposes in addition to research, including 
employment assistance for the handicapped and technical assistance 
for organizations which assist minority groups. During JTPA's first 
three years, most pilot and demonstration funds were provided to 
the following entities:
Groups serving the handicapped $12.0 million 
National Alliance of Business 10.2 
AFL-CIO Human Resources
Development Institute 5.6 
70001 Training and Employment Institute 4.5 
Opportunities Industrialization Centers
of America, Inc. 3.6 
National Tooling and Machining 3.5 
SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc. 2.6 
U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services 2.4 
National Urban League 1.5 
National Puerto Rican Forum 1.4
Because of inadequate funding as well as an inefficient allocation 
of the available research money, major gaps exist in our knowledge 
of JTPA operations. ETA only recently issued minimal information 
about the Title IIB summer youth employment program. Two 
major field studies examined Title IIA, but covered similar ground 
and left important aspects of the program unstudied. Both scruti 
nized JTPA's state and local administrative agencies, but neither 
directly examined the role and activities of subcontractors who 
provide the training, or the individuals who receive it. 13 Since the 
administrative agencies infrequently provide services directly to 
enrollees, the failure to examine service providers is a glaring 
deficiency in the Labor Department's assessment of JTPA. Conse 
quently, little is known about the providers of training, their 
quality, the criteria used to accept or reject applicants, and the 
factors responsible for success or failure. Absent such knowledge, it 
is difficult to gauge JTPA's success or improve the program.
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To fill the informational gaps, the Labor Department opted in 
1986 for randomly assigning a sample of individuals eligible for 
JTPA to either a treatment group or a control group receiving no 
services. This approach has conceptual appeal, but the department 
has had considerable difficulty in implementing the project, and the 
SDAs could not be chosen by a random selection process as 
originally intended. The experimental sites should begin enrolling 
participants in 1988, but the results will not be available for several 
years.
The Absence of Leadership
Despite improvements under Secretary Brock, federal adminis 
tration of JTPA continues to be dominated by the idea that states 
and localities know best, and that Washington can contribute most 
by staying out of the way. As an Ohio JTPA administrator 
observed, "The Feds are determined to push decisions to the state 
level, even when a national policy guideline would eliminate 
confusion." 14 The administration has paid insufficient attention to 
local requests for audit guidance and improved technical assistance 
and data collection. As subsequently demonstrated, the vacuum 
created by federal negligence has not been filled by JTPA's remain 
ing partners.
State Governments
JTPA relies heavily upon the states to exercise administrative 
authority over job training. The governor is responsible for desig 
nating local service delivery areas (SDAs), reviewing local training 
plans, enforcing performance standards, allocating the portion of 
Title II funds which are not distributed on a formula basis to SDAs, 
auditing SDA expenditures, providing technical assistance, and 
coordinating JTPA operations with the activities of other social 
programs in the state.
Labor Department or gubernatorial rhetoric notwithstanding, 
there is little evidence that states have rushed in to exercise their 
statutory responsibilities, or that state leadership has produced
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significant results. One easily quantifiable indicator of interest is 
state cash contributions to JTPA operations. On that score state 
involvement has been generally negligible or nonexistent. More 
over, the average state has spent less than two-thirds of its 
federally-provided set-aside funds (for administration, education, 
performance awards, and older workers). The inability of states to 
fully spend federally-provided funds has been observed in other 
programs besides JTPA. On the whole, state policy is limited largely 
to fulfilling the minimum requirements of the law, although states 
such as California and Massachusetts have taken a considerably 
more active stance. An SDA official from Baltimore, Maryland 
echoed the views of many local officials across the country in 
observing, "The state has not established any program priorities." 15 
The partnership which Congress envisioned between the governor, 
the newly-created state advisory council, the legislature, business, 
labor, and other state governmental agencies has emerged only in 
isolated cases. With few exceptions, state legislatures have demon 
strated little interest in JTPA. State agencies, public interest groups 
and unions play a barely noticeable role in fashioning state policy, 
and business involvement at the state level has been exercised 
through the statutorily-required councils which have displayed little 
initiative.
Governors and State Agencies
The law leaves governors considerable freedom in directing 
JTPA. Because JTPA state councils are advisory bodies and are 
barred by law from operating training programs, governors had to 
designate administrative agencies to manage JTPA at the state level. 
State JTPA administration is largely an extension of previous 
CETA arrangements. In four of five states, the former CETA 
balance-of-state agency (which administered programs not under 
local control, normally political jurisdictions with less than 100,000 
persons) continued to administer JTPA. Only eight states selected 
new administrative agencies. A majority of governors designated 
either their labor departments or employment and training agencies 
to administer all JTPA funds, while about a dozen governors 
housed JTPA in economic, community affairs or human resource
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agencies, and even a private corporation. The average state admin 
istrative agency employs 33 professional JTPA staff (full-time 
equivalent positions), ranging from 1 to 157.
The highest initial gubernatorial priority was to disassociate 
JTPA from CETA's negative image. Following JTPA's implemen 
tation, direct gubernatorial involvement became sporadic and ad 
ministrative authority shifted to the governors' appointees. Given 
the divergent interests of other actors on the state stage — the 
legislature, state JTPA councils, other state agencies, business and 
labor, and community-based organizations — some conflict was 
natural, but fairly stable relationships ensued following the initial 
turf battles. 16
State Councils
Congress charged the job training coordinating councils with 
advising the governor on the designation of service delivery areas, 
planning the distribution of funds not allocated by formula to 
SDAs, monitoring the consistency of local training plans with the 
state plan, reviewing state employment service and vocational 
education plans, and preparing an annual report. The councils are 
also responsible for preparing the required biennial governor's state 
job training plan, which establishes criteria for coordinating JTPA 
programs with other state and local education and training efforts, 
including vocational education, economic development, rehabilita 
tion, and employment service activities. The federal Labor Depart 
ment can reject the state plan only if it conflicts with the law.
JTPA requires that the following groups be represented on the 
council:
• one-third from the business community;
• one-fifth from the state legislature and state agencies;
• one-fifth from local governments, including service delivery 
areas; and
• one-fifth from organized labor, community-based organiza 
tions, local educational agencies, and the general public.
Since the quotas do not total 100 percent, governors possess some 
leeway to favor the representation of particular groups. Guberna-
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torial appointments to the councils, which average 32 members, 










Despite their authorized wide-ranging responsibilities, the coun 
cils generally exercise little influence over state JTPA policy. As a 
rule, councils reinforce state JTPA agency policy rather than acting 
as an independent force. Analysts examining 20 state councils found 
that only four councils played a primary role in determining state 
JTPA policy. 17 One of four SDA administrators and PIC chairper 
sons believes that the councils have no impact on the program. 18
Few states provide adequate support for their councils. In 1985 
the average council budget was about $275,000, ranging from 
$50,000 to over $1 million. Only eight councils select their own staff 
director; the other directors are appointed by the governor or the 
state administrative agency. The average council has only 3.5 
full-time employees, ranging from zero (in eight states) to 12 
positions. Only 15 councils have permanent staffs; the others 
borrow staff from the state JTPA administrative agency.
Legislatures
State legislators have also played a minor role in JTPA, and the 
few instances where legislators showed an interest in the program 
were as likely as not to result in unproductive turf battles. Total 
state appropriations for employment and training programs have 
accounted for a minute fraction of the federal contribution. The 
Congressional Budget Office noted that the states spent only $122 
million for job training in 1984, less than 5 percent of the federal 
funds. 19 Incomplete evidence indicates that state contributions have 
not significantly increased since 1984.
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The law requires SDAs to submit local job training plans to state 
legislatures, but many SDAs fail to do so. Just as Congress failed 
for years to note that the Labor Department did not submit 
required annual reports, the state solons have apparently not missed 
the local plans, according to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.
One analyst concluded that only one of five state legislatures 
demonstrates more than minimal interest in JTPA. The most 
prominent example is California, which set aside $6 million of its 
federal social services block grant to match SDA child care 
assistance, and enacted a new state welfare initiative emphasizing 
legislative oversight of JTPA services. 20 In addition, California's 
Employment and Training Panel, with an annual $50 million 
budget, administers a retraining program for individuals eligible for 
unemployment insurance. Delaware enacted a similar program on a 
smaller scale. State commitment even in these cases, however, 
involves little or no direct appropriation. Both the California and 
Delaware training programs were financed by reallocating state 
unemployment insurance funds, and represent no additional finan 
cial commitment.
The State-Local Partnership
Conflicts between the federal government and local training 
administrators were common during CETA. In contrast, analysts 
have observed little discord between state and SDA officials. 
However, this relative amity has not markedly improved program 
management relative to CETA. The states are generally more 
interested in protecting themselves from audit disallowances than in 
improving the quality of training.
Following JTPA's enactment in October 1982, governors moved 
slowly to implement the new law. Understandably not convinced 
that the Labor Department would relinquish its regulatory role, 
governors delayed involvement in JTPA administration until the 
Labor Department issued regulations confirming the federal gov 
ernment's abdication of authority.
State-local JTPA relations have been influenced by the statutorily- 
defined role of each partner, the federal government's neglect of
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its responsibilities, and the degree of state activism and SDA 
sophistication. The law clearly reserves most training decisions to 
the SDAs, but Congress empowered the states to influence local 
program operations by other means. The states may establish 
educational requirements for local programs, add to or modify 
federal performance standards, and define key terms such as what 
constitutes a job placement. In addition, JTPA discretionary set- 
aside funds can be used as a carrot to encourage desirable SDA 
behavior. The federal noninterventionist posture further expanded 
state authority by default.
Most states did not choose to exercise their full authority. State 
review of local training plans was characterized as "a paper policy 
process devoid of any real policy oversight" by a Lexington, 
Kentucky SDA administrator, a view endorsed by many local 
officials. Although the Labor Department delegated the interpreta 
tion of the law to the states, these often behaved as if they had been 
passed a hot potato. A Des Moines, Iowa SDA official noted 
critically, "The state has been reluctant to provide necessary 
interpretation of the act and in many cases has allowed localities to 
struggle through court proceedings and binding arbitration."21
Prior job training experience was another important factor in the 
evolution of state-local relations. The geographic boundaries of half 
the SDAs are virtually identical to the CETA prime sponsors, and 
because these SDAs had considerably more familiarity with job 
training programs than the states, they were often able to limit state 
intervention. SDA officials further expanded their influence through 
statewide associations. By mid-1985 virtually all states with more 
than two SDAs had SDA directors' organizations, and several had 
associations of PIC officials.
Both the degree of state activism, and the problems between 
states and SDAs, can be gleaned by examining the SDA designation 
process and state technical assistance policies. Congress authorized 
governors to set the geographical boundaries of local program 
areas. Since it was widely believed that 470 CETA prime sponsors 
was an excessive number, the designers of JTPA anticipated that 
governors would consolidate local operations. Instead, the number 
of SDAs ballooned to 620. Several factors caused the proliferation 
of SDAs. Gubernatorial authority in creating SDAs is somewhat
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limited. Jurisdictions with over 200,000 people and consortia of 
local governments serving a substantial portion of a labor market 
area with more than 200,000 persons have the right to form an 
SDA. Another factor was that local governments were often able to 
pressure governors into designating them as separate SDAs and 
avoid consolidation with other areas. Since governors had little to 
gain politically from opposing local interests, they often acquiesced 
to lobbying pressures. In fact, most of the increase in SDAs was 
attributable to the subdivision of former CETA balance-of-state
99areas.
The proliferation of SDAs resulted in programs of less than 
optimal size and the wasteful duplication of administrative re 
sources. JTPA's significantly lower budget exacerbates this prob 
lem. Over a quarter of the SDAs receive less than $1 million, 
considered minimal to administer a job training program. Based on 
average outlays per enrollee and the duration of training provided 
by SDAs, a $1 million annual allocation permits services to only 
about 550 participants, with only slightly more than 100 individuals 
enrolled at any given time. Since about a third of these participants 
enroll in classroom training, providing cost-effective training for 
more than one or two occupations is difficult at best.
State technical assistance is most commonly directed toward 
management information, performance standards, youth employ 
ment programs, and the analysis of labor market information to 
identify growth occupations. SDAs commonly complain about 
inadequate state technical assistance. Despite inadequate technical 
assistance at the federal level, a Toledo, Ohio PIC representative 
observed, "The state does not have the same quality of staff that the 
federal government has available to it. Often the SDA ends up 
providing on-the-job training to the state."23 State administrative 
agencies, which provide most technical assistance, on average assign 
only three staff members to this task. In fact, 11 administrative 
staffs surveyed did not have a single technical assistance specialist.24 
Most assistance is funded by the JTPA set-aside which provides 6 
percent of Title IIA funds (a little over $100 million annually) to 
governors for technical assistance and performance awards. How 
ever, in JTPA's first three years, the states spent only a third of the
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available 6 percent funds, and only a little over a third of the 
expenditures were devoted to technical assistance.25
Little Ventured, Little Gained
Driven by ideology rather than the knowledge gained from 
research or experience, policymakers during the early 1980s acted as 
if all wisdom resided in state houses and the federal government 
could do little right. But since JTPA's enactment, most states have 
passively waited for federal instruction rather than forging ahead on 
their own.
Before JTPA, job training expertise was concentrated at the 
federal and local levels. The states, relatively inexperienced, would 
have had to invest substantial resources to design and improve 
training programs for the poor. Instead, most states believe that 
local administrators know best, and are content to leave well 
enough alone. Moreover, as the designation of SDAs demonstrated, 
the states have far less leverage over localities than the drafters of 
JTPA assumed. The states seem far more interested in boosting 
local programs than in critically examining them. Ironically, a 
program which was designed to demonstrate the potential of state 
leadership instead suggests that a strong federal presence is neces 
sary to administer effective training programs for the unskilled and 
deficiently educated. While a genuine federal-state partnership 
would be more desirable, the JTPA experience casts doubt on 
whether this arrangement can be achieved.
The Local Partnership
Congress expressly delegated training authority to JTPA local 
service delivery agencies. To promote leadership, cooperation and 
accountability, Congress instituted a complex administrative frame 
work. Local elected officials, preeminent under CETA, share au 
thority with newly empowered private industry councils, which are 
dominated by business representatives. They jointly select a pro 
gram administrator to supervise day-to-day operations and service 
providers to train enrollees.
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Political factors took precedence in the administrative redesign of 
local training programs. As a Rockford, Illinois SDA official 
summed up the changes, "I do not feel that the PIC/elected official 
concept is administratively preferable to the CETA system, but 
under the circumstances a drastic change was necessary because 
CETA suffered from a — mostly unwarranted — negative image. 
The new partnership has allowed the image of employment and 
training to become more positive."26 There is little indication that a 
different administrative framework has significantly improved JT- 
PA's operations, but the public relations impact has clearly been 
salutary.
By 1987 the JTPA system was made up of 620 local SDAs, each 
with an average of about 8-10 staff members. Six governors of states 
with populations below a million opted for statewide SDAs. At the 
other extreme, 9 states have over 20 SDAs, topped by California 








One of every four SDAs is an intact political entity — a state, city, 
or, most commonly, a county; the rest are multiple local political 
jurisdictions.27
The average JTPA Title II grant in 1987 amounted to $3.5 
million, ranging for Title IIA operations alone from $67,000 for an 
Arizona SDA to $56 million for New York City. Two-thirds of the 
SDAs received less than $2 million for Title IIA operations (figure 
2.3). SDAs also receive additional money, mostly from the Title IIA 
state set-asides and the Title III dislocated worker program, totaling 
about a tenth of the average SDA's budget according to a 1985 
survey.28
Private Industry Councils
Employer representatives, who by law must constitute a majority 
of private industry council members, are appointed by the chief
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elected officials of the SDA from a list of nominees presented by 
local business organizations, primarily chambers of commerce.
Figure 2.3 
The Title IIA budget of some 400 SDAs was below $2 million (1986).
40%
Under $1 $1-2 $2-3 $4-5 Over $5
Title IIA budget (millions) 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Other PIC members represent local education agencies, the public 
employment service, labor unions, rehabilitation agencies, community- 
based organizations, and economic development agencies. The 
chairperson must be chosen from the business members. The size of 
the PIC was initially determined by elected officials, but subse 
quently PIC members determined the council's size. However, the 
authority to fill vacancies remains with elected officials. The average 







Vocational rehabilitation agencies 1
Economic development agencies 1
Other 1
Initially, few PIC members possessed experience with federal 
employment and training programs: only a quarter had served on a
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CETA council. Although direct information is available only for 
PIC chairpersons, probably many PIC members had garnered 
considerable experience with JTPA by 1987. Over 90 percent of the 
chairpersons have served more than two years on a council. Overall 
PIC turnover is low, averaging about five members per year. SDA 
administrative personnel supply the staff for 70 percent of PICs.29
PICs focus their attention on the selection and review of service 
providers. Since business representatives constitute a majority of 
PIC members, it is not surprising that PICs tend to favor on-the-job 
training and to frown upon services which increase costs, such as 
child care assistance or stipends. Curriculum reviews and on-site 
inspections usually play no part in PIC judgments. 30 Emphasis on 
performance standards reflects both the Labor Department's prior 
ities and a business predilection for bottom-line judgments.
Congress expected increased employer participation in JTPA to 
reap a rich harvest of benefits, and the Labor Department as well as 
many SDAs regard business involvement as the key to the pro 
gram's claimed success. The Reagan administration views business 
as inherently more efficient than government, but support for 
employer participation in JTPA has extended beyond those who 
promote it as a matter of faith. Since most jobs are generated in the 
private sector, it seems only reasonable that businesses have a voice 
in employment and training efforts. Business leadership is not 
considered as susceptible to constituent pressures as elected officials, 
and hence freer to make program decisions on professional 
grounds. Finally, JTPA's designers hoped that greater business 
involvement would expand training opportunities and boost job 
placements.
The expansion of the employer role in job training programs was 
implemented largely without controversy. As Congress intended, 
business members dominate most PICs, and they share the direction of 
SDAs with elected officials. While business participation is not as critical 
to JTPA's workings as the Reagan administration contends, increased 
employer involvement remains a notable political achievement.
One area where business has clearly made a difference is in 
JTPA's image. To some extent business had no choice but to 
promote JTPA. The Reagan administration and business organiza 
tions sold JTPA as a training program run by employers dedicated
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to the "bottom line," rather than by "do gooders." This character 
ization of the program is vastly exaggerated, but it effectively 
co-opted the most vocal former critics of employment and training 
programs. PIC public relations activities also undoubtedly contrib 
ute to JTPA's positive image.
About half of PIC leaders either train or hire JTPA participants; 
the others who do not cite an absence of openings or a need for 
more skilled workers than the program can provide. Some observ 
ers argue that conflict of interest laws deter PIC representatives 
from training or hiring JTPA participants in their own firms, but 
less than one of seven PIC chairpersons offered this explanation for 
not training JTPA enrollees.
To date, employers have maintained a strong interest in JTPA. 
Of the average 14 PIC business members, about four leave per year. 
The primary reasons offered by a sample of PIC chairpersons were 
personal factors and the amount of time required. Most PICs have 
no problems recruiting new business members, and the time com 
mitment is the major difficulty for PICs which have such problems. 
Surveys of PIC chairpersons and SDA administrators also show 
that almost all PIC employer representatives are satisfied with their 
role and influence in JTPA.31
One analysis concluded that no significant operational differences 
distinguish PIC versus government-dominated SDAs. The move 
ment toward increased utilization of on-the-job training under 
JTPA was not more pronounced in PIC-dominated SDAs, and 
where the public sector was preeminent there was no greater 
tendency to serve a more severely disadvantaged clientele. The 
analysts also found no consistent differences in performance 
outcomes.32 Surveys of SDA officials also indicate that the views of 
PIC employer representatives and their fellow council members are 
not markedly different. Only slightly more than half of PIC 
chairpersons and SDA administrators thought the attitudes of the 
two groups diverged, and no more than a fifth pointed to any single 
issue differentiating business and nonbusiness PIC members. Sur 
prisingly, only a fifth of the SDA administrators thought employer 
members were more responsive to business needs than other PIC 
representatives. JTPA's meager resources and the Labor Depart-
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ment's emphasis on performance standards may more significantly 
influence program operations than the enhanced business role.
Apart from PIC involvement, local businesses also contribute 
modest financial and other support to SDA programs. Two-thirds 
of the SDAs receive some form of material assistance from local 
businesses, most commonly training or office equipment. Assistance 
in developing training curricula, office or classroom space, and 
training personnel are donated to about 30 percent of the SDAs. 
One in five SDAs is aided by nontraining personnel (e.g., computer 
programmers or accountants) from local firms. One in six SDAs 
receives business cash contributions, averaging $17,000 (ranging 
from $1000 to $1 million), but this represents less than 0.1 percent 
of federal expenditures. 33
The Partnership in Action
To ensure that employers would be equal partners in formulating 
SDA policy, Congress divided authority between PICs and local 
officials. The local partnership jointly selects an administrative 
agency to run the program. Government bodies, primarily local 
governments, account for nearly two-thirds of program administra 
tors. Most of the remaining SDAs are administered by PICs or 
private nonprofit groups (figure 2.4). Administrative changes since
Figure 2.4 
Local governments administered half of SDAs (1985).
Economic development (1.5%)







Source: National Alliance of Business
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1983 show a decreasing use of local governments and an increased 
utilization of nonprofit organizations. From 1983 to 1985 the 
proportion of local governments selected as administrative agencies 
declined from 57.1 to 50.2 percent, while the proportion of non 
profit administrative agencies nearly tripled, rising from 4.5 to 12.8 
percent.34
The local biennial training plan requires the approval of PICs and 
elected officials, and subsequent substantial deviations from the 
plan also require joint approval. The plan must include a detailed 
presentation of the type, duration and cost of the training; the 
performance goals; the means of selecting service providers; finan 
cial accountability safeguards; and the means of coordinating JTPA 
with other employment-related programs. The governor may reject 
or amend the plan for the following reasons:
• the plan does not comply with JTPA's provisions or 
regulations;
• inadequate safeguards exist to protect funds;
• the administrative agency does not have the capacity to 
operate the program;
• the local plan does not comply with the coordination criteria 
enumerated in the governor's plan; or
• measures to correct audit or performance standards prob 
lems are inadequate.
Disputes between the governor and the SDA are resolved by the 
federal Secretary of Labor. Whether the plans represent a serious 
effort to achieve local goals, or are prepared merely to conform with 
the law, is a matter of speculation. State reviews of local plans are 
generally pro forma; rejection of local plans is apparently rare, since 
no cases have been reported.35
Observers do not agree on the general balance of authority which 
evolved during the program's first four years. Although the con 
sensus is that the PICs play an important policymaking role, the 
extent of PIC dominance varies. JTPA's provisions made it inevi 
table that the role of elected officials and job training staff would 
significantly diminish under JTPA compared with CETA. In addi 
tion, many local officials lost interest in employment and training
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programs after funding declined and public service jobs were 
eliminated. The money and extra staff associated with CETA had 
enabled elected officials to expand public services and thus enhance 
their political prestige. Another factor which facilitates PIC author 
ity is a belief among many elected officials that the councils will 
shield them from blame in the event of fraud or abuse.
Few instances of confrontation have surfaced between PICs and 
elected officials. In many cases where the PICs determine local 
policy, elected officials either voluntarily acquiesce to PIC domi 
nance or actively promote PIC authority. Only in isolated cases has 
business hostility toward former CETA administrative holdovers 
been a problem. Conflict between elected officials of multijurisdic- 
tional SDAs occurs about as often as PIC/elected officials 
disputes.36 Despite their diminished authority, three of five city 
officials surveyed by the National League of Cities said they were 
satisfied with their role in JTPA (the remainder felt they had too 
little voice in the program).37
Elected officials are better able to dominate SDAs in highly rural 
and major urban areas. In the former, geographically dispersed 
council membership makes active PIC participation difficult to 
achieve. In major urban areas, mayors generally tend to wield much 
greater local authority than elected officials in less populous juris 
dictions, and administrative sponsorship of long-standing programs 
is difficult to overturn. Interestingly, the elected officials of single- 
jurisdiction SDAs are not necessarily better able than leaders of 
multiple jurisdictions to set JTPA policy. In fact, in some cases 
competition for JTPA funds in multijurisdictional SDAs produces 
agreements between public officials that effectively preclude PIC 
control. This occurred even in one SDA composed of 86 political 
jurisdictions. 38
Congress obviously intended the JTPA administrative structure 
to improve employment and training performance. Although it is 
difficult to isolate the impact of a different administrative system 
from other program changes, several tentative conclusions emerge 
from JTPA's first four years. Whether or not the system is superior 
to CETA's prime sponsor network, the JTPA structure clearly 
represents a viable administrative framework. PIC relations with
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elected officials are generally harmonious. However, budget reduc 
tions, limitations on stipends for trainees, and the introduction of 
performance standards (especially job placement and cost-per- 
placement criteria) probably exercise greater influence on JTPA 
operations than the new local administrative arrangement. Business 
participation has significantly enhanced JTPA's image, but there is 
no definitive evidence that employer involvement has improved 
program operations.
Coordination
Convinced that divided authority and rivalry among government 
agencies impeded cost-effective assistance to the poor, JTPA's 
authors required governors to integrate JTPA with local education 
and training, public assistance, employment service, rehabilitation, 
and economic development agencies. Such efforts were not new, but 
Congress made coordination an integral part of JTPA and allocated 
funds to achieve this goal.
Better-integrated programs provide obvious benefits. The sense 
of futility and powerlessness which often accompanies poverty is 
reinforced when applicants are shuffled amongst various agencies. 
Increased coordination offers job training administrators operating 
with reduced federal funding a potentially important means to tap 
into other federally- and state-funded programs to enhance training 
and employment opportunities for JTPA clients.
Effective coordination requires diverse strategies. Referring 
AFDC applicants to JTPA may facilitate coordination, but more 
complicated financial agreements are required when local SDAs 
contract with public employment service offices and vocational 
education agencies to provide placement assistance and classroom 
training. However, in these examples SDAs would still be using 
established institutions in a traditional manner. It is more difficult 
to persuade established institutions to alter their operations to serve 
JTPA's aims. For example, state economic development programs 
often entice businesses to relocate by offering generous tax and 
other incentives. Asking firms to hire poor, unemployed job seekers 
is hardly an inducement, making coordination between JTPA and 
conventional economic development programs difficult.
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Prior to JTPA, ad hoc efforts to integrate employment and 
training services with other social programs had produced few 
notable results. JTPA attempted to improve this record by making 
state councils responsible for developing coordination initiatives 
and subsequently monitoring progress. Governors may reject SDA 
plans which do not conform with state coordination goals, and also 
control discretionary coordination funds. A portion of the funds 
from three of the state set-asides can be used to bolster coordination 
efforts.
State set-asides 1987 allocation
(millions)
Education (8 percent) $147 
Incentive awards and
technical assistance (6 percent) 110 
Older worker training programs (3 percent) 55
JTPA also amended the Wagner-Peyser and Social Security Acts to 
promote coordination of job training with the employment service 
and the Work Incentive program for AFDC recipients. In addition, 
governors may allocate 10 percent of employment service funds — 
nearly $80 million in 1987 — to operate joint employment service/ 
JTPA projects.
Employment Service
Established in 1933, the federal-state employment service system 
attempts to match employers with job seekers — many of them 
disadvantaged — through a nationwide network of over 2000 
public employment offices with a $778 million budget for 1987. The 
expansion of public service employment during the Carter admin 
istration encouraged coordination between the employment service 
and employment and training programs. As long as local CETA 
administrators were not held accountable for ineligible public 
workers recruited through public employment offices, and the latter 
received credit for placing CETA enrollees, both agencies profited 
by cooperating. However, publicized charges that ineligible persons 
were hired to fill public service employment slots caused Congress 
to tighten monitoring. Local programs were held strictly account-
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able for ineligible enrollees, and consequently reduced subcontract 
ing to employment offices and handled eligibility determinations 
internally. Two-thirds of CETA programs in 1980 also utilized 
public employment offices to help CETA trainees find jobs, but 
three-fifths of local CETA administrators thought public employ 
ment offices performed this task poorly, and some stopped referring 
enrollees to the employment service. 39
Because of the close connection between the employment service 
and JTPA's job placement mission, Congress required local public 
employment offices to develop their program plans in conjunction 
with PICs and elected officials. The three local partners as well as 
the state council must approve the plans.
The Reagan administration's decision — going well beyond the 
intent of the law — to virtually abandon the employment service to 
the states further facilitated gubernatorial authority to coordinate 
JTPA and the employment service. While Congress rejected admin 
istration proposals to turn over the employment service to the 
states, the Secretary of Labor cut federal staff assigned to employ 
ment service activities to a score of employees, rendering effective 
national oversight impossible. Because local employment offices 
have no independent authority, federal nonintervention effectively 
gave governors even more control over the employment service than 
they have over JTPA.
Despite this expanded authority, governors have generally done 
little to reshape the public employment service, and have displayed 
little interest in doing so. Several states have placed the service in the 
same agency as JTPA, aligned the local geographical boundaries of 
the two programs, or used employment service 10 percent set-aside 
funds for coordinated projects.40 However, a study of 16 states 
concluded that governors have little impact on employment service 
policy. In fact, analysts considered the state employment service 
plans less structured than pre-JTPA plans. State JTPA plans 
typically contain only general references to the employment service. 
Even merging JTPA and the employment service into the same state 
agency does not ensure coordination, because in most cases the 
separate programs continue business as usual. For example, Flor 
ida, which merged the two organizations at the local level, only
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partially improved coordination because the governor exercised 
little control over local JTPA operations.41
At the local level, one study found that only 6 of 31 SDAs 
examined used the employment service to provide most eligibility 
determinations. The service is rarely used as the main source for job 
placements, although this is the agency's primary function. The 
study also concluded that the PICs had no real impact on local 
employment office policy in any of the 31 SDAs studied, and 
remained largely uninterested in improving coordination with pub 
lic employment offices. In fact, PIC involvement in employment 
service planning has progressively declined.42 Two other surveys 
found that almost all SDAs have written agreements with local 
employment offices involving applicant intake and job referrals, but 
these probably represent a continuation of activities initiated during 
GET A, which required agreements between the two agencies.43
Several factors partially explain the lack of interest by most states 
and localities in coordinating the two programs. State and local 
employment service offices represent a stable bureaucracy not 
readily amenable to change, and since the staff are state employees 
their loyalty lies with state rather than local interests. Second, many 
administrators believe that the programs serve different ends — 
training versus direct job placement. Third, the states cannot 
compel SDAs to utilize the employment service. The 6 percent 
set-aside can encourage this practice, but these funds are spread thin 
in attempting to achieve multiple objectives. Finally, JTPA's em 
phasis on performance standards and performance-based contract 
ing impedes local coordination. Under performance-based con 
tracts, the SDAs withhold full payment until the trainee is placed in 
a job, and contractors tend to place clients themselves — or claim 
to have placed them — rather than risk financial losses by relying on 
public employment offices in which they have little confidence.
Education
A clear dividing line cannot be drawn between education and job 
training programs; in fact, the latter are often called "second 
chance" education programs. If U.S. education and economic 
systems functioned effectively, there would be little need for JTPA,
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but the persistence of inadequate literacy and vocational skills 
among millions of adults demonstrates the need for cooperation 
between the two systems. However, the task is extraordinarily 
difficult. Americans are educated by a multiplicity of diverse 
institutions administered by all three levels of government as well as 
the private sector. Curriculum decisions are made by state agencies 
as well as 15,000 local school districts. The federal government has 
expanded its role in education since World War II, but has limited 
leverage because federal money accounts for less than 9 percent of 
total spending and Americans have traditionally resisted federal 
involvement in education.
Prior to JTPA, the most important effort to promote coordina 
tion between education and employment and training programs 
was undertaken through one of the 1977 Youth Employment and 
Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) programs. The youth em 
ployment and training program, financed at nearly $600 million 
annually between 1978 and 1981, required that 22 percent of the 
funding be spent on joint projects with schools. Evaluations of the 
effort concluded that cooperation between education and training 
institutions improved, but this yielded only limited changes in 
school services to dropouts or approaches toward disadvantaged 
students. Without direct authority to influence school program 
ming, YEDPA grants offered too little financial clout to effect 
changes.44
The 1917 Vocational Education Act marked the first federal 
involvement in job training, and today represents an important 
federal educational investment directly related to JTPA. The pro 
gram serves primarily noncollege bound students. The fiscal 1987 
budget provides $875 million for vocational education, and states 
and localities spend an additional $7 billion. In 1987 the Reagan 
administration proposed to eliminate federal support for the 
program. Approximately 17 million students are enrolled in 
vocational education programs, although less than 6 million receive 
occupationally-specific training. Altogether, an estimated 1.3 mil 
lion disadvantaged youth received at least some assistance from the 
program.
When federal training programs were inaugurated in the early 
1960s, most classroom training was offered in public vocational
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education facilities. After GET A expanded the range of service 
providers, the federal government attempted to maintain coopera 
tion between job training and vocational education activities, but 
with limited success.45 Tight school budgets impeded coordination 
efforts, and the back to basics movement deemphasized vocational 
training.
The 1966 Adult Education Act established the major federal basic 
education program for disadvantaged adults. It finances literacy 
training, secondary education, and English as a second language 
courses with $106 million in fiscal 1987 federal funds and another 
$175 million from states and localities. Approximately 2.5 million 
people enroll annually in federally-funded adult education pro 
grams, which spend an average of only $112 per participant.
Most of the statutory requirements utilized by JTPA and the 1984 
Carl Perkins Vocational Education Act to improve the coordina 
tion of job training with education programs were carried over from 
previous legislation. The JTPA 8 percent set-aside is to be spent 
through cooperative agreements among state education agencies, 
SDAs, and local education agencies. At least 80 percent of the grant 
must be allocated for educational services, and these funds must be 
matched by the state or locality. Three-quarters of the service funds 
must be spent on the disadvantaged, with the remainder to be used 
for other individuals facing barriers to employment. The balance of 
the education grant is intended to facilitate coordination with job 
training programs. Another JTPA provision requires SDAs to give 
education agencies the opportunity to provide training services 
unless it is demonstrated that other service providers would be more 
effective.
To date, however, there is little evidence that these statutory 
requirements have had a measurable impact on program opera 
tions. State council administrators surveyed saw few signs of 
coordination at either the state or the local level. Despite the law's 
requirement that SDAs be party to the disposition of 8 percent 
funds, half the states bypass the SDAs.46 A National Governors' 
Association survey of 37 states found that only 3 states had 
appropriated funds for the 8 percent matching requirement (the 
others presumably made in-kind contributions), and the states have 
spent only a little over three-fourths of the federal set-aside funds.
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Programs financed through the 8 percent education set-aside pro 
vide classroom training to roughly 100,000 individuals annually, 
but only a quarter of participants receive remedial education, 
English as a second language assistance, or high school equivalency 
training. The 1986 JTPA amendments require states to serve at least 
some dropouts with 8 percent funds, but such a minimal standard 
may not have much impact. Only 32 percent of the terminees found 
jobs, at hourly wages averaging $5.47
Welfare
Congress specified reductions in "welfare dependency" as one of 
JTPA's principal objectives, continuing a two-decade-old policy of 
using employment and training programs to promote the self- 
sufficiency of welfare recipients. JTPA's efforts have been aug 
mented by the Work Incentive (WIN) program, which serves 
employable Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
recipients. In fiscal 1987 the appropriation for WIN amounted to 
$133 million, less than a third of the level appropriated six years 
earlier in inflation-adjusted dollars.
The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act permitted states 
flexibility in designing and administering work-welfare programs 
and to require AFDC recipients to work in return for assistance. 
Stepping up the pressure to induce AFDC recipients to seek work, 
the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act allowed the 
states to require AFDC recipients to participate in a job search 
program to establish or maintain their eligibility for assistance. 
While all states operate work or training programs for AFDC 
recipients, the number actually assisted is unknown. Beginning in 
1987, the states must also implement employment and training 
programs for food stamp recipients. In addition to federally 
mandated or encouraged programs, some states also provide em 
ployment assistance to poor individuals receiving state or local 
general assistance.
Historically, coordination between WIN and other employment 
efforts has been minimal.48 Since JTPA/welfare coordination is 
apparently not a high state priority — Massachusetts and a few
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other states are exceptions — it is unlikely that cooperation has 
increased in recent years.49 At the local level, few welfare adminis 
trators are represented on PICs. Two of every five JTPA partici 
pants receive some form of public assistance, nearly identical to the 
experience under CETA. A survey of 45 SDAs found that two- 
thirds of the welfare recipients served had not been referred by a 
welfare agency or any other program. Moreover, only a fourth of 
the WIN referrals who enrolled in JTPA obtained support services 
from the WIN program.50 Given general SDA practices, it is 
unlikely that these enrollees received support assistance from JTPA 
funds.
Other factors suggest that coordination between JTPA and 
welfare programs may have decreased since JTPA's enactment. 
Where a CETA prime sponsor had to deal with one major federal 
program (WIN), Congress subsequently created five federal work- 
welfare programs, undoubtedly complicating both state and local 
coordination efforts. At the same time, federal funding has dwin 
dled, and the uncertainty of WIN's future hardly provides an 
impetus for JTPA to invest much effort in cooperating with the 
program. Finally, although the law requires the Labor Department 
to ensure that WIN registrants are referred to JTPA, the admin 
istration's laissez faire policy toward both programs renders this 
provision toothless.
A lesser obstacle to coordination is JTPA's requirement that any 
payments to AFDC recipients be counted as income. Senator Dan 
Quayle reported that, by requiring agencies to reduce AFDC 
benefits by the amount of money JTPA enrollees receive to cover 
travel or other training-related expenses, welfare recipients are 
discouraged from pursuing training. 51
Older Workers
On the average, the incidence of unemployment among older 
individuals is relatively low, but those who lose their jobs tend to 
remain unemployed longer than younger workers, or drop out of 
the labor force entirely. Of a state's Title IIA allocation, 3 percent 
is set aside (a little over $50 million nationally) for services to low 
income individuals over 55. States pass most 3 percent funds to 
SDAs.
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One of the very few social programs that Congress has singled out 
for increased funding in the 1980s, the Senior Community Service 
Employment Program (Title V of the Older Americans Act) is the 
major employment program for the elderly. The program's budget 
has risen from $275 million in fiscal 1981 to $326 million in fiscal 
1987, almost matching the inflation rate. The Senior Community 
Service Employment Program annually provides part-time public 
jobs for approximately 100,000 older individuals in households with 
incomes below 125 percent of the poverty line. This income criterion 
is more generous than the JTPA standard.
During JTPA's first three years, the states spent only two-thirds 
of the 3 percent set-aside. The mandatory allocation of funds for the 
elderly — which did not exist under CETA — may have improved 
coordination with the Senior Community Service Employment 
Program. However, Congress left little room for effective coopera 
tion between the two programs. Nearly 80 percent of the commu 
nity service program's funds are allocated by the federal govern 
ment directly to eight national contractors, including the American 
Association of Retired Persons, the National Council on Aging and 
the Urban League. Governors have almost no control over this 
money. Thus whatever coordination occurs is probably due to 
arrangements made by individual SDAs, but cooperation is un 
doubtedly limited since the two programs offer different services to 
their clients.
Three percent set-aside programs enroll about 25,000 individuals 
annually. The reported characteristics of these enrollees do not 
differ appreciably from older enrollees in other Title IIA programs. 
Most 3 percent trainees enroll in brief job search programs, as 
follows:
Service Enrollees receiving service




Since a small proportion of participants receive multiple forms of 
assistance, the total is slightly higher than 100 percent. Reports
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from 15 states indicate that 64 percent of terminees found jobs at an 
average hourly wage of $4.50. 2
Economic Development
Coordination between JTPA and economic development pro 
grams has attracted increasing attention in the employment and 
training community, although the law itself barely addresses the 
subject. However, the lip service to economic development has not 
been matched by action. The few states which attempt to coordinate 
JTPA with economic development programs tend to tap JTPA 8 
percent education set-aside funds. One state targeted all of its 8 
percent JTPA set-aside and 10 percent employment service set-aside 
for economic development projects, and in addition required the 
SDAs to reserve 10 percent of Title IIA funds for company-specific 
training. Other means of coordinating the two programs include 
either reserving a portion of jobs created through economic devel 
opment projects for JTPA participants, or requiring contractors to 
use JTPA as a first source in soliciting job applications. 53
A major obstacle to coordinating JTPA and economic develop 
ment efforts is the divergent goals of the two programs. Many state 
economic development policies are characterized by beggar-thy- 
neighbor efforts to persuade firms to relocate, and requiring 
employers to hire the poor fits awkwardly into an incentive 
package. Consequently, a National Governors' Association survey 
found that only two states had such hiring requirements, and most 
states volunteered that they would not consider including JTPA 
training as a carrot for luring employers. The wide range of 
economic development programs — encompassing grants, loans, 
loan guarantees, and tax incentives administered by various state 
agencies — further impedes coordination. 54 Even if potential 
employers were interested in JTPA trainees, it would be difficult to 
dovetail the timing of the training with the hiring needs of the 
employers.
Given the present nature of economic development programs, 
initiatives to coordinate these programs with JTPA are probably 
misdirected. Including JTPA as part of an incentive package to woo 
firms from one state to another is no more than a corporate shell 
game which wastes scarce dollars available for training.
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Great Expectations, Minimal Returns
There is little reason to believe that coordination between job 
training and other social programs has improved much under 
JTPA. While conceptually appealing, the importance of coordina 
tion has been greatly exaggerated by many program administrators 
and policymakers. Enhanced coordination can improve program 
effectiveness, but should never have been expected to mitigate the 
effects of multibillion dollar budget cuts in employment and 
training programs.
Promoting cooperation among various social programs is inher 
ently difficult. JTPA administrators have no control over other 
social programs, and can attempt to facilitate coordination but not 
mandate it. Responsibility for the different programs lies with 
various levels of government, and in several programs the private 
sector plays an important role. In many cases, no single adminis 
trator has the authority or capability to compel various agencies to 
coordinate divergent programs. Even in instances where the state 
government possesses sufficient statutory authority, longstanding 
bureaucratic arrangements may effectively block reform.
In addition to difficulties emanating from fragmented adminis 
trative responsibility, the purposes, clientele and operations of 
many social programs differ greatly from JTPA. Common instruc 
tional goals characterize vocational education and JTPA, but 
school financing is not directly dependent on graduates' job place 
ment records. Both JTPA and work-welfare programs emphasize 
employment results, but most work-welfare programs stress direct 
job placement activities to remove welfare recipients from the rolls 
as quickly as possible. Staff have little incentive, therefore, to place 
a welfare recipient in a JTPA classroom training program rather 
than directly in a job.
JTPA's coordination provisions are also too ambiguous to ensure 
results. Compounding the problem, the Labor Department pursues 
a deliberate nonintervention policy and state coordinative directives 
are generally vague and inconsequential. Unless Congress articu 
lates clear goals, which are further specified and enforced by federal 
and state administrators, increased cooperation will remain only a 
rhetorical objective.
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Several key assumptions by JTPA's designers regarding coordi 
nation have proven to be erroneous. Elevating the role of states, 
JTPA relies upon the governors to guarantee better interprogram 
cooperation, but state agencies do little to promote coordination. 
Another widely-held misconception was that reduced funding 
would prompt JTPA administrators to work more closely with 
other programs and more fully use alternative resources. However, 
funding and personnel cuts across almost all social programs 
instead caused widespread retrenchment, and administrators have 
been reluctant to invest in coordination at the expense of direct 
provision of services.
Even if the SDAs had desired to pursue coordination efforts more 
vigorously, JTPA's administrative cost limitations constrain such 
action. Even without significant investments in coordination and 
with some creative accounting, the average SDA devotes the 
maximum allowable funding to administration. Assessing barriers 
to cooperation, negotiating interagency agreements to eliminate 
coordinative obstacles, and monitoring progress to ensure smooth 
implementation require significant resources which would undoubt 
edly exceed JTPA's administrative cost limitations.
Finaly,Reagan administration efforts to revamp, drastically re 
duce or abolish a number of programs related to JTPA inhibit 
interprogram cooperation. Until the future of the employment 
service, vocational education, and WIN programs becomes clearer, 
cooperation between these programs and JTPA will be hampered.
Training Adults 
and Youth
JTPA service delivery area (SDA) operators are permitted broad 
flexibility in devising training strategies for enrollees, but the law 
severely limits spending for administration, allowances and other 
supportive services. The SDAs are also required to meet federal 
performance standards governing job placement rates, wages, and 
the cost of providing assistance. JTPA training eiforts may be an 
improvement over CETA in some respects, but the program's 
problems are serious and remain largely unaddressed.
Enrollees
Eligibility and Selection
As under CETA, eligibility is generally restricted to
• individuals whose families earn less than the federal poverty 
guideline or less than 70 percent of the Labor Department's 
lower living standard income level. (The latter guideline 
varies by locality, ranging in the continental U.S. from 
$9210 to $11,660 for the average-sized poor household of 
three, compared to the uniform 1987 federal poverty guide 
line of $9300.);
• individuals in families receiving cash welfare or food stamps;
• foster children; and
• handicapped adults whose personal earnings do not exceed 
the income criteria, irrespective of their family's income.
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Unemployment insurance, cash welfare, and child support pay 
ments are not counted as income in determining eligibility. Con 
gress also permitted SDAs to assist individuals who do not meet the 
income criteria but face other barriers to employment, including 
displaced homemakers, addicts and school dropouts, but such 
participants may not exceed 10 percent of total enrollment. How 
ever, few SDAs actively utilize this provision.
The law singles out for special assistance subgroups within the 
poverty population. SDAs are mandated to spend 40 percent of 
their Title IIA funds on youth enrollees under 22 years old and 
enroll dropouts and welfare recipients in proportion to their 
presence in the area's eligible population. Less well-defined is the 
requirement that JTPA serve "those who can benefit from and who 
are most in need of assistance.
Very little is known about how SDAs recruit applicants for the 
program. Past examinations of CETA and the Job Corps indicate 
that most job training applicants learned about these programs by 
word of mouth, and the same is probably true of JTPA.
Deciding who to select from among the applicants is one of the 
thornier problems facing SDA administrators. The law emphasizes 
assistance to those "most in need," but the Labor Department has 
failed to define this ambiguous requirement and consequently most 
states and SDAs ignore it. 1 Because serving deficiently skilled and 
educated applicants is costly and fraught with difficulties, local 
administrators tend to favor more employable individuals in order 
to show "results." This practice, known in the trade as "creaming," 
is accomplished by establishing educational and occupational skill 
qualifications as well as using more informal and subjective assess 
ments of applicants' motivation and employability.
The extent of creaming is difficult to quantify because few SDAs 
record the number of rejected applicants, let alone the reasons for 
disqualification. However, every case study of JTPA has found 
evidence of creaming. In one SDA, 60 percent of the dropouts who 
applied were turned away. In another, 362 of 1844 eligible appli 
cants were rejected because they were functionally illiterate, needed 
remedial education, or had a limited command of English. Some 
SDAs require high school or equivalency diplomas as a prerequisite 
for enrollment.2 A comparison between the characteristics of
Enrollees 59
employable AFDC mothers (those required to register for the Work 
Incentive program) and AFDC mothers enrolled in JTPA also 
tends to indicate creaming. Only half of the former have a high 
school degree, compared with two-thirds of the AFDC mothers 
enrolled in JTPA.3 Many SDAs also screen out applicants with 
unsatisfactory work histories or skills. For example, some programs 
reject applicants who type less than 25-30 words per minute for 
secretarial training. A Denver skills center requires secretarial 
applicants to possess a high school diploma and pass two typing 
tests before admission.4
The subcontractors who provide services to enrollees may per 
form additional screening. More than half of a sample of service 
providers in Illinois established entrance criteria, typically involving 
academic proficiency, in addition to the SDAs' qualifications. 5 
Some SDA administrators have reported that service providers 
screen 20-25 eligible applicants for each training opening. One SDA 
used a 10-point system designed under CETA to favor individuals 
with the greatest impediments to sustained employment. However, 
an administrator noted that the system broke down under JTPA: 
"Previously lots of sixes and sevens got into the training programs; 
the contractors just won't take them now. They look for ones and 
twos." Three-fourths of a sample of SDAs noted that JTPA 
participants are better educated, have more job experience, and 
have less need of support services than CETA's clientele. One 
administrator explained why SDAs accepted service provider 
screening: "This is the trade-off: we expect high placement rates and 
low costs; they [service providers] get the freedom to take whoever 
they think will help them achieve that."6
A comparison by the U.S. General Accounting Office of JTPA 
and CETA client characteristics in a matched sample of 148 CETA 
prime sponsors and SDAs with identical boundaries showed few 
differences. 7 National totals of recorded participant characteristics 
also indicate few differences between the two programs. These 
findings do not prove that creaming is absent in JTPA, however, 
because qualified participants who are similar in age, sex and years 
of schooling may differ widely in employ ability. While SDAs 
generally make no effort to define or recruit those most in need of 
assistance, they usually set recruitment goals for women, minorities
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and welfare recipients and specify these targets in contracts with 
service providers. Service providers generally have the discretion to 
choose the best qualified applicants within these parameters, which 
may explain why reported client characteristics do not indicate 
creaming.
Creaming did not originate under JTPA. In fact, one study of 
CETA found that almost all local prime sponsors used educational 
criteria to screen out applicants, and that administrators generally 
accepted the screening practices of service providers.8 However, 
several reasons make it likely that creaming is practiced more 
extensively under JTPA. First, cost and job placement performance 
standards put pressure on SDAs to select more employable enroll- 
ees. Particularly in the case of adult performance standards, which 
give SDAs credit only for job placements, there is little incentive to 
invest funds in enrollees requiring remedial education before enter 
ing occupational training. Many SDAs pursue a deliberate policy of 
serving as many individuals as possible at the lowest possible cost 
per trainee, which inhibits assistance to enrollees requiring more 
intensive training to enhance employability. Finally, the larger 
business role in JTPA and the concomitant emphasis on business 
needs probably also promotes creaming. Employers do what comes 
naturally and favor the most qualified applicants.
Although JTPA's ostensibly high job placement rates have gar 
nered much praise for the program, the evidence indicates that 
SDAs deliberately select more qualified applicants and exclude 
those most in need in order to achieve this result. However, this 
politically safe policy may be economically inefficient in the long 
run, since job training programs produce the greatest net impact by 
serving individuals with greater labor market handicaps.9
Characteristics
In 1985, Title IIA programs enrolled about 1.1 million partici 
pants, nearly identical to the number assisted by the principal 
CETA training program during the late 1970s. However, in order to 
maintain this enrollment level, administrators had to cut inflation- 
adjusted expenditures per enrollee by a third. Even by relying on 
low cost services, JTPA's appropriation permits assistance to only 
about one in 20 of the working-age poor.
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The typical Title IIA enrollee is an unemployed high school 
graduate under age 30. Participants are about equally divided 
between whites and minorities, two-fifths receive public assistance, 
and a quarter have dropped out of school (table 3.1).
SDA training programs are required by law to allocate 40 percent 
of total funding to youth enrollees. However, almost half the SDAs 
have difficulty meeting the youth spending requirement, which they 
attribute to the shortage of eligible youth in their area, the law's 
restrictions on stipends which could have been used as an incentive 
to enroll youth, inadequate recruiting, and an emphasis on low-cost 
services. The General Accounting Office suggested that a more 
important factor determining an SDA's inability to meet the youth 
requirement was the absence of special programs targeted toward 
16-21 year olds. 10 Despite these difficulties, the 40 percent youth 
spending requirement has undoubtedly promoted greater service to 
youth than would otherwise have occurred. Many policymakers 
believe that assisting young people will reap a greater net long-term 
impact than aid to adults, but this assumption rests largely on faith. 
Emphasis on training assistance to youth has fluctuated signifi 
cantly over the past quarter century.
Table 3.1. 
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Women constitute slightly more than half of JTPA participants. 
Compared to male enrollees, women are slightly older and better 
educated, more likely to be black, twice as likely to be receiving 
cash welfare, and more likely to have been out of work for at least 
six months at enrollment.
Two of five participants receive public assistance, including some 
who benefit from more than one program. A third receive food 
stamps, a fifth are AFDC recipients, and slightly less than a tenth 
obtain state or local general assistance or refugee assistance. States 
with higher than average AFDC payments tend to enroll a higher 
proportion of their welfare rolls in JTPA than states paying less 
than the national average (29 vs. 20 percent). 11 This may imply that 
states with higher AFDC payments make greater efforts to enroll 
recipients in order to reduce welfare costs, or that the enrollees are 
better qualified for undergoing training. The finding also apparently 
contradicts the common notion that states with relatively high 
AFDC payments discourage the work ethic.
Administrative Limitations and Support Services
JTPA departed radically from CETA in restricting income and 
support services to trainees. Federal CETA administrators gener 
ally required local programs to pay allowances equal to the mini 
mum wage to all classroom trainees, even 14-year-olds in the 
summer program. Total support expenditures, including classroom 
training allowances, work experience wages and outlays for other 
services, accounted for 59 percent of the 1982 CETA training 
budget. 12 CETA's stipend policy was based on the assumption that 
the poor could not pursue sustained training without income 
support. A disadvantage of this policy was that, given the low 
earnings of CETA's clientele, stipends could present an attractive 
alternative to work for some trainees. 13
Taking this speculation as fact, the Reagan administration 
charged that stipends made CETA an income support rather than 
a training program, and proposed to ban the payments altogether. 
After a prolonged and bitter debate, Congress and the administra 
tion reached a compromise requiring SDAs to devote at least 70
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percent of Title IIA expenditures to training. No more than 15 
percent can be spent on administration, and no more than 30 
percent on combined administration and support costs (including 
allowances and supportive services such as transportation assis 
tance and child care). The new rules have almost completely 





The law leaves "training" largely undefined, but Labor Depart 
ment regulations permit direct training costs to include outlays for 
equipment, classroom space, job-related counseling, and half of the 
costs for work experience if less than six months duration and 
combined with another form of training. Other work experience 
costs are considered a support service expense. Most states classify 
participant recruitment and eligibility determination costs as train 
ing expenditures. Contractor profits are probably also recorded as 
training expenses, but because separate reporting of profits is not 
required, it is impossible to estimate such costs.
During JTPA's first three years, the SDAs reported that admin 
istrative outlays accounted for 14-15 percent of their Title IIA 
expenditures. However, neither Congress nor the Labor Depart 
ment adequately defined administrative expenses, allowing SDAs to 
fudge management costs and to claim that their programs are lean 
and trim. Labor Department regulations allow SDAs to hide 
administrative expenditures by counting all performance-based con 
tracting costs as training expenses. Performance-based contracts 
involve withholding full payment from job trainers until the enrollee 
finds a job. A large but unreported proportion of SDA funds is 
allocated through performance-based contracts, significantly under 
stating JTPA's true administrative costs. Even with the loopholes, 
SDA administrators claim that the cost limits have had a negative 
impact on local management by constricting staff size as well as 
monitoring and evaluation activities. 14
The law directs SDAs to include allowances, half of work 
experience expenditures, and other assistance necessary to enable
64 CHAPTER 3
participants to remain enrolled in training programs (including 
transportation, child care and health care) as support service costs. 
Apparently, program administrators do not find the cost limitations 
onerous, because few SDAs request waivers. In fact, on the average, 
SDAs report that they spend only three-quarters of the allowable 
funds for provision of services; a U.S. General Accounting Office 
survey found that support spending accounts for only half of the 
allowable 15 percent. 15 The skimping on support services reinforces 
the allegations of creaming and the proclivity of SDAs to stress 
"pure" training. Only one of six participants receives support 
services. Even if it is assumed that all support costs are for 
allowances and various support services (i.e., ignoring the work 
experience costs allocated as support), average support spending in 
1985 amounted to only $161 per participant, or about $11.50 a 
week. Arguing that JTPA's reduced budget should be channeled 
directly to training and that support assistance encourages depen 
dency, SDA policymakers hold support costs to a minimum. The 
law notwithstanding, by 1987 the view that support services were 
outside JTPA's responsibility was widespread. As a North Dakota 
JTPA official put it, "Those clients who need other social or human 
services prior to skill training should be served by other programs 
designed to remove those barriers." 16
Transportation, child care and medical assistance are the most 
typical support services offered, the latter usually restricted to 
job-related needs such as eyeglasses or required physical exams. The 
SDAs typically deny assistance to on-the-job training or work 
experience program enrollees on the grounds that they receive 
wages and therefore should be able to provide for their own needs. 
The most common means of providing assistance are through direct 
cash payments to enrollees, set-asides in contracts with service 
providers, and unfunded agreements with outside agencies. Referral 
of enrollees to social service agencies, which have faced severe 
funding losses during the 1980s, does not guarantee that the 
individuals receive assistance. The 20 percent of JTPA enrollees 
who receive AFDC are automatically eligible for health assistance 
through medicaid.
Less than 1 percent of JTPA Title IIA funding is spent on 
allowances. Only one of seven participants receives stipends, aver-
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aging $34 weekly. Payments are based on such factors as the 
number of hours spent in training, household size, income, and 
commuting distance to the training site.
Denying support services has had a deleterious impact on JTPA's 
effectiveness. More than half of SDA administrators and service 
providers surveyed believe that because of the limits, JTPA enrolls 
individuals who are less disadvantaged then GET A participants. A 
majority also believe that they must operate curtailed training 
programs because enrollees, lacking income support, cannot afford 
long-term training. One positive impact noted by SDA directors is 
that participants are more motivated to pursue training and are not 
in the program to obtain a stipend. 17 However, it could also be 
argued that the enrolled participants are likely to secure jobs on 
their own and that provision of basic needs should come before 
"building character."
As JTPA professionals often note, "You can't eat training." 
Many poor individuals who require income and support services to 
initiate and complete a job training program are excluded from 
JTPA. Congress should consider liberalizing the statutory support 
service cost limitations, and the Labor Department should encour 
age SDAs to expand services to participants who need help. To 
optimize the impact of limited resources, stipends should be ad 
justed to the income needs of the enrollee's family. In addition, 
SDAs should husband resources carefully by monitoring partici 
pant progress and dismissing enrollees whose main interest appears 
to be stipends rather than training.
Training
JTPA Title IIA programs offer many occupational courses 
similar to CETA's, but despite this continuity JTPA's practices 
differ greatly from its predecessor. Four distinct components ac 
count for the bulk of JTPA enrollment. Classroom and on-the-job 
training averages no more than about three to four months. Job 
search training, designed to hone participants' job hunting skills, is 
much shorter, usually lasting two weeks or less. Finally, work 
experience programs place youth with limited employment back-
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grounds in entry-level jobs with government agencies and nonprofit 
organizations. Some JTPA participants receive no assistance other 
than counseling.
Although the categorization of services in the two programs 
differs somewhat, the SDAs substantially expanded OJT and job 
search assistance and reduced work experience and classroom 
training compared to GET A (figure 3.1). National training distri 
bution data mask an incredible degree of diversity among SDAs. 
Forty JTPA Title IIA programs exhibited the following differences 
in the proportion of participants enrolled in different types of
10services. 18
Service Range





The factors that account for different service options are unclear. 
An examination of CETA training found little connection between 
local economic conditions, client characteristics, and the type of 
services offered. 19
Classroom Training
Most JTPA classroom training is directly job-related, although a 
small proportion is devoted to remedial education. Relatively more 
women, blacks, the long-term (over six months) unemployed, and 
public assistance recipients tend to be assigned to classroom 
programs.
Classroom training programs are extremely brief, most scheduled 
for between three and six months, but some for as little as two to six 
weeks. JTPA trainees typically receive nearly 30 hours of instruc 
tion weekly for a little over four months, a month less than the 
average CETA classroom trainee. The actual difference is undoubt 
edly even greater than the data indicate, because until 1986, when 
Labor Department regulations proscribed the practice, SDAs could 
categorize program completers in a "holding status" for up to three 
months which some SDAs counted as part of the training courses.
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Figure 3.1
Compared to CETA, JTPA substantially expanded on-the-job 
training and job search assistance.
CETA (1982) JTPA (1985)





Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Since many SDAs deny admittance to applicants considered 
educationally deficient, it follows that JTPA downgraded remedial 
education compared to the role this training component played 
under GET A. In 1982, 14 percent of GET A enrollees received 
remedial education assistance, compared to only 7 percent of JTPA 
enrollees three years later.
The limited information available on occupational offerings 
indicates that nearly half of JTPA training is for clerical and sales 
jobs. Data from a dozen SDAs examined suggest that the distribu 
tion of occupations for which enrollees are trained has changed 
slightly since CETA.20
Training occupation CETA JTPA
Clerical and sales 38% 43% 
Machine trades and bench work 22 16 
Technical (mostly health care) 13 19 
Service (mostly building
maintenance and food service) 12 10
SDAs typically contract with service providers — most com 
monly public or private schools, community-based organizations, 
or businesses — to serve an entire class of JTPA participants. 
Individual referrals to schools are atypical, usually restricted to 
cases where an entire class cannot be organized, especially in rural 
areas.
On-the-Job Training
OJT involves learning an occupational skill through work. SDAs 
usually reimburse firms for half of the employee's wage costs, 
theoretically to reimburse employers for additional training costs 
and to induce firms to hire JTPA eligibles who otherwise might not 
be considered. However, absent careful monitoring JTPA may in 
fact be providing windfall benefits to employers who take advan 
tage of the subsidy for individuals they would have hired in any 
case. The law restricts the use of JTPA funds to "activities which are 
in addition to those which would otherwise be available," but this 
vague standard is not easily enforceable.
SDAs typically negotiate OJT contracts with small businesses 
who train no more than a few enrollees for entry-level jobs. As a
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rule, SDAs first screen applicants to select those who are likely to be 
acceptable to the employer, and then refer several applicants to the 
employer, who makes a final choice. Average OJT training duration 
is a little less than 3.5 months, about a month shorter than under 
CETA.21
The proportion of enrollment in OJT has doubled since CETA. 
The local business representatives whose influence increased under 
JTPA tend to favor OJT, and the program offers significant 
advantages to SDA administrators working within the constraints 
of JTPA's performance standards and cost limitations. OJT has 
always produced high placement results because administrators 
often require employment commitments beyond the reimbursement 
period in return for the wage subsidy, and since enrollees receive 
wages they generally do not need either allowances or support 
services.
Not surprisingly, employers tend to select the most qualified 
applicants for OJT slots. In fact, some SDAs even allow employers 
to recruit their own OJT participants. White men (two-thirds of 
OJT enrollees), adults, high school graduates, individuals not 
receiving public assistance, and those unemployed for less than six 
months are overrepresented in OJT compared with other forms of 
training. The Labor Department has not yet released data on the 
earnings of JTPA participants before enrollment, but comparable 
CETA data indicate that OJT trainees had consistently higher 
pre-enrollment earnings than other participants. With increasing 
employer influence and a widespread orientation toward serving the 
needs of business, the creaming problem is undoubtedly more 
widespread under JTPA. For example, the Houston PIC announces 
that its OJT program is designed "for businesses that want to 
reduce labor costs and increase profits."22
Employers participating in CETA perceived only minor differ 
ences in productivity between OJT trainees and other employees, 
which may mean that the firms were taking no greater risk than 
normal in accepting OJT trainees. Furthermore, without sufficient 
on-site monitoring there is little indication of how much training 
OJT enrollees actually receive. Employers who sponsored CETA 
on-the-job trainees reported devoting little more staff time to orient 
and instruct OJT trainees than other employees. Firms estimated
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that under CETA they devoted about 42 hours total staff time to 
train or orient OJT trainees, or about 2 hours a week.23 If the same 
practices continue under JTPA, it seems likely that OJT may 
function more as a wage subsidy to induce the employer to hire a 
JTPA-referred worker than as a reimbursement for presumed 
additional training time required by a JTPA enrollee. Some SDAs 
acknowledge using OJT in this fashion. However, the experience of 
CETA as well as the more recent Targeted Jobs Tax Credit 
demonstrates that absent careful monitoring, many employers hire 
individuals they would have employed without government induce 
ments, but still collect the subsidies.24
Job Search Assistance
At least a fifth of JTPA participants are engaged primarily in brief 
job search programs. One analyst concluded from examining SDA 
records that it is difficult to distinguish job search assistance from 
"other services," and that the former is probably underreported. 
Enrollees deemed job-ready are placed in job search programs. 
Studies of JTPA's dislocated worker program indicate that the 
projects frequently limit enrollment to individuals who have either 
job leads or actual offers, a practice probably pursued by Title IIA 
programs as well. The range of job search assistance includes 
preparing resumes, locating job openings, direct referrals to em 
ployers, interviewing tips, and job clubs providing advice and 
support. Project participants usually receive several days of instruc 
tion before pursuing a self-directed job search with some advice and 
material assistance (typewriters, phones, copying machines, etc.) 
from SDAs. National reporting data indicate that the average job 
search participant is enrolled for four weeks, but these figures 
undoubtedly include a holding period during which enrollees 
receive no assistance. A study that examined local SDA operations 
found that job search programs typically last no more than two 
weeks.25
Year-Round Youth Programs
In 1985, nearly half a million youths below age 22 were enrolled 
in Title IIA. The majority of youth enrollees receive classroom,
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on-the-job, and job search training, although they constitute a 
minority within these programs (figure 3.2). In contrast, most 
participants in work experience and miscellaneous training pro 
grams are under 22. SDAs place most work experience enrollees in 
part-time jobs in a variety of government agencies and nonprofit 
organizations. Seventy percent of youth work experience enrollees 
are in high school. National data, which most likely exaggerate 
program duration, indicate that the average enrollee remains in a 
work experience program for 4.5 months. Work experience pro 
grams last longer than other forms of JTPA training, although since 
most enrollees are students they probably work less than 20 hours 
a week.
Because nearly two- fifths of youth enrollees are in school, the law 
specifies that positive outcomes of youth programs must include 
school completion, military enlistment, and — most significantly — 
successful completion of a "competency-based" program. Such 
programs typically tutor enrollees in basic education, job-specific 
skills, "world of work" awareness or job search techniques, and 
probably account for much of the assistance categorized as "mis 
cellaneous" services.
Figure 3.2
Most enrollees in work experience and miscellaneous training 
programs are under age 22 (1985).
Number under 22 Component Percent of enrollees 
(thousands) under 22
6 6 | | Job search I———I 31 %
75 | | Work experience | [81%
82| | OJT | | 31%
1 0 21 | Miscellaneous I "1 61 %
1 49 | | Classroom training
474 )} All JTPA
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Despite congressional emphasis, JTPA competency-based pro 
grams have gotten off to an extremely slow start, although appro 
priate models were readily available.26 Ignoring the law, the Labor 
Department's initial positive termination standards gave SDAs no 
credit for providing youth with basic competencies. The department 
reversed its decision after JTPA got underway, but did not define 
what SDAs could count as a competency-based outcome until June 
1986. In the intervening two-and-a-half years the states were 
responsible for ensuring that SDA competency-based programs 
were "sufficiently developed," but less than half the states attempted 
to enforce this vague standard.
The law is ambiguous about who is responsible for determining 
acceptable competency standards. In somewhat confusing lan 
guage, JTPA states that the Labor Department shall prescribe 
performance standards, including attainment of "employment com 
petencies recognized by the private industry council." Many state 
and local officials have interpreted this provision as delegating 
complete approval authority over employment competencies to the 
PICs, and not surprisingly the Office of Management and Budget 
agrees. The House-Senate conference report on JTPA makes it 
clear, however, that both the Labor Department and the states were 
intended to supervise competency-based standards.
The Labor Department has not been helpful in resolving the 
confusion. It issued guidelines governing acceptable competency- 
based programs, but focused primarily on process issues rather than 
on substance, rejecting content standards as infringing on local 
autonomy. SDAs are credited for successful youth competency 
attainment in one of three areas: preemployment or work maturity 
skills, basic education, and job-specific skills. Preemployment and 
work maturity skills include labor market knowledge, career plan 
ning, job search techniques, consumer education, and positive work 
attitudes and habits. Basic education programs may include read 
ing, math, writing, or oral communications instruction. Job-specific 
competency training is similar to classroom occupational training, 
except that SDAs receive credit for participants' enhanced skills 
rather than subsequent employment success. SDAs are free to 
operate any of these three types of competency-based programs or 
none at all, although it is nearly impossible for SDAs to meet the
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Labor Department's positive termination performance standards 
without operating at least some competency programs.
The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that only about 
three-fifths of the SDAs it surveyed operated competency programs 
in 1985. The most commonly offered programs were in the least 
rigorous preemployment and work maturity skills area, and only a 
quarter of the SDAs operated basic education projects and a 
quarter operated job skills projects. 27 More recent Labor Depart 
ment data indicate that about four of five SDAs now operate 
competency programs, although emphasis on education and job 
skill competency programs probably remains limited. The Office of 
Management and Budget has repeatedly blocked Labor Depart 
ment efforts to collect the information necessary to evaluate SDA 
competency programs.
Summer Youth Programs
In addition to Title IIA youth training, JTPA's Title IIB contin 
ues a summer jobs program for youth first initiated as a component 
of President Johnson's antipoverty efforts and a stable fixture of 
federal employment programs ever since. The projects typically pay 
14-to 21-year-olds the minimum wage for part-time work in gov 
ernment agencies and community-based organizations. The sum 
mer program constitutes a major part of JTPA, with an annual 
price tag of about $750 million. However, the Labor Department 
did not collect even basic data on enrollees until 1986, precluding a 
credible assessment. The department did finance an evaluation of 
the CETA summer program before the transition to JTPA.28 
Because the current program is similar except for increased provi 
sion of remedial education, the study's findings as well as other 
relevant CETA data probably fairly represent the JTPA summer 
program.
Other summer programs for disadvantaged youth complement 
JTPA's Title IIB. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program provides 
a tax break for employers who hire poor 16- and 17-year-olds 
during the summer. The special summer credit is more generous 
than the year-round TJTC program. Employers can receive a tax 
credit of 85 percent of up to $3000 paid to eligible youths during the 
summer. However, the effective maximum tax break of $2,550 is
74 CHAPTER 3
somewhat less than this, depending upon the specific tax liabilities 
of the employer. Despite the generous terms, credits were issued for 
only 27,000 teenagers in 1985. There is probably little coordination 
between JTPA's and TJTC's summer programs.29
Several states and localities operate summer youth corps pro 
grams which provide minimum wage jobs primarily on public land, 
involving work on conservation and maintenance projects. Total 
state and local funding is less than $20 million. The Michigan 
Youth Corps, which spends $15 million to provide 12,500 jobs, is by 
far the largest of the state programs. 30
Financing and administration. Annual JTPA appropriations 






Adjusted for inflation, funding for 1988 is only about three-quarters 
of the average CETA appropriation during the 1979-81 period. 
While overall funding is lower, the uncertainty formerly associated 
with appropriations has undoubtedly diminished under JTPA 
because of the new forward funding system. Due to last minute 
congressional wrangling over CETA summer jobs spending, local 
prime sponsors sometimes received funding after operations began, 
precluding project planning. The Reagan administration has repeat 
edly attempted to limit funding for the summer program, but 
Congress has rejected these proposals except for 1987. In January 
1987 the President proposed an $800 million budget and offered 
amendments allowing SDAs to serve young AFDC recipients 
year-round with Title IIB funds.
The allocation of summer program funds is based primarily on 
adult unemployment rates, using the same formula applicable to 
year-round training programs. Consequently, urban areas with a 
high proportion of poor youth are underfunded. Because of the 
costs entailed, it is impractical to ascertain annually the distribution
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of poor youths among the SDAs. However, decennial census data 
suggest that the regional distribution of poor youth is nearly 
identical to the distribution of poor 16-65-year-olds. Thus using 
poverty rather than unemployment data may mitigate funding 
fluctuations and inequities in the summer program. 31
The summer jobs program is administered by state and local 
officials and private industry councils in the same manner as the 
Title IIA program. Congress specifically exempted the summer 
program from the cost limits applied to other JTPA programs, but 
Labor Department regulations prohibit summer programs from 
spending more than 15 percent of total costs on administration. 
Reported administrative spending was slightly lower.
During the late 1970s, the U.S. General Accounting Office found 
that many youths were not adequately supervised on the job and 
were therefore probably not receiving useful work experience. 
Consequently, the Labor Department monitored summer programs 
more closely and required local administrators to increase their 
oversight activities. Analysts found no serious problems at work 
sites visited in 1983, and concluded that enrollees received mean 
ingful employment experiences. Following JTPA's enactment, fed 
eral monitoring has been pro forma at best, and there is little 
indication that the states exercise careful oversight of SDA summer 
programs.
Typically, one worksite employee supervises five enrollees, al 
though the ratio ranges from 1:1 for technical jobs to 1:10-12 for 
maintenance or conservation crews. Supervisors include both reg 
ular worksite employees as well as temporary summer program 
employees who lead the work crews. Orientation assistance varies 
from brief sessions to two days of formal training, although most 
programs provide manuals to supervisors. Because the orientation 
is usually held at central locations, not all supervisors can leave 
work to attend. Supervisors almost unanimously endorse the 
summer program as a worthwhile endeavor, but offer several 
criticisms. Many believe they need more training on how to manage 
teenagers. Few programs make adequate efforts to match enrollees' 
job assignments with their interests, which produces frustration for 
all parties. Finally, supervisors recommend that programs dismiss
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participants with excessive absences to maintain the morale of other 
enrollees, and institute a rewards system for exemplary youth.32
Enrollees and services. Eligibility for participation is based on 
the same income criteria as Title IIA, but 14- and 15-year-olds also 
qualify for Title IIB. Of the approximately 5-6 million eligible 
youth, about 750,000 or 12-15 percent enroll each summer. Local 
recruitment efforts often generate more applicants than can be 
placed in jobs. Administrators use a variety of techniques to address 
this dilemma, including lotteries, first-come first-served enrollment 
policies, point systems which favor targeted groups, and restrictions 
on the number of hours participants can work in order to spread 
available funds.
The typical summer youth enrollee is a minority high school 
student (table 3.2). Compared to youth in Title IIA programs, 
summer enrollees are younger (a third are 14- or 15-years-old), less 
likely to be white or dropouts, and more likely to be AFDC 
recipients. JTPA and CETA summer enrollee characteristics differ 
little.
Table 3.2
Nearly two of three Title KB enrollees are 



















































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Although the law permits SDAs to provide a wide variety of 
services to summer youth enrollees, the program has remained 
primarily a work experience program with some remedial education 
and "world of work" instruction. Participants usually work 32 
hours per week for six to eight weeks at the federal minimum $3.35 
hourly wage.
Most enrollees work at government agencies, schools and 
community-based organizations. The summer program's lengthy 
history allows administrators to establish long-term relationships 
with agencies and offices which previously provided satisfactory 
work opportunities. Moreover, widespread budget cuts have stim 
ulated demand for subsidized summer enrollees. Program adminis 
trators can afford to be choosy in selecting worksites.
Most participants are assigned to maintenance, clerical or office 
work positions, but other assignments include aide positions in 
agencies serving the elderly, handicapped and children; making car 
deliveries; and working on conservation projects. In one locale, 
youth helped record the oral histories of Indochinese immigrants; in 
another, enrollees worked at a cable TV studio and were able to 
participate in filmmaking. However, given the age and inexperience 
of most enrollees, such assignments are atypical.
Summer programs typically provide enrollees with a total of two 
to three days of "world of work" instruction, including an expla 
nation of the labor market and various occupational opportunities, 
job search and interview tips, and help with preparing resumes. 
Some administrators conduct group seminars, while other pro 
grams delegate world of work training to worksite supervisors. The 
quality of instruction varies greatly, but reports from both admin 
istrators and enrollees indicate that these programs are generally 
inadequate and uninteresting to the youth.
In 1982, only 3 percent of total summer participants received 
occupational training. Whether participants are assigned to work 
experience or training positions, few receive job placement help and 
even fewer obtain unsubsidized jobs which might enable them to 
work part-time during the school year. 33
In 1986 the summer program devoted an average of 5 percent of 
its budget to provide basic education to about one in ten enrollees,
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an investment similar to the 1982 CETA program.34 Following 1986 
congressional amendments requiring SDAs to assess the reading 
and math skills of enrollees, and to spend at least some money on 
basic education, the SDAs planned to increase their provision of 
remedial assistance as follows:
1986 1987
(estimate)
SDAs providing basic education 57% 100% 
Title IIB funds devoted to education 5 12 
Enrollees receiving assistance 8 21
Most SDAs rely on reading and math tests to determine enrollees' 
need for remediation. However, nearly a third of local projects 
restrict remediation enrollment to students only, excluding drop- 
outs — who may need help the most — and graduates. Education 
participants receive an average of 12 hours instruction weekly (at a 
cost of $775), and spend another 20 hours at their work experience 
assignment. Projects commonly offer enrollees stipends or academic 
credit to encourage class attendance, and some make work experi 
ence job offers contingent upon enrollment in remedial courses. Few 
SDAs provide basic education themselves; most rely on local 
schools. 35
An assessment. Assessing the impact of summer employment 
programs is difficult both because of a paucity of data and 
disagreements over the appropriate goals of the program. During 
the riot-torn summers of the 1960s, the program was commonly 
referred to as "fire insurance" because it helped keep teenagers off 
the streets. The current program places more emphasis on educa 
tional goals.
Research on the program's impact has focused on evaluating the 
benefits of summer work experience alone or in combination with 
remedial education, and determining to what extent localities use 
the summer jobs for government activities which would have been 
performed in any case. Work experience has produced tangible 
benefits for communities as well as providing enrollees with both 
job opportunities and income. However, numerous studies demon 
strate that summer work experience by itself does little to improve
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future employability and earnings, for which more intensive skills 
training is necessary. 36
A six-year experimental program supplementing summer work 
experience with remedial education is now in progress. The project 
provides 14-15- year-olds likely to drop out of school with 90 hours 
of basic reading and math instruction as well as a short course 
aimed at reducing teen pregnancy. Results from the project's first 
two years are encouraging. Poor, deficiently educated youngsters, 
who typically experience learning losses during the summer, main 
tained their reading level and slightly increased their math profi 
ciency. Enrollees bettered the control group's performance by half 
a grade in reading and nearly a full grade in math. These results 
represented an improvement over the first year's outcomes, largely 
because a standardized curriculum replaced the previous practice of 
allowing each school to develop its own program. Sexually active 
participants were 50 percent more likely than the control group to 
use contraceptives — nearly half of both groups were sexually active 
at the beginning of the summer. Instructional costs per enrollee 
amounted to slightly more than $500, in addition to the costs of 
about $1000 per participant for the average summer program.37
In 1983 some localities used summer youth enrollees as substi 
tutes for regular government employees, thereby effectively substi 
tuting federal for local funds.38 However, given the age and 
inexperience of the participants, it is unlikely that the substitution 
problem was very serious.
Summer work experience programs have provided jobs to mil 
lions of poor youth who probably would not otherwise have found 
work. This role is extremely important, especially in the case of 
minority youth with disturbingly low labor force participation rates 
and even lower employment to population ratios. However, several 
changes could enhance the program's effectiveness. First, the avail 
able funds could be spread further by paying less than the minimum 
wage to 14- and 15-year-olds. Second, the Labor Department 
should encourage SDAs to increase basic education offerings. 
Nearly a third of the SDAs believe that summer remedial education 
is the responsibility of the school system and not JTPA. Congress 
may need to reconsider 1986 proposals requiring SDAs to devote a 
specified proportion of Title IIB funds to remediation in order to
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prod these laggards. Third, the Labor Department should develop 
curriculum standards for brief job search courses which would 
teach enrollees to prepare resumes, locate openings and interview 
for job opportunities. Finally, a portion of summer program funds 
should be reallocated to Title IIA youth training or education 
programs. Despite the increase in short-term costs, investments in 
education and training will reap more lasting gains than work 
experience programs.
Miscellaneous Training Issues
Little is known about the quality of JTPA training. The federal 
government has failed to monitor training quality, and private 
industry councils generally rely upon reported placement and cost 
outcomes rather than reviewing curricula and visiting training 
sites. 39 A U.S. General Accounting Office study shortly before 
CETA's demise found that programs which carefully considered 
program assignments, provided assistance appropriate to partici 
pant needs, and carefully monitored training progress had much 
higher placement rates than other prime sponsors. However, ad 
ministrators often routed applicants to available openings, paying 
scant attention to participant needs, and neglected to contact 
participants following enrollment to smooth obstacles to successful 
program completion and subsequent employment.40 While no 
similar assessment has been made since 1982, it is unlikely that the 
situation has improved.
The proportion of enrollees receiving sequential training — e.g., 
remedial education followed by OJT or classroom occupational 
training — is not known, but the number cannot be very large. 
Two-fifths of the SDAs enroll participants in a single program 
only.41 Under the Labor Department's reporting system, partici 
pants receiving sequential training are placed in the "other services" 
category, accounting for 11 percent of enrollees. Average reported 
training duration for these individuals is only a little over three 
months, allowing little opportunity for sequential training, and the 
"other services" category includes many participants who are in 
school or only receive job search assistance.
Congress directed the SDAs to increase training opportunities for 
women in nontraditional occupations, but local programs have
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largely ignored this directive and occupational training remains 
highly sex-segregated. A Wisconsin study found that women were 
primarily trained to be waitresses, secretaries, hospital attendants, 
cashiers and tellers, while men prepared for work as janitors, cooks 
or kitchen helpers, truck drivers, and for various construction 
positions. Congress also encouraged SDAs to boost service to 
displaced homemakers, typically middle-aged women with little 
employment experience who are entering the labor market due to 
divorce or the death of their spouses. However, very few programs 
actively recruit displaced homemakers, and those SDAs which do 
so provide these women primarily with job search assistance, which 
can hardly be expected to supply them with employable skills.42
Service Providers
SDAs utilize many training institutions which operated under 
CETA. However, the relative importance of various training con 
tractors and the assistance they provide have changed significantly. 
Most SDAs use more than one agency to recruit and select 
enrollees, and SDAs typically subcontract training instead of 
operating programs directly. Only one of six SDAs provided all 
training directly in 1985, and about two-thirds subcontracted at 
least half their training funds (figure 3.3). The most widely used 
subcontractors are public education institutions, operating in 85 
percent of the SDAs. Postsecondary schools are the most com 
monly utilized education institution, although about half the SDAs 
contract with public high schools.43
Thirty percent of the SDAs use for-profit schools to provide 
primarily job-specific training, but the training is generally expen 
sive, which clashes with JTPA's emphasis on reducing costs, and the 
schools tend to vigorously screen applicants. For example, one 
proprietary school turned down 25 JTPA eligibles for every 1 
accepted, and another screened 118 eligible individuals to enroll 
19.44 Further reflecting the role that business representatives play in 
determining JTPA policy, two-thirds of the SDAs turn to private 
employers to offer on-the-job training, although some of the SDAs 
which decided to rely heavily on OJT have encountered difficulty in 
developing enough training positions.
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Figure 3.3 




Subcontract less than 50%
Subcontract 50-80% 
Source: National Alliance of Business
Community-based organizations (CBOs), nonprofit groups 
which provide a variety of services to the needy, played an 
increasingly important role in employment and training programs 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Major CBOs with nationwide networks 
include Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America, Inc., 
SER-Jobs for Progress, the AFL-CIO's Human Resources Devel 
opment Institute, 70001 Training and Employment Institute, the 
Urban League, and Wider Opportunities for Women. The role of 
CBOs has diminished considerably under JTPA. For example, two 
of the larger CBOs experienced the following reductions from their 
height under CETA to JTPA.
Opportunities SER- 










Local affiliates 80 40
Funding (millions) $ 49 $ 35
Although about 80 percent of SDAs contract with at least one 
CBO, only half of these utilize CBOs for any training. The others 
use CBOs for outreach, eligibility determinations, or helping JTPA
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terminees find jobs. In most of the local programs which have no 
contracts with CBOs, no CBOs operate within the SDA's 
boundaries.45
The major reason for the decline of CBOs under JTPA was the 
elimination of GET A public jobs and Youth Employment and 
Demonstration Projects Act programs in which CBOs played an 
integral role. JTPA's severe restrictions on work experience pro 
grams and allowance payments and emphasis on performance 
standards also severely hurt CBOs. The rise of performance-based 
contracts, with full payment delayed until terminees find work, has 
caused cash flow problems for CBOs dependent upon JTPA funds 
for survival.46 The poor quality of training offered by many CBOs 
may also have played a role in their exclusion as providers of 
training. However, CBOs are important for recruiting individuals 
most in need and representing the interest of the needy.47 The 
declining role of CBOs reflects JTPA's emphasis on the needs of 
business rather than the needs of the individuals JTPA was designed 
to help. Altogether, a third of the CBOs operating CETA programs 
were not awarded SDA contracts, but most of these did not even 
apply for funding because their role was curtailed under JTPA.48
In addition to recruiting and training enrollees, subcontractors 
also help find jobs for many JTPA terminees. Program operators 
are often expected to place their own enrollees, but almost two- 
thirds of SDAs use a variety of institutions to place JTPA 
graduates.49
Entity used for job placement SDAs using entity
Training provider 53%




In line with JTPA's emphasis on low costs, short-term training 
and high job placement rates, contractors who fail to meet these 
specifications are weeded out. One former CETA contractor noted 
that in order to obtain a JTPA contract, his agency had to switch 
from "taking the tough cases to becoming an efficient personnel 
office for local businesses." Illinois youth service providers who had
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operated under CETA indicated that they reoriented their JTPA 
programs away from remedial and vocational training toward 
preemployment and job search assistance. 50
Performance-based contracting rapidly emerged following JTPA's 
enactment and has provided several distinct advantages to SDA 
administrators. Contractors have a powerful incentive to place their 
trainees — or to report them as placed — which helps the SDA to 
claim success in achieving the performance targets. Second, 
performance-based contracting permits "management by numbers," 
minimizing on-site monitoring time and expense. Finally, Labor 
Department regulations allow SDAs to categorize administrative 
and support services expenditures as "training" costs if provided 
through performance-based contracts. As noted, this enables SDAs 
to evade the law's strict nontraining cost limitations. By 1985, 
performance-based contracts accounted for three of four SDA 
contracts with service providers. The contracts typically specify 
uniform job placement and cost targets regardless of enrollee 
characteristics, giving contractors every incentive to select the most 
qualified individuals. 51
Despite their popularity, SDAs have noted two disadvantages to 
performance-based contracting. The absence of advance funding 
can present serious problems for contractors dependent upon JTPA 
financing. Second, such arrangements encourage contractors to 
overstate placements to claim the maximum possible profit, and 
therefore require careful monitoring, which is not widely practiced 
under JTPA. A Massachusetts PIC director, in characterizing the 
consequences of JTPA's so-called performance-driven system, 
noted, "The move towards performance-based contracts has raised 
the specter of programs designed and operated for the numbers 
game."52 Performance-based contracts can represent a useful tool 
for holding service providers to their commitments. However, 
JTPA's experience demonstrates the importance of augmenting 
performance-based contracts with standards for training quality, 




Perhaps the most important factor which led Congress to em 
phasize performance standards was widespread, though largely 
unsubstantiated, criticism of the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act. As dissatisfaction with CETA mounted, Congress 
directed the Labor Department in 1978 to develop performance 
standards to assess the effectiveness of the program. Four years 
elapsed before the Labor Department implemented performance 
criteria on a trial basis, but the experiment was abandoned during 
the transition from CETA to JTPA. 1 Performance standards ap 
pealed to JTPA's designers as a way to eliminate the need for 
detailed, costly oversight by the federal government, so long as 
localities delivered results.
The use of objective, measurable and fair standards to judge the 
quality of job training programs is universally hailed but not easily 
accomplished. Legislative pronouncements typically represent dec 
larations of vague intent rather than realistic objectives. Conse 
quently, administrators must specify performance measures and the 
means of achieving them. Key outcomes such as a "quality job" and 
"educational achievement" require definition, taking into account 
the abilities of the program's clientele. Equally difficult is the task of 
adjusting standards for localities with radically different economic 
conditions, client characteristics, and training institutions. Even 
many quantifiable factors elude precise measurement, and perfor 
mance standards are no better than their statistical foundation. For 
example, local unemployment statistics are little better than 
guesstimates. 2 Even under the best-designed system, significant
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factors that affect performance, such as participant motivation, are 
difficult to measure and are thus ignored.
Poorly drafted performance standards may produce the appear 
ance of program success without the substance and also cause 
unintended and deleterious side-effects. Guidelines which reward 
operators for graduating enrollees from educational programs but 
fail to specify the educational standards can produce the "suc 
cessful" attainment of meaningless credentials which may well be 
disregarded in the market place. Even when the standards are 
carefully defined, the administrators may respond by selecting the 
most qualified applicants, undermining the goal of helping those 
who most need assistance. Granting their obvious potential useful 
ness, performance standards nevertheless cannot fully answer the 
question, "How much difference does JTPA really make?" Care 
fully designed experiments which randomly assign individuals with 
similar characteristics to training and control groups may provide 
insights, but such efforts are costly and frequently difficult to 
implement in more than a handful of local programs.
JTPA's Requirements
Congress decreed that "the basic return on [JTPA's] investment is 
to be measured by the increased employment and earnings of 
participants and the reductions in welfare dependency." The law 
directs the Secretary of Labor to prescribe adult performance 
standards which may include placement in unsubsidized jobs, job 
retention, increases in earnings, and reduced welfare payments. For 
youth, the following criteria must also be considered: attainment of 
competency-based standards, successful completion of school or an 
equivalency degree program, and enrollment in other training 
programs or the military. The standards must consider participants' 
labor market experience both before enrolling and after program 
completion. Finally, the law requires the establishment of cost 
standards applicable to the above measures. The Labor Depart 
ment may modify the performance measures no more than once 
every two years.
Apart from the difficulties inherent in designing and implement 
ing performance standards, the law presents two major problems.
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First, JTPA's drafters confused performance standards with impact 
evaluations, which attempt to gauge the net impact of a program. 
For example, the law emphasizes decreased welfare dependency and 
the postprogram employment and income status of recipients 
following their training. About half of all recipients leave the 
welfare rolls within two years, most without any additional govern 
ment assistance (although many later return). Thus many recipients 
who participate in JTPA would probably have left the welfare rolls 
without job training. Determining the net impact of JTPA would 
require tracking an appropriate control group of welfare recipients 
who did not enroll in JTPA. Performance standards are unsuited to 
determining the program's net impact, because they only measure 
results without gauging JTPA's contribution to the outcome. After 
a false start, the Labor Department did not begin impact assess 
ments until 1986, and the project's implementation has been fraught 
with difficulties.
The second problem presented by the law is the application of 
performance standards to competency-based programs devoted to 
teaching enrollees basic education, training them for entry level 
skills, or exposing them to job search techniques. Applying perfor 
mance criteria to such disparate activities requires standardized 
program guidelines and detailed information for each program 
component, which few if any SDAs maintain. Moreover, standard 
ized federal program regulations clash with JTPA's emphasis on 
state and local control.
Despite these statutory flaws, the inclusion of performance 
standards in the law represents an advance. But this achievement 
has been partly vitiated by the Labor Department's overreliance on 
performance standards to the exclusion of other means of oversee 
ing JTPA, and the overemphasis SDAs placed on the targets. In 
addition, the administration's implementation of the standards 
themselves has been deficient in a number of important respects.
Federal Implementation
The Labor Department's choice of seven performance standards 
(four for adult enrollees and three for youth participants) was based
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on both the law and the criteria considered during the GET A years.
National Performance Standards (1986-7)
Adult
Entered employment rate (total) 62% 
Entered employment rate (welfare recipients) 51% 
Hourly wage $4.91 
Cost per placement $4,374
Youth (16-21)
Entered employment rate 43% 
Positive termination rate 75% 
Cost per positive termination $4,900
The entered employment rate standards are denned as the propor 
tion of JTPA terminees who find jobs. The two cost standards 
reflect total outlays divided by the number of job placements (plus 
other positive outcomes for youths). The seven standards have 
remained in effect since 1983, but the numerical targets for each 
standard have, in most cases, been made more stringent.
The positive termination standards applied to youth are ambig 
uous. These benchmarks are supposed to measure the proportion of 
16-21-year-olds who obtain work; successfully complete a 
competency-based program; return to school after dropping out; 
complete primary, secondary or postsecondary schooling; or enroll 
in other training programs or the military. The Labor Department, 
however, left the definition of youth competencies up to localities, 
and the U.S. General Accounting Office found that programs range 
from rigorous classroom training to one-session motivational sem 
inars. These extreme variations preclude meaningful comparisons 
between SDAs using the positive termination standards, and in fact 
discourage quality programs by giving equal credit to brief, super 
ficial courses. 3
In devising the performance standards, the Office of Management 
and Budget and the Labor Department initially flouted the law's 
requirement that trainees' postprogram experiences be considered. 
Both the job placement and hourly wage standards are based on the 
JTPA trainee's first day on the job. No distinction whatsoever is 
made between temporary or permanent employment, or part-time
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or full-time jobs. The Office of Management and Budget refused 
until 1986 to allow the Labor Department to even collect data to 
establish postprogram standards. This has effectively delayed post- 
program measures until at least mid-1988, six years after JTPA's 
enactment.
Setting proper target figures for placement rates, earnings, and 
costs necessarily reflects tentative judgments. Information about the 
normal labor market experiences of the poor and the impact of 
training is at best fragmentary, and performance targets conse 
quently reflect the values and best estimates of administrators. The 
Labor Department initially used 1982 CETA performance results as 
a baseline, then arbitrarily adjusted the figures upward. The depart 
ment raised most of the standards by 10 percent, for example, 
because of an undefined "productivity improvement factor" that by 
the stroke of a pen made JTPA more efficient than CETA.
The law also requires the Labor Department to devise adjust 
ments to the performance standards to produce equitable measures 
for SDAs facing varying economic conditions and enrollees. Four 
of five states currently use the Labor Department's optional 
adjustment methodology, and it has a significant impact on the 
performance standards. In states which use the department's model, 
SDA performance is judged by adjusted standards which may differ 
greatly from the national standards.
One important reason for the discrepancy between the adjusted 
standards and the national standards is that until 1986 the Labor 
Department issued two sets of performance standards annually: the 
national standards and model standards (table 4.1). The depart 
ment holds that the law's prohibition on changing the performance 
standards more frequently than biennially does not apply to the 
model's performance standards. For example, although the na 
tional standards remained unchanged between 1984 and 1985, the 
department made the targets relatively more difficult to attain by 
significantly tightening the adjustment model's performance stan 
dards. Despite this action, most SDAs were still easily able to meet 
— or at least claim to meet — the standards. In 1986, for the first 
time, the national standards and the model's standards were 
identical for five of the seven benchmarks.
Table 4.1
The actual performance standards SDAs faced often differed 
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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The second important element of the adjustment model is the 
various economic, demographic, and client characteristic factors 
used to adjust the standards. The annual adjustments are based on 
the correlation between these factors and past performance results, 
and a regression methodology is used to estimate the relative 
importance of each factor. CETA data were used until JTPA 
information became available in mid-1985. The local unemploy 
ment rate, average wage, proportion of families in poverty, and 
population density are the components for determining the different 
economic conditions that prevail in SDAs. Adjustments for varying 
participant characteristics include the proportion of enrollees who 
are welfare recipients, high school dropouts, handicapped, members 
of various minority groups, females, and students. The only training 
factor considered is the duration of training measured in weeks. The 
same factors are not used in adjusting each of the seven perfor 
mance standards, and factors have been added or dropped from one 
year to another to attempt to improve the model's predictive ability. 
For example, the population density factor was added in 1986 for 
four of the performance measures.
The 1986 adjustments to the adult job placement standard for 
Cleveland illustrate the model's application to a high unemploy 
ment area where the SDA serves a severely disadvantaged popula 
tion. The performance standard is derived by applying the Labor 
Department "weights" to the difference between Cleveland's demo 
graphic and economic characteristics and the average for all SDAs. 
With these adjustments, Cleveland's adult job placement standard 
is reduced to 47 percent, well below the national standard of 62 
percent (table 4.2).
An examination of the 1984 and 1985 adjusted standards shows 
the significant variations between the national and SDAs' median 
adjusted performance standards (table 4.1). In some instances the 
basis for the discrepancies is puzzling. That the adjusted adult job 
placement standard was slightly higher than the corresponding 
national standard seems reasonable, since the model incorporated 
the 1982 recession level unemployment rate, and it is likely that job 
placements rose during the recovery when unemployment dropped. 
However, the adjusted youth job placement standard was much 
lower than the corresponding national standard.
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The adjusted cost standards for adults and youth were signifi 
cantly lower — more difficult to meet — than the national stand 
ards. The adjusted job placement standard for welfare recipients 
was also more stringent than the national standard. In contrast, the 
adjusted adult wage standard and the youth positive termination 
standard were both more lenient than the respective national 
standards.
The adjustment factors had a much greater overall impact on the 
model standards in 1984 than in 1985. In the latter year, there was 
very little difference between the model and the median adjusted 
standards, except for the adult cost placement benchmark. How 
ever, in 1984 the adjustment factors effectively tightened the model 
standards in all cases but the youth positive termination rate. Some 
of the principal adjustment factors responsible for these shifts raise 
serious concerns about the validity of the Labor Department's 
model. The Labor Department's highly questionable assumption 
that it would be less costly for the SDAs to serve single mothers 
made the adult cost standard much more difficult to meet. For 
youth, the principal reason for the divergence between the median 
adjusted standards and the model standards for all three bench 
marks was that the SDAs served a higher proportion of high school 
graduates. However, it is unclear why serving more graduates 
should simultaneously make placements more difficult to achieve 
and positive terminations (which include job placements) easier.
To ensure that the performance standards would be uniformly 
applied across the country, the Labor Department in 1983 proposed 
mandatory adoption of the adjustment methodology. However, the 
Office of Management and Budget rejected this proposal on the 
grounds that it would unduly interfere with state autonomy. 
Consequently, state use of the department model is optional. 
Governors can either apply the national performance standards 
directly to the SDAs, or adjust the standards utilizing their own or 
the Labor Department's methodology. Labor Department regula 
tions require that state-developed adjustment methodologies be 
based on reliable data and applied consistently among SDAs. The 
states are free to make different adjustments for each of the seven 
standards. A state may apply the national standards to the job
Table 4.2
The Labor Department's adjustment model greatly reduces 




1 . Population density(thousands of persons per
square mile)
2. Unemployment rate
3. Average annual wage (thousands of dollars)
4. Proportion ofpoor families
Participant characteristics
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using Cleveland's 1985 data.
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placement target, the Labor Department-adjusted standard to the 
wage benchmark, and a state-adjusted standard to the cost criteria. 
Three states have rejected the Labor Department's model and at 
least six states have considered such a move. If more states follow 
suit, the uniformity of the national performance criteria would be 
undermined. Nationwide consistency was further impaired by the 
Labor Department's decision to allow SDAs to use either the 1986 
or the 1987 adjustment model in calculating their 1987 performance 
standards.
The adjustment factors are designed to compensate for the 
problems of SDAs which face relatively severe economic conditions 
or serve a disproportionately disadvantaged clientele. Conversely, 
the adjustments also attempt to discourage SDAs from trying to 
beat the system by enrolling more qualified applicants. However, 
the adjustment factors alone cannot prevent creaming, and impor 
tant flaws render the claimed scientific validity of the Labor 
Department's model questionable.
First, the formula can only be as reliable as the data or the 
standards upon which it is based. However, the economic and 
demographic data given the most weight are unreliable or outdated. 
As indicated previously, local unemployment data are little better 
than guesses. Poverty adjustments are based on 1979 data. While 
population density data may remain relatively stable in the short 
run, they are a questionable measure of the accessibility and cost of 
transportation to the poor. The inaccuracy of the estimates is 
further compounded by the fact that geographic boundaries for the 
data reported by the Census Bureau and other agencies do not 
necessarily coincide with the geographical jurisdictions of the 
SDAs. Information on participant characteristics, if properly col 
lected and reported, is more accurate, but these factors generally 
have less influence on the adjustment model. Training duration 
figures are extremely deficient both because of poor collection 
procedures and because duration is defined as weeks rather than 
hours of training.
Apart from these general deficiencies, other difficulties afflict 
specific standards. Because the youth positive termination rate and 
the cost per positive termination are poorly defined, the adjustments 
have little meaning. In the case of the job placement standard for
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welfare recipients, the Labor Department's technical consultants 
have concluded that the adjustment model does not satisfactorily 
explain the range of performance among SDAs.4
The Labor Department's inconsistent application of the adjust 
ments over the 1984-87 period also raises doubts about the validity 
of the models. For example, four local economic and demographic 
factors strongly influence the adult job placement standard, but 
only the local unemployment rate is used to modify the youth 
placement benchmark. Educational attainment is not considered in 
the adult cost standard adjustment, although it is more costly to 
train educationally deficient participants. The weights for many of 
the factors have changed greatly from year to year, and occasionally 
the department changes the directional value of a given factor — 
that is, factors which would make the standard harder to meet one 
year have been changed to make the target easier to attain in the 
next. Some of the Labor Department's modifications represent 
reasonable adaptations to changing conditions or corrections of 
past misjudgments, but the changes have been too extensive to 
inspire confidence in the overall method. For example, the propor 
tion of enrolled unemployment insurance recipients was considered 
one of the most important factors in adjusting the job placement 
standard in 1984, but by 1986 its influence in the model was almost 
negligible. The same is true for the proportion of enrolled older 
workers, a factor not even included in the 1987 model.
State Direction
Although the federal role in performance standards is supposed 
to be preeminent, governors have the authority to mandate addi 
tional performance criteria, modify the federal standards, award 
monetary incentives to SDAs which exceed performance standards, 
and sanction SDAs which perform poorly. Federal nonintervention 
further augments state flexibility in implementing performance 
standards.
To date, however, the states have wielded little of this authority, 
even to address widely acknowledged program deficiencies. JTPA 
requires SDAs to serve those "most in need," and to allocate 
"equitable services" to welfare recipients and school dropouts. 
However, both the Labor Department and the states have generally
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failed to enforce these requirements, in spite of numerous reports 
that SDAs ignored these provisions. The states also accord a low 
priority to promoting effective youth competency standards. 5 With 
regard to postprogram measures, the majority of states collected 
posttraining data before the Labor Department issued regulations 
on the subject in 1986, but virtually all failed to implement 
standards measuring job retention.6
Providing financial awards to SDAs which exceed performance 
standards and sanctioning SDAs which perform poorly was sup 
posed to provide governors an important means of exercising 
influence over local operations, but the SDAs deny that the 
incentive grants exert much influence on local policy.7 Six percent of 
a state's Title IIA funds, a little over $100 million nationally, is 
annually allocated to governors for incentive awards and for 
technical assistance. However, during JTPA's first three years, the 
states spent only a third of the available 6 percent set-aside funds. 
Of the funds spent, the states devoted about half to incentive 
awards rewarding exemplary performance. The law also requires 
governors to provide incentives for SDAs which target "hard-to- 
serve" individuals, but the states allocate only about a tenth of their 
6 percent funds toward this goal. The remaining 40 percent of the 
set-aside is used for technical assistance. 8
If an SDA fails to meet performance standards for two consec 
utive years, the governor must intervene and choose a new admin 
istrative entity, restructure the PIC, select different service provid 
ers, or take other action necessary to improve performance. 
Technical assistance must be offered before the governor steps in. 
While precise information is not available, the National Governors' 
Association has no record of a single case where a state sanctioned 
an SDA for failure to meet performance standards.
Governors may modify the national performance standards by 
using either the Labor Department's adjustment methodology or 
their own model. However, even states which use the federal 
methodology can make additional adjustments for local conditions, 
and nearly half the states do so but to a very limited degree. States 
granted adjustment requests to less than 100 SDAs, most com 
monly for the adult wage or youth job placement standards in cases 
where the SDA's unemployment rate or client characteristics devi-
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ated substantially from the national averages. 9 Recognizing the 
imprecision of the model, the Labor Department also allows 
governors to adjust performance standards within a predetermined 
"tolerance range," but few states do so. Tolerance range adjust 
ments for 1986 were as follows:
Adults
Youth
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SDAs reported that they met all four performance standards for 
adults but did not do as well for youths. In 1985, seven of every ten 
adults found jobs paying an average hourly wage rate of nearly $5 
at a cost of about $3000 per placement. Job placements exceeded 
the standards at a lower cost than allowed by the standards, and the 
average hourly wage rate was exactly on the mark (table 4.3). 
However, the national positive termination rate for youth was well 
short of the designated target until 1985.
Table 4.3 
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JTPA's claimed results significantly exceed CETA's performance 
except for hourly wages. GET A placement rates ranged from 39-48 
percent over 1978-82 (compared to 60 percent for all 1985 JTPA 
terminees), and CETA's average cost per placement was over twice 
as high as JTPA's. However, JTPA adult and youth terminees 
earned about 10 percent less than CETA participants after adjust 
ing for either inflation or average wage growth, even though CETA 
served a slightly higher proportion of youth, as follows:
Average hourly wages
JTPA (1985) $4.65 
CETA (1981)
Actual wages 4.32 
Adjusted for inflation 5.27
Adjusted for wage growth 5.18
Placement and wage rates are strongly correlated with both 
demographic characteristics and the type of training received (table 
4.4). Placement rate differences between men and women are 
neither large nor consistent across different types of training. 
However, male enrollees have significantly higher wages: in fact, 
male high school dropouts earn on average more than women with 
a high school diploma but no further education. However, gender 
earnings differentials are not as great as for the total labor force, 
probably because JTPA trainees qualify mostly for entry-level 
occupations. Placement rates for whites average 10 percentage 
points higher than blacks, while Hispanic performance is midway 
between the two groups; differences in wage rates exhibit a similar 
pattern.
Public assistance recipients, the long-term (over six months) 
unemployed, and high school dropouts find job less often than the 
average enrollee, although the reported placement rates for drop 
outs is a surprisingly high 59 percent. Wage rates are the mirror 
image of placement rates for these three groups, with dropouts 
more likely to obtain a job but with the lowest average wage.
Not surprisingly, on-the-job trainees are much more likely to 
obtain work with relatively higher wages than most other trainees, 
since the most qualified applicants are assigned to OJT and most 
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Note: National totals differ slightly from those presented in table 4.3 because data in this table are based on a sample of enrollees.
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enrollment practices also probably contribute to job search termi- 
nees' high placement rates. Classroom trainees (some of whom 
receive only remedial education) have relatively low placement rates 
but they receive the same hourly wage rates as OJT participants and 
25 cents per hour above job search graduates. Those assigned to 
either work experience programs or miscellaneous "other services" 
have both low placement and wage rates, largely because many of 
these enrollees are high school students.
Figure 4.1 
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Not all observers believe that JTPA's results demonstrate unqual 
ified success. There are good reasons to believe that the program's 
reported performance is exaggerated, and administrators' single- 
minded focus on producing good numbers has promoted creaming 
and discouraged more intensive training.
Selected state postprogram surveys show that roughly a third of 
the trainees employed at termination are out of work three months 
later. However, in Massachusetts, with nearly full employment, 90 
percent of employed terminees retained their jobs. In several states 
where follow-up results are recorded for individuals not employed 
at termination, between 30 and 50 percent find work within three
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months. Almost all of the employed adults work full time. Former 
OJT trainees are the most likely to retain their jobs, followed by 
classroom training graduates. Retention rates for other terminees 
are generally significantly lower, but this is probably attributable to 
the high proportion of youths in the other programs. 10
Widespread anecdotal reports indicate that many SDAs and 
service providers manipulate enrollment and termination reporting 
to inflate placement rates. In Illinois, one-fourth of the service 
providers examined did not officially enroll individuals until train 
ing was underway to avoid counting early program dropouts who 
were less likely to find work. Some service providers waited until a 
likely job was identified, and one agency delayed all paperwork and 
only submitted the names of individuals who were almost certain to 
complete the program. 11 Program termination reports are similarly 
manipulated to enhance claimed results. As already indicated, many 
SDAs place graduates in a three-month "holding status," reporting 
the placement rate not at termination but instead within the 
following three months. A Michigan SDA places graduates in 
nonpaying "internships" until they obtain employment to avoid 
counting them as jobless. State and SDA definitions of acceptable 
job placements vary widely. Denver considers a trainee placed if the 
employer confirms that the hiring decision has been made, while in 
another SDA the individual must remain employed for over five 
months to count as an acceptable placement. 12
Instances of outright fraud are not unknown. A Washington, 
D.C. contractor receiving half a million dollars reported that almost 
all graduates found jobs, while in reality almost none had. 13 While 
such incidents are probably rare, the SDAs' inattention to moni 
toring clearly leaves JTPA vulnerable to flagrant abuses. A 1982 
U.S. General Accounting Office examination of 35 randomly selected 
proprietary schools found that half the schools inflated their job 
placement rates beyond what their own records indicated. In addition, 
employers contacted had not hired individuals the schools claimed to 
have placed with them in one of five cases. 14 Absent careful monitor 
ing, there is good reason to believe that reporting is even more 
suspect under JTPA, as reimbursement is often contingent upon 
placement success. Follow-up surveys in two states indicate that 
claimed placement rates may be exaggerated by 5-10 percent. 15
102 CHAPTER 4
Pressure to meet the original performance standards and main 
tain high performance led to widespread creaming. Many local 
administrators who acknowledge creaming argue that federal policy 
leaves them little alternative. This "devil made me do it" alibi is 
somewhat disingenuous because rather than protesting against 
performance standards, most SDAs trumpet their figures as proof 
of local program success. Nevertheless, both the law and federal 
policy supply a strong impetus toward creaming. Without allow 
ances, it is impossible to train the individuals lacking independent 
means of support who probably need help the most. Federal adult 
cost standards, reduced by a third since JTPA's inception after 
adjusting for inflation, hinder SDAs from providing the deficiently 
educated the basic competency and training they need to secure 
better jobs. However, the average adult cost per placement for 1985 
was $1600 below the median adjusted standard, demonstrating the 
SDAs' eagerness to provide even less intensive assistance than the 
performance standards allowed. Enforcement of the law's mandate 
to serve those "most in need" could provide some counterweight 
against creaming, but would entail increased costs per placement.
In enacting JTPA, Congress recognized that a performance 
standards system had potential drawbacks. The law directs the 
National Commission for Employment Policy, a JTPA-funded 
federal advisory group on employment issues, to evaluate the 
impact of the Labor Department's standards. The commission 
funded a descriptive study of state performance standard policy, but 
it has only recently begun to take the necessary steps to determine 
the impact of the standards on participants, services and costs as 
required by law.
Finally, the evolution of training under JTPA raises serious 
questions about program quality. The proportion of on-the-job and 
job search training increased from about a fifth to nearly half of all 
training from CETA to JTPA. Cost limitations, superficial perfor 
mance standards and business influence had more to do with this 
shift than the track records of OJT and job search in improving 
future employability. JTPA's emphasis on job search assistance is in 
some ways beneficial because few individuals are knowledgeable job 
hunters. However, the SDAs' failure to combine job search with 
more intensive training is troubling. Virtually every study of job
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search assistance has concluded that while the training has clear 
short-term benefits, the impact dissipates within one to two years. 
On the other hand, the congressional decision to limit work 
experience programs was probably justified except for welfare 
recipients, because careful research has indicated that this is the 
only group that benefits from work experience. 16
In contrast to other forms of assistance, quality classroom 
training has a proven track record for cost-effectively improving 
enrollees' long-term job prospects. Comparisons for JTPA are not 
available, but during CETA, classroom trainees had proportion 
ately higher long-term earnings gains than participants in other 
forms of training. 17 Classroom training remains the most popular 
service offered by SDAs, but the proportion of participants trained 
in the classroom has declined from ahnost half under CETA to a 
third under JTPA. Moreover, average classroom training duration 
has dropped by a month since CETA, although the Labor Depart 
ment recognizes that longer and more comprehensive training is 
crucial in improving enrollees' employability. 18 A study of CETA 
found that graduates' subsequent earnings increased more than 
proportionately with lengthier training. 19 Research on the Job 
Corps program for poor youths yields identical findings.
Does Training Work?
Most CETA and JTPA research indicates that the programs 
improve the skills, earnings, and employment rates of participants. 
Studies of CETA found that enrollees' higher earnings were prima 
rily due to increased working time rather than higher hourly wages. 
Also, the positive impact was apparently not directly tied to 
occupationally-specific training because, with the exception of those 
trained for clerical jobs, within two years most CETA terminees no 
longer worked in their field of training.20
There is less agreement regarding the relative merits of classroom 
and on-the-job training in enhancing employability. Most CETA 
evaluations were based on comparing the experiences of CETA 
participants with a very different "comparison" group derived from 
a sample of the Current Population Survey.21 In attempting to
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equitably compare the experiences of two such different groups, 
researchers made statistical adjustments to control for divergent 
earnings histories and demographic characteristics. The inherent 
weakness of this method is demonstrated by the fact that, although 
each study used essentially the same data, researchers often arrived 
at startlingly different conclusions.22
The Labor Department's follow-up of enrollees in 20 SDAs to 
evaluate JTPA will not be available before 1990. Few states or 
SDAs have critically assessed their operations. An Indiana study 
which is better than most found that former enrollees made 
considerable gains in the two years following program participa 
tion. Although the comparison group was clearly more advantaged 
than the JTPA participants, the earnings of white female and black 
male former enrollees actually surpassed those of the comparison 
group.23 Vermont found that employed adult terminees boosted 
their hourly wages by an average of 14 percent over their previous 
jobs. Most enrollees with job experience viewed their new job as a 
step up from prior positions.24
In sum, while JTPA probably improves participants' employabil- 
ity, its achievements fall far short of the Labor Department's claims 
made on its behalf. Although the introduction of performance 
standards — if appropriately implemented — should have im 
proved the quality of training, JTPA's single-minded focus on 
attaining dubious numerical targets may have done more harm than 
good. As a Lima, Ohio administrator explained, "We must show 
paper success whether clients are served or not."25 In its review of 
CETA shortly before JTPA's enactment, the U.S. General Ac 
counting Office concluded that "relying solely on placement rates to 
monitor program performance is inadvisable."26 Disregarding this 
advice, the Reagan administration heavily emphasized placement- 
based performance indicators and neglected other means of moni 
toring JTPA. Responsibility was delegated to the states, few of 
whom provided constructive leadership.
Aiding 
Dislocated Workers
The dynamics of economic change have invariably led to the 
obsolescence of occupational skills and the displacement of work 
ers. The anxieties of displaced workers that new jobs will not 
become available have been exaggerated, as economic growth has 
usually been accompanied by rising productivity, generating new 
jobs and better working conditions. The economic and psycholog 
ical adjustments faced by displaced workers are nonetheless formi 
dable.
In the early 1980s, several factors combined to produce grave 
economic dislocation in the United States, as an ever increasing 
number of industrial as well as newly developing nations became 
fully competitive with American industry in world markets. Ac 
cording to one estimate, trade difficulties resulted in a net loss of 
about two million jobs between 1979 and 1984. 1
The transition of employment from the goods-producing to the 
services sector in recent decades was compounded by the onset of 
the worst recession since the Great Depression. Ironically, even the 
prolonged economic recovery following the 1981-2 recession did not 
end the dislocation problem because other nations pursued vigor 
ous export policies, taking advantage of the overvalued dollar and 
the reinvigorated purchasing power of Americans. The U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics estimated that more workers were displaced in 
1985 than in any previous year in the 1980s.
To aid dislocated workers, Congress added a new component to 
federal job training legislation. However, when Congress enacted 
JTPA's Title III dislocated worker program, it possessed little 
reliable information about the magnitude and nature of the dislo-
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cated worker problem. The Congressional Budget Office estimated 
shortly before JTPA's passage in 1982 that the number of dislocated 
workers ranged between 100,000 and 2.1 million, depending on the 
definition of the term.2 Dislocation had not been considered a 
serious problem since the early 1960s, and it literally took an act of 
Congress to compel the Reagan administration to survey the extent 
of worker dislocation. However, the survey's preliminary results 
were only available two years after JTPA's enactment.
Assessing the scope of dislocation is compounded by the difficulty 
of defining who is a dislocated worker and determining the labor 
market impacts of dislocation. To estimate the number of displaced 
workers, the Bureau of Labor Statistics decided to include workers 
who had held their previous job for three years or more and were 
laid off due to the shutdown or relocation of a plant or company, 
slack work, or the abolition of their position. The BLS definition is 
narrower than that favored by some observers who argue for the 
inclusion of previously self-employed job losers and against the 
exclusion of those with less than three years tenure. On the other 
hand, the BLS definition is more expansive than alternatives which 
count only job losers from declining industries. Definitional dis 
agreements reflect differing viewpoints about the reemployment 
difficulties experienced by job losers. Some analysts believe that 
dislocated workers with lengthier job tenure face greater readjust 
ment problems, particularly if they are displaced from declining 
industries, than other job losers. However, the evidence on whether 
dislocated workers face longer unemployment spells or greater 
subsequent wage losses than other job losers is not conclusive.
Dislocated workers constitute about 10-20 percent of the unem 
ployed. The latest Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that 10.8 
million workers aged 20 years and over were dislocated between 
1981 and 1985, including 5.1 million with at least three years tenure. 
Sixty-seven percent of the latter were employed in January 1986, 18 
percent were unemployed, and 15 percent had dropped out of the 
labor force. Forty-four percent of the workers who regained 
full-time employment earned less than in their previous job. Minor 
ity, unskilled, deficiently educated, and older workers suffered 
disproportionately severe reemployment problems.3 An analysis of 
a 1984 BLS survey found that nearly half of the reemployed
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dislocated workers had changed occupations. Operators, fabrica 
tors, and laborers moving into service occupations accounted for 
most of the shift.4 Most jobs in these broad occupational categories 
require few skills.
Programs Antedating JTPA
Concerned about the impact of automation on unemployment, 
Congress enacted in 1962 the Manpower Development and Train 
ing Act (MDTA), the first targeted federal assistance program for 
dislocated workers. However, when unemployment declined shortly 
after MDTA's passage, Congress redirected the program toward 
serving the low-income unemployed.
Also in 1962, Congress enacted what would later become a major 
and sustained federal effort to aid dislocated workers. The Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program differs from MDTA, 
CETA and JTPA in that it specifically benefits workers displaced by 
foreign trade, provides primarily income support rather than 
retraining, and also assists the affected firms. At its height in 1980, 
TAA provided more than $1.6 billion to over 500,000 displaced 
workers. However, the program's high costs and the fact that most 
beneficiaries were concentrated in a few high-wage industries made 
TAA an easy mark for budget cutters after 1981. The Reagan 
administration favored the termination of the trade program, but 
Congress extended TAA until 1991. In 1987 the program provided 
income support or job-related assistance to some 60,000 dislocated 
workers at an estimated cost of $206 million.
To qualify for TAA assistance, the Labor Department must 
certify that workers lost their jobs as a result of import competition, 
a judgment that is necessarily not only subjective but also often 
highly politicized. Job losers employed by a certified firm for at least 
six months and who participate in a job search program are eligible 
for a year of benefits. Those enrolled in approved job training 
programs may receive payments for an additional six months. In 
fiscal 1987 an estimated 55,000 workers received $176 million in 
income support, averaging $3200 per person. In addition, qualified 
individuals are also eligible for state-approved training, job search
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allowances, and relocation assistance. However, job-related assis 
tance is limited by the available funds. Congress budgeted only 
$29.9 million for these programs for fiscal 1987, and due to 
inadequate federal reporting requirements, it is not clear whether 
states in the past have even fully expended the federal appropria 
tion. Consequently, very few dislocated workers have benefitted 
from TAA job-related assistance. During 1986, an estimated 7700 
persons were trained, 1400 received job search allowances, and 1100 
were provided relocation assistance.5 In 1987 the Reagan adminis 
tration proposed replacing TAA and JTPA's dislocated worker 
program with a new program that would more than double total 
federal aid to dislocated workers and emphasize job-related assis 
tance rather than income support.
JTPA Operations
The Reagan administration's initial opposition to incorporating 
a new program for dislocated workers as part of JTPA received 
scant congressional consideration because of rising concerns over 
dislocation in the midst of the worst slump since the Great 
Depression. The JTPA legislative debate centered on the larger Title 
II program, with little attention paid to the dislocated worker 
program. The staff director for the Senate Employment and Pro 
ductivity subcommittee characterized the law's language as "re 
markably close to the first draft."6
Because so little was known about the most cost-effective means 
of assisting dislocated workers, Congress placed few stipulations on 
the program, delegating administrative responsibility largely to the 
states. Both eligibility requirements and authorized services are 
broadly defined. The most significant restriction is the law's require 
ment limiting nontraining costs to 30 percent of the federal 
allocation. In addition, although the law does not prohibit the use 
of dislocated worker funds for public service employment, Labor 
Department regulations forbid the practice.
Financing
For 1987, Congress appropriated $200 million for the dislocated 
worker program (figure 5.1). The law requires that at least 75
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percent of the funds be allocated directly to the states. In the 
absence of regular surveys on dislocated workers in each state, the 
distribution formula is based on the state's relative proportion of 
unemployed persons and the relative proportion of individuals 
unemployed 15 weeks or longer, although the duration of unem 
ployment may not be a reliable indicator of dislocation.
Figure 5.1







Fiscal Oct. 1983- 
1982 June 1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
The Labor Department has reserved 25 percent of the dislocated 
worker appropriation — the maximum allowable under the law — 
to aid areas facing high unemployment, mass layoffs, or natural 
disasters. In screening state applications for the funds, the Labor 
Department considers whether the needs of the area can be met with 
allocated JTPA or other funds, and also the number of displaced 
individuals requiring assistance.
Similar to the Title IIA distribution formula, reliance on volatile 
unemployment rates produces substantial year to year fluctuations 
in the distribution of dislocated worker funds among the states. 
However, because the average state spent only two-thirds of its 
available Title III funds through June 1986, volatile funding 
allocations probably did not cause serious problems in the states 
that failed to spend the available funds.
Based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of dislocated 
workers, the West and Midwest are overfunded while the South gets
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less than its fair share, if the funds were distributed solely on the 
basis of total dislocated workers in each region.7






Ironically, although the South gets less than its fair share of 
dislocated worker appropriations, the region spends relatively little 
of its formula funds. The Midwest, which is overfunded, spends the 
highest share of its formula appropriation, as follows:






State underspending is primarily attributable to a heavy reliance 
on low-cost job search assistance and an inability to rapidly 
organize projects. Eleven states exacerbated their underspending 
problems by reserving up to a fourth of their federal allocation for 
contingencies. Because states spent only about half of Title III 
appropriations through mid-1985, the Reagan administration suc 
cessfully convinced Congress to reduce 1986 funding by over half, 
to less than $100 million. The administration argued that unexpend 
ed funds carried over from the previous year would allow the states 
to maintain an even level of funding for dislocated workers. While 
this was true for the entire country, almost half the states could not 
maintain equivalent expenditure levels in 1986 because they had 
spent a relatively high proportion of their previous allocations.8 
Therefore, the budget reduction effectively penalized states which 
had diligently utilized Title III funds. Congress restored 1987 
dislocated worker funding to $200 million.
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The Labor Department contends that underspending could be 
ameliorated by eliminating the allocation formula and providing 
the department with discretionary authority to distribute all Title 
III funds.9 However, state officials note that it is impossible to 
obtain a discretionary grant in less than four months, although one 
purpose of the fund is to rapidly respond to emergencies. 10 During 
1985, the department issued only three grants within the first three- 
and-a-half months of the program year, two-thirds of the funds 
were awarded during the last half of the year, and about two-fifths 
were not issued until the final month. In 1986, according to 
departmental press releases, a tenth of the discretionary funds were 
not released until the final week of the program year.
To augment assistance to dislocated workers, the law requires 
states to match federal funds allocated by formula on a dollar-for- 
dollar basis. The matching requirement is reduced by 10 percentage 
points for each 1 percent that the state's unemployment rate exceeds 
the national average. For example, if the national jobless rate is 7 
percent and a state's is 8 percent, the state need only match 90 
percent of the federal allocation. A state with a 17 percent 
unemployment rate would not have to provide any matching funds.
The matching requirement has had a negligible impact on 
boosting funds for dislocated workers. In 1985, nine states provided 
only $15 million in matching funds against the $167 million federal 
formula allocation. 11 The law and regulations are loosely drawn 
and permit counting in-kind contributions and half of unemploy 
ment insurance payments to enrollees in lieu of direct cash contri 
butions. Labor Department regulations which explicitly delegate to 
governors the responsibility for determining what constitutes an 
allowable match make the law's requirement even less meaningful. 
States typically pass the responsibility for generating the phantom 
matching funds to administrators of local dislocated worker 
projects. 12 Most local project administrators interviewed by the 
U.S. General Accounting Office acknowledged that the in-kind 
resources would have been generated even without the requirement.
The matching requirement has had an impact on the selection of 
participants and service providers. Both states and localities target 
services to unemployment insurance recipients, at the expense of 
other dislocated workers not receiving financial assistance. States
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also tend to favor service providers such as community colleges 
who, because of high overhead costs, can easily supply the spurious 
required match. 13
Administration
Like JTPA's Title IIA, the dislocated worker program limits 
administrative and support costs to 30 percent of the federal 
allocation. The law specifies no further limitation, but Labor 
Department regulations restrict administrative expenditures to 15 
percent. These restrictions only apply to federal formula funds, not 
to the discretionary allocations. In 1985, projects allocated 79 
percent of total dislocated worker outlays to training, 16 percent to 
administration and 5 percent to support services. Although admin 
istrative costs slightly exceeded the limit, it is unlikely that states 
ignored the regulations because the data include both formula and 
discretionary fund expenditures. The Labor Department did not 
require separate reporting for these two categories until 1986.
Although the states possess considerable authority, few display 
vigorous leadership in administering dislocated worker programs. 
In addition to their failure to spend the available funds, one study 
noted that state administrators could not readily name all the 
dislocated worker projects in their state, let alone provide basic 
information on project activities. 14
In 43 states, the same agency administers both the Title II and III 
programs. The states utilize one of three arrangements for distrib 
uting dislocated worker funds: 26 states allocate funds for specific 
projects, 14 states operate statewide programs through the employ 
ment service or community college system, and the balance of the 
states allocate the funds to SDAs or other political jurisdictions.
The states exercise little oversight of dislocated worker projects. 
Minimal technical assistance is provided, and state JTPA officials 
usually do not seek financial or in-kind contributions from compa 
nies responsible for layoffs. 15 Most projects collect only federally 
required information, and a survey of 20 states indicated that only 
one in four collect follow-up data on participants. 16 The U.S. Office 
of Technology Assessment criticized the Title III data collection 
system as "a slender basis for analyzing the performance of JTPA
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programs, for determining funding needs in relation to perfor 
mance, for learning from experience, and for improving future 
performance." 17
Dislocated Worker Projects
During 1985, 221,000 individuals were enrolled in over 500 Title 
III projects, a small fraction of the potentially eligible population. A 
third of the projects are located in New York, California, and Ohio. 
Each serves an average of 78 enrollees at one time, but the average 
is skewed upward by about 5 percent of the projects, which serve 
over 800 enrollees. About two-fifths of the projects are designed for 
a particular plant, company or industry, but these projects tend to 
serve other eligible individuals in the surrounding area. Most 
projects are administered by public institutions, primarily JTPA 
Title IIA service delivery areas, community colleges and employ 
ment offices: 18
Service delivery areas 31%
Educational institutions 26 
Community-based organizations 13
Employment service 9
Unions and/or employers 9
Other state agencies 4
Administrator undetermined 8
SDAs which administer both Title II and III operations usually 
integrate applicant intake, participant assessments, and job place 
ment efforts for both programs. However, in areas where the SDA 
does not administer a Title III project — the more common 
situation — there is little coordination between the two programs. 19 
Statutory provisions in the trade adjustment assistance legislation 
seriously impede coordination with JTPA's dislocated worker pro 
gram. For example, the law prohibits the supplementation of TAA 
training funds with money from other federal programs.20
Enrollees
Congress opted for a broad eligibility definition for Title III 
programs, authorizing each state to "establish procedures to iden-
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tify substantial groups of eligible individuals." States may qualify 
persons who:
(1) have lost their jobs or received notice, are eligible for 
unemployment insurance or have exhausted their benefits, 
and are unlikely to return to their previous industry or 
occupation;
(2) have lost their job or received notice as a result of a 
permanent plant closure;
(3) are unemployed for extended periods with limited oppor 
tunity for reemployment in a similar occupation in the 
local labor market; or
(4) were self-employed and are unemployed as a result of 
general economic conditions in the community.
Using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics definition, but including 
workers with less than three years job tenure, 3.1 million workers 
were displaced during 1985, but only 221,000 were enrolled in 
program year 1985, including 147,000 newly enrolled.
About two of three enrollees are 22-44-year-old white males with 
high school educations who had previously worked in a manufac 
turing job. Nearly half are members of low-income households 
(table 5.1). The Labor Department contends that "the States are 
conducting sufficient outreach to contact older and less-educated 
dislocated workers." In fact, high school dropouts and older 
individuals, who face disproportionate reemployment difficulties, 
are underserved by dislocated worker projects. A third of unem 
ployed dislocated workers, but only a fifth of enrollees, failed to 
complete a high school education. A fifth of unemployed dislocated 
workers, but less than a tenth of the participants, is over 54. The 
U.S. General Accounting Office found that about a quarter of the 
dislocated worker projects do not enroll older workers — possibly 
in violation of JTPA's civil rights provisions — and one of nine 
excludes individuals with less than a high school education.21 On 
the other hand, the long-term unemployed are overrepresented in 
dislocated worker projects. A third of the enrollees had been jobless 
more than six months, although only a quarter of the unemployed
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dislocated workers had been out of work that long.
Table 5.1.
The typical Title m enrollee is a high school 
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Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and General Accounting Office
Participant characteristic data indicate that the deliberate selec 
tion of more qualified applicants, referred to in the trade as 
"creaming," is common. Case studies of 15 dislocated worker 
projects, while not representative of all projects — 10 were selected 
on the basis of their successful job placement performance — 
provide insights on the participant selection process. Project admin 
istrators used a trial job search period lasting from one to ten days 
as a screening device, and at the end of the period selectively 
enrolled individuals who had either job leads or offers. Question 
naires and interviews were also commonly used to assess the 
motivation, however defined, and employability of applicants. 
Requiring applicants to attend a number of intake events before 
being formally enrolled was another means to weed out the 
unmotivated. The projects which emphasized high placement rates
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practiced aggressive recruitment strategies to enroll more qualified 
individuals.22 The U.S. General Accounting Office found that 
employers selected applicants in 10 percent of Title III projects.23 
Despite the fact that JTPA serves only a small proportion of 
dislocated workers, project administrators report difficulty in re 
cruiting enrollees, probably because displaced workers are not 
aware of the Title III program or in some cases because the projects 
have poor reputations. Because most projects are ad hoc, short- 
term efforts, it is impossible to establish a continuous referral 
network in the community.
Training and Support Services
Labor Department planners originally assumed that enrollees 
would be retrained for new careers, but local project operators 
instead emphasize short-term assistance costing an average of a 
little over $800 per participant. Two-thirds of enrollees receive job 
search assistance, primarily brief workshops and counseling, but 
less than half obtain any kind of occupational training or remedial 
education (table 5.2). However, as is true for Title IIA programs, 
dislocated worker projects vary markedly in the services they 
provide. According to the Labor Department, the median length of 
stay in Title III is 3.8 months, but General Accounting Office 
reports suggest that this figure is exaggerated.24
Job search assistance predominates because of its low cost, short 
duration (typically two weeks or less), administrative convenience, 
and a preference on the part of many enrollees for immediate 
placement rather than training. Based on a sample of 15 projects, 
the cost per placement for job search programs was only a third as 
much as either classroom or on-the-job training. Job search pro 
grams can be taught in-house to large groups, lowering unit costs. 
Specialized personnel are not required, and the need for support 
services is minimal compared with more intensive forms of training. 
Job search assistance can serve a variety of functions, such as 
weeding out the unmotivated or separating job-ready participants 
from those requiring more specialized training.
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Table 5.2. 
Less than half of Title HI enrollees receive any job training (1985).
Percent of Percent of Median
projects participants duration Cost per
offering service* receiving service* (weeks) participant






































Sources: U.S. General Accounting Office and Department of Labor
*Due to multiple responses or participants receiving multiple services, totals are 
greater than 100 percent.
Where training is offered, it is typically provided in conjunction 
with job search assistance. Case studies show that a battery of basic 
education, interest, and aptitude tests are used to screen classroom 
training participants. The tests tend to be rigorous when the service 
provider operates under a performance-based contract. According 
to project administrators, the tests often serve to weed out referrals 
to vocational schools. In addition to the use of tests, administrators 
seldom assign participants lacking independent means of financial 
support to training programs.25
Most dislocated worker projects are arranged hurriedly because 
employers frequently fail to provide advance notice of layoffs. Due 
to these pressures, limited funding and the fact that most projects 
last no more than a year, administrators tend to rely upon existing 
service providers, usually community colleges or vocational schools. 
Title III projects tend to enroll participants in existing courses 
rather than working with the institutions to develop courses 
designed to meet the special needs of JTPA's clientele. Dislocated 
worker classroom training programs only last nine weeks on 
average, even briefer than corresponding Title IIA classes. A third 
of them are 5 weeks or less, and only a fifth last beyond 20 weeks.
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About one of six dislocated worker enrollees receives on-the-job 
training. Title III OJT programs are similar to employer-provided 
training in Title II A, and are limited due to the inability of program 
administrators to procure sufficient OJT slots. The following broad 
occupational categories are most common in projects providing 
classroom or on-the-job training:
Percent of projects offering 
Occupation Classroom training OJT
Clerical or office 60% 64%
Semiskilled equipment or machine operation 55 83
Technical paraprofessions 52 42
Skilled crafts or trades 48 60
Service 33 55
Sales 17 41
Remedial education accounts for only 6 percent of total enroll 
ment, despite widespread indications that many enrollees need such 
assistance. Two-thirds of the projects provide no remedial ed 
ucation.26 Even where it is available, most projects do not orient 
remedial education toward dropouts but instead offer two week 
brush-up classes in conjunction with classroom or on-the-job 
training. Because of the preponderance of high school graduates in 
Title III and the availability of remediation classes in local schools, 
most state officials see no need for additional remedial education 
assistance from JTPA.27 Many dislocated workers shun remedial 
training as a tacit acknowledgment of illiteracy. Sensitive to this 
problem, some projects design refresher courses specifically for their 
participants. However, this requires a level of investment and 
expertise which most projects are unwilling or unable to achieve.
Support services, including transportation assistance and child 
care, are also very limited. The dislocated worker program only 
spends a third of the 15 percent of expenditures allowable for 
support costs, and more than two-fifths of the projects do not 
provide any support services. Less than a quarter of participants 
receive services, at an average cost of $196 or between $10-20 per 
week. Only 2 of 15 projects examined paid stipends, amounting to 
$50-60 per week.28
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To sustain dislocated workers while in training, the law prohibits 
states from denying unemployment insurance benefits to eligible 
individuals who are enrolled in Title III. However, some states have 
discouraged assistance to program participants by requiring them 
to document JTPA enrollment and file individual waivers to qualify 
for UI benefits. In two of five SDAs surveyed, Title III trainees were 
either ineligible for UI or else state policy required case by case
?Qreviews.
Relocation assistance is offered in isolated cases. Two percent of 
participants receive such assistance at an average expenditure of 
about $600. The law limits relocation assistance to individuals who 
either cannot obtain employment within commuting distance or 
have a job offer in another locale. For most project participants, 
relocation is a last resort.30
Performance Record
The law requires the department to set standards based on 
placement and retention in unsubsidized jobs, but lacking an 
established performance record the Labor Department initially set 
no national benchmark, and instead required governors to establish 
their own job placement standards. Governors were also encour 
aged to implement cost standards.
Based on reports that more than 60 percent of participants 
entered employment in three-quarters of the states in 1984, the 
department adopted this rate as a guideline for 1986-7. As in the 
case of Title IIA, and in spite of the law's requirement that job 
retention be considered, the job placement guideline does not 
distinguish between part-time versus full-time or temporary versus 
permanent jobs. The apparent reason for the department's reluc 
tance to set a definitive standard is the difficulty of collecting 
representative data on dislocated worker programs. The ad hoc, 
short-term nature of most dislocated worker projects has hindered 
the collection of random sample data, without which the standards 
cannot be fairly adapted to projects facing diverse circumstances 
and enrollees. Performance standards have apparently had less 
influence on dislocated worker projects than on Title IIA programs. 
Half the states do not use performance-based contracts, and only 
three states rely exclusively on such contracts. 31
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About 69 percent of program terminees found jobs, with hourly 
wages averaging over $6 at an average cost of $2000 per placement. 
Job placement performance is similar to the average for adults in 
Title IIA programs, and the average hourly wage — though below 
enrollees' previous earnings — is more than a dollar higher. Three 
of every four who were reemployed found work in four broad 
occupational categories: 32
semiskilled equipment or machine operation 34%
skilled crafts or trades 15
clerical or office work 13
service positions 12
Projects operated by unions and/or employers report the highest 
wage rates, but the reported placement rates of different program 
operators varied little. 33
Operator Hourly wage
Unions and/or employers $7.62
Service delivery areas 6.70
Educational institutions 5.88
Other public institutions 5.93
The claimed job placement rates for the long-term unemployed, 
blacks, welfare recipients, dropouts, white males, and unemploy 
ment insurance recipients are within a narrow range of 61 to 71 
percent. These reported results are baffling, since a much higher 
differential in placements would normally be expected, but the 
projects seem to claim success for all comers. Women earn the 
lowest hourly wages ($5.25), while individuals with more than a 
high school education earn the most ($7.07).
Performance outcomes differ for various types of training. OJT 
enrollees achieved the highest placement rates but earned relatively 
low hourly wages. Classroom and job search training graduates had 
similar placement and hourly wage rates.
Classroom Job search 
OJT training assistance
Placement rate 83% 62% 66% 
Hourly wage $6.12 $6.56 $6.40
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The reported performance results are subject to serious flaws. In 
addition to the defects already noted, job placement data do not 
distinguish between new jobs and recalls of dislocated workers by 
their former employer. For example, Michigan "achieved" a re 
markable 93 percent placement rate with an hourly wage rate 
averaging $9.47 simply because General Motors recalled about 
2000 auto employees who had enrolled in dislocated worker 
projects. 34
Trade Politics and Pending Legislation
Alarmed by rising trade deficits exceeding $100 billion annually 
for three consecutive years, Congress has pushed the trade issue to 
the forefront of the national agenda. In 1987, to stem protectionist 
pressures, President Reagan took the unusual step of proposing to 
consolidate JTPA's Title III and Trade Adjustment Assistance into 
a new dislocated worker program financed at $980 million for 1988, 
more than double the $406 million funding received by these 
programs the previous year.
In an implicit criticism of state management of Title III, the 
legislative proposals — including the administration's — envisioned 
expanding both federal and local involvement in the prospective 
dislocated worker programs. Most policymakers also acknowl 
edged the need to more rapidly respond to mass layoffs and plant 
closings by obtaining early notice of layoffs from firms and 
establishing teams to provide technical assistance for rapid imple 
mentation of local projects.
Nearly half of the displaced workers surveyed by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics received no advance notice of their layoff. 35 
Administrators require at least several months to prepare an 
effective dislocated worker program. Congress should require large 
firms to provide at least three months notice of mass layoffs. The 
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment found little evidence substan 
tiating business claims that an advance notice requirement would 
cause serious problems.36 Even a Reagan administration task force 
concluded that "advance notification is an essential component of a 
successful adjustment program."37
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The Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service is a model program 
which relies on itinerant teams of experts to help rapidly organize 
local dislocated worker projects. Ensuring the involvement and 
cooperation of both management and labor as well as community 
agencies is a key element in the program, a strategy of proven worth 
in U.S. projects as well. 38 The U.S. Department of Labor is now 
undertaking a pilot project testing the Canadian approach, and 
Title III reform proposals incorporate this model.
Additional funding should improve the cost-effectiveness of Title 
III, as most projects have less than 100 enrollees at a time, far too 
few to operate efficient programs. The added funds could also 
enhance the impact of the program by making it possible for 
administrators to target assistance to the most disadvantaged 
displaced workers; substantially increase training, basic education, 




A product of the Great Society's antipoverty efforts, the Job 
Corps is the nation's oldest continuous federal youth training 
program. Its high costs have prompted continuing scrutiny, but by 
the early 1980s the program's accomplishments were acknowledged 
across the political spectrum. The Job Corps' statutory goal is "to 
assist young individuals who need and can benefit from an unusu 
ally intensive program, operated in a group setting, to become more 
responsible, employable, and productive citizens."
The program operates residential centers in the belief that 
removing poor youth from their debilitating environment is a 
necessary precondition to improving employability. The model 
reflects the view that poor individuals are trapped in an intergen- 
erational "culture of poverty" which can be best combated through 
intensive services to youth. Having profited from experience, the 
Job Corps' effectiveness has improved since the program was 
established in 1964, but its basic structure has changed little under 
JTPA. It remains a federally-administered program. Throughout its 
history, the corps has provided extremely disadvantaged youths 
with basic education and vocational training, followed by job 
placement assistance after leaving a center.
Several states operate year-round youth corps programs which 
are similar to the Job Corps, spending approximately $100 million 
annually to assist some 15,000 enrollees. The $44 million California 
Conservation Corps, which operates both residential and nonresi- 
dential camps, is the largest state effort. State and local youth corps 
pursue a broad variety of educational and vocational goals. Al-
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though many state and local programs do not restrict eligibility to 
poor youth, enrollees are primarily disadvantaged. 1
Administration and Financing
As of mid-1987, the Job Corps funded 105 centers. Businesses 
and nonprofit organizations administered 75 centers under con 
tract, while the federal Departments of Agriculture and the Interior 
operated 30 civilian conservation centers (CCCs), modeled upon the 
New Deal's Civilian Conservation Corps. CCCs emphasize con 
struction and natural resource projects and are located on public 
lands, primarily in national parks and forests. Contract centers 
operate in both urban and rural locales.
Nearly three-quarters of Job Corps centers and training slots are 
located in the South and West (table 6.1).2 Because many eligible 
youth do not live in close proximity to Job Corps centers, only a 
little over half of enrollees are assigned to centers in their home 
states. 3 The law limits nonresidential trainees to no more than a 
tenth of participants, and approximately this proportion of nonres 
idents are enrolled each year. Currently no center is strictly 
nonresidential.
Table 6.1
Relatively few Job Corps centers are located in 







































Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and Abt Associates, Inc.
The training capacity of the centers varies widely, from 100 to 
2600 slots. Centers which can train over 500 corpsmembers at a time 
constitute a fifth of all centers but serve almost half of total enrollees 
(figure 6.1). All of the 30 civilian conservation centers and a quarter 
of the contract centers have a capacity of less than 250 slots,
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reducing their ability to operate administratively efficient training 
programs. The six largest private contractors operate 48 centers and 
train three-fifths of enrollees.
Distribution
Average center





conservation centers 29% 16%
Six largest
private operators 46 58
Other private
operators 26 27
The major source of program instability has been widely fluctu 
ating funding support and attempts by Presidents Nixon and 
Reagan to abolish the corps, resulting in capacity enrollment 
ranging from 25,000 to 40,000. In inflation-adjusted 1986 dollars, 
Job Corps funding reached over $1 billion in 1966, but dropped to 
$300 million in the mid-1970s (figure 6.2). Financing rose initially 
following President Carter's inauguration but declined again, sub 
sequently increasing when the administration made reducing youth 
unemployment a major domestic priority. Since 1981, constant
Figure 6.1 
Twenty-one centers train nearly half of all corpsmembers.
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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dollar funding for the Job Corps has ranged from $600 to $680 
million. Center enrollment capacity has closely followed the avail 
able funding.
Figure 6.2
Job Corps appropriations have fluctuated 
since the program began.
Millions 
$1,200 i
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
On its 20th anniversary in 1984, President Reagan gave the 
program a glowing endorsement, stating, "Your vital program has 
provided hundreds of thousands of deprived youths with basic 
educational and vocational training to prepare them for their future 
in the workplace. This is in keeping with the American spirit of 
helping others reach their full potential, a spirit that has sustained 
our Nation from its very founding."4 However, several months later 
the Reagan administration executed an about-face and proposed in 
early 1985 to eliminate the program. Congress remained steadfast in 
its support of the Job Corps and rejected the Office of Management 
and Budget's repeated attempts to reduce Job Corps funding. For 
1987, Congress raised the funding by 7 percent to $656 million and, 
acknowledging defeat, the administration proposed a nearly iden 
tical $652 million budget for the following year. The House of 
Representatives voted to boost 1988 Job Corps funding to $783 
million.
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The administration's efforts to eliminate or scale back the Job 
Corps, while unsuccessful, nevertheless diminished the program's 
cost-effectiveness. The program's utilization rate, a measurement 
of average center enrollment compared to capacity, declined 
from over 99 percent in 1983 and the first half of 1984 to about 95 
percent in 1984-5, increasing costs by about $600 per corpsmember 
service year. Job Corps director Peter Rell testified before a 
congressional committee that the efforts to end the program were 
"the major reason" behind recruitment difficulties, because young 
people were wary of enrolling in a program which might imminently 
close. 5
Labor Department staff reductions further impaired federal 
administration. From 1980 to 1987 federal Job Corps personnel 
diminished by over a third, from 294 to 190. Three business Job 
Corps operators protested the effects of the personnel cuts on the 
program's effectiveness, and one, RCA, criticized the "drastic 
decrease in the level and quality of technical assistance." The 
business representatives also noted that the Labor Department's 
annual program reviews, designed to improve center operations, 
have become more cursory.6 These criticisms were substantiated in 
a leaked internal Labor Department memorandum on the Job 
Corps which concluded, "It seems clear from all indications that we 
are not doing a fully adequate job of monitoring." The memo also 
acknowledged that the Department "practically eliminated" train 
ing and technical assistance contracts which had supplemented 
departmental staff assistance to centers. 7
Job Corps costs are far higher than those of other JTPA 
programs, primarily because of the expenses associated with oper 
ating residential facilities (figure 6.3 and table 6.2). The cost per 
training year (the cost of serving a corpsmember for a year) declined 
steadily between the start of the program and the late 1970s, as two 
administrations deferred needed capital improvements and permit 
ted health care and allowance expenses to fall behind the cost-of- 
living. Rectification of these problems and the expansion of the 
program raised corps costs slightly until the early 1980s.8 From 




The Job Corps' high costs are primarily due to 
residential expenses (1985).
Recruitment and placement




Construction and rehabilitation 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Despite cost reductions over the past two decades, continued high 
costs — $15,800 per training year in 1985 — have prompted efforts 
to improve cost efficiency and repeated attempts to close or 
contract-out the civilian conservation centers, which are more 
costly. Excluding expenses over which centers have little control 
(e.g., allowances, construction, recruitment and placement), costs 
per training year in 1984 ranged from $8300 to $20,000 across 
centers. The differences were primarily attributable to salaries and 









Even after controlling for size, CCC costs per training year were 
40 percent more than at contract centers because of higher voca 
tional training and residential living costs. Higher staff costs 
account for more than half the differential. The costs of union 
instructors constitute 65 percent of the difference in training
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Table 6.2. 















































































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Due to different reporting sources, these totals differ slightly from data cited 
earlier.
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expenditures, and higher residential costs are explained by civil 
service salaries and costlier food expenditures (56 and 32 percent of 
the difference, respectively).
CCC enrollees experienced better labor market success than 
contract center corpsmembers in 1984:
Placement rate Hourly wage rate
Civilian conservation centers 84% $4.47 
Contract centers 71 3.91
However, a comparison of relative training expenses (excluding 
equipment) in 1982 indicates that the superior performance of 
CCCs may not be commensurate with the costs. 10 Moreover, CCC 
enrollees are probably slightly more advantaged.
Job Corps Enrollees
Recruitment and Screening
Unlike other JTPA components, the Job Corps has sought 
consistently to limit enrollment to poor youths who face impedi 
ments to employment. The Job Corps' high costs, the nature of the 
target population, and the difficulties inherent in a residential 
program necessitate a careful selection process. The law requires 
that applicants must be
• 14 to 21 years old (although in practice only 16-21-year-olds 
are accepted);
• economically disadvantaged and in need of education, 
training or counseling to secure meaningful employment, 
meet Armed Forces requirements, or succeed in school or 
other training programs;
• living in an environment that would "substantially impair 
prospects for successful participation in other programs 
providing needed training, education, or assistance;" and
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• "be free of medical and behavioral problems so serious that 
the individual could not adjust to the standards of conduct, 
discipline, work, and training which the Job Corps 
involves."
Several of the standards involve highly subjective judgments, re 
quiring staff to single-out individuals who have employment hand 
icaps severe enough to necessitate exceptional assistance but not so 
debilitating as to preclude success. The screening process is of 
crucial importance in minimizing the number of enrollees who drop 
out of the corps. Early leavers receive little benefit and drive up 
already high residential costs.
Until the early 1980s, most recruitment and screening was 
performed by public employment offices, but the Labor Depart 
ment subsequently instituted a more competitive system. All con 
tracts are awarded through competitive bids and provide a fixed 
price (typically $160 to $240) for each recruit. Currently state and 
local government agencies, private profit and nonprofit groups, and 
Job Corps centers augment the recruitment efforts of public em 
ployment offices.
Although the corps often pays recruiters a premium for enlisting 
women, it continues to experience difficulties attracting women to 
the program. Parental reluctance to allow their teenage daughters to 
enroll in a residential program, as well as the fact that prospective 
female corpsmembers are more likely to be single parents, probably 
contribute to problems in recruiting women. Congress, in 1982, 
ordered the department to "immediately take steps to achieve" 50 
percent female enrollment, but the proportion of women instead fell 
from 38 to 32 percent during the succeeding four years.
A persistent criticism of recruiters centers on their lack of effort 
to determine if applicants could be better served by alternative 
programs. Congress intended the Job Corps to be a last resort for 
youth whose living environment impairs their employment and 
education prospects. In 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
concluded that the program's screening was so lax that "nearly any 
disadvantaged youth can qualify." GAO noted that an inadequate 
eligibility determination procedure had characterized the corps 
since its inception. 11 More recent investigations indicate that the
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problems GAO enumerated continue. 12 However, while it is clear 
that Job Corps screening has not satisfied the letter of the law, the 
characteristics of corpsmembers indicate that recruiters generally 
enforce the law's intent.
Characteristics
The Job Corps' clientele has remained remarkably similar over 
the years. The average corpsmember reads at the 6th grade level. 
Almost three of four have never held a full-time job. Four of five are 
high school dropouts, and nearly half of their families receive 
welfare (table 6.3).
Female enrollees generally have completed more schooling than 
males. One of four female enrollees has completed the 12th grade, 
compared to about one of fifteen men. One of six female and one of 
twenty male enrollees are nonresidents. Nonresidential corpsmem 
bers have completed slightly more years of schooling than residen 
tial enrollees, but their entry reading levels are nearly identical. 
Eighteen percent of nonresident enrollees are Hispanic, compared 
to 8 percent of residents.
The clientele of civilian conservation centers differs markedly 
from that of contract centers, and is probably less disadvantaged. 
Half of CCC enrollees are white, compared to only a quarter of 
contract center enrollees. Only one in ten CCC participants is 
female. Although CCC corpsmembers are slightly younger and 
have consequently completed less schooling, their entry reading 
levels are on average a grade higher than contract center 
participants. 13
Given the subjectivity of the Job Corps' eligibility requirements, 
it is possible only to estimate the number of potentially eligible 
individuals. About one million of the approximately four million 
disadvantaged 16-21-year-olds are high school dropouts. An addi 
tional but unknown proportion are deficiently educated graduates. 
Like other job training programs, the 100,000 annual enrollees 
represent a fraction of those potentially eligible. However, due to 
the program's residential nature only a minority of the eligible 
youth wish to enroll.
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Table 6.3
Most corpsmembers are minority high school dropouts 


























































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Upon arriving at a center, the new corpsmember receives a 
week-long orientation explaining the educational and vocational 
programs, residential rules, health services and recreational activi 
ties. Most of the centers assign a veteran corpsmember to each new
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enrollee to facilitate his or her transition to center life. The average 
enrollee remains at a center for seven months, but a third leave 
within three months (figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4
A major problem of the Job Corps is that half the enrollees remain 
in the centers for less than six months (1985).
10% 15% 20% 25% 
Percent of enrollees
Source: U.S. Departmentof Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Education
Centers organize the educational and vocational programs by 
dividing the day in half for each track, alternating weeks, or using 
both methods depending upon the occupational training course. 14 
In 22 centers examined, 10 used a split-day schedule, 6 alternated 
weeks, and 6 used a combination schedule. The split-day schedule is 
more advantageous to enrollees, who have problems under the 
alternating week schedule in sustaining their attention for a full day 
of educational instruction and retaining course material during the 
off week. Centers which alternate weeks of educational and voca 




Over four-fifths of corpsmembers have completed the 9th grade, 
but only 14 percent read at that level. However, entry-level abilities 
range from the functionally illiterate to those who can read fairly 
well. Therefore, instructors first administer standardized tests to 
determine at what level corpsmembers should begin their reading 
and math program. In addition to the placement test, the Labor 
Department recently required centers to administer adult basic 
education tests to all new enrollees to uniformly gauge educational 
gains.
To accommodate divergent reading abilities, Job Corps reading 
instruction is individualized. Enrollees move through a series of 
short, competency-based lessons, progressing to the next lesson 
only after passing a test to ensure proficiency. Individuals proceed 
at their own pace and are assisted by instructors when they need 
help. Basic course materials are standardized, but the Labor 
Department encourages centers to test innovative and experimental 
approaches, and the Job Corps has pioneered in developing instruc 
tional materials for youth and adults who failed in or were failed by 
the schools.
Lack of confidence and motivation typically compound corps- 
members' reading difficulties. Although the program deemphasizes 
competition between enrollees, staff report that poor readers often 
feel stigmatized by other corpsmembers. Centers are not equipped 
to deal with learning disabilities, and individuals with severe 
disabilities are usually terminated from the program. Many enroll 
ees are more interested in occupational training than education, and 
participants' interest and progress often lag when they do not see 
the relevance of schooling to their careers. Consequently, educa 
tional and vocational instructors often work together to resolve 
occupational training problems attributable to poor reading skills.
The Job Corps' reading program is remarkably successful in 
comparison to traditional schooling techniques, although the cen 
ters have been slow to utilize computer-assisted instruction, prob 
ably because of financial impediments. Recent achievement tests 
indicate that corpsmembers on average gain about two months of 
reading achievement for every month of instruction. Thus enrollees
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not only perform dramatically better than they had in school, but 
outpace average student performance. The average corpsmember, 
enrolled in the program for seven to eight months, probably 
progresses from a 6th grade reading ability to a 7th or 8th grade 
level. Although the Labor Department has required centers to 
maintain records of participants' reading gains, a 1985 study found 
that reporting was so inadequate that "no reliable data" existed to 
assess reading improvement. 15 However, since that time the depart 
ment has revised its instructions, requiring centers to use a uniform 
standardized test to assess corpsmember educational progress.
Some centers offer courses in English as a second language, 
primarily for the Hispanic, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian 
corpsmembers who account for about a tenth of enrollees. These 
individuals usually remain in ESL programs until their English is 
adequate for educational and vocational training, which typically 
takes six months to a year. The Labor Department does not report 
the average length of stay for ESL enrollees, but it is probable that 
many do not remain long enough to complete an occupational 
training course.
Most new enrollees' math skills do not extend much beyond basic 
addition and subtraction. Instructors estimate that 40-60 percent of 
new corpsmembers have difficulty with fractions, measurements, 
percentages and decimals. The math program offers individualized 
and self-paced instruction designed to make corpsmembers profi 
cient in consumer math. Unlike the program's other education 
courses, the math curriculum is based primarily on commercially 
published texts rather than on Job Corps materials, although some 
supplementary exercises have been developed specifically for the 
program.
Math instructors generally encounter few problems teaching from 
the standardized curriculum, although, as in the reading program, 
teachers commonly use supplementary materials. Math education is 
linked to some degree with vocational training, particularly in labs 
where students practice measurement exercises. Teachers also work 
informally with vocational instructors when corpsmembers face 
training difficulties attributable to deficient math skills.
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High School Equivalency and Beyond
Enrollees who attain 8th or 9th grade reading proficiency enter 
the high school equivalency degree program. The Job Corps has 
designed a special curriculum for the program, although many 
instructors supplement this material and a fifth of the instructors 
questioned were so dissatisfied with the curriculum that they did not 
use it at all.
Evaluations of the Job Corps demonstrate that attainment of an 
equivalency degree has a significant impact on later employment 
success and educational achievement. 16 However, only about a 
seventh of the enrollees take the General Education Development 
(GED) test. Ninety percent of those who take the test pass it.
Several factors partially explain the limited number of corpsmem- 
bers who take the test. A fifth of new enrollees in 1985 had 
completed the 12th grade. Most of these individuals probably 
already possessed a diploma or equivalency degree, and in fact only 
4 percent took the GED while in the corps. A third of enrollees 
leave the program within three months, and it takes about that 
much time to complete GED instruction. However, even of those 
who had not completed the 12th grade and stayed in the Job Corps 
longer than six months, less than a third take the GED test. Not 
even half of those staying over a year take the test. One study 
examined the correlation between entry reading level and GED 
attainment for corpsmembers who had completed grades 9 through 
11 and remained in the program for over six months. The distribu 
tion follows:
Entry reading level Obtained GED
Less than 7th grade 16%
7th to 8th grade 46
9th grade or higher 65
Although the Job Corps' GED program has improved considerably 
in recent years — the proportion of enrollees obtaining equivalency 
degrees has doubled since the late 1970s — more emphasis on 
securing equivalency degrees for corpsmembers is necessary. 17 The 
limited number of long-term participants who receive certificates 
suggests that the record can be further improved. In late 1986, the
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Job Corps instituted a GED performance standard to promote the 
high school equivalency program.
Corpsmembers who complete their vocational program and 
attain a high school diploma or equivalency degree may receive 
postsecondary education or training through the corps' advanced 
career training program. Begun in 1979 to encourage lengthier 
program stays and provide a career ladder for outstanding achiev 
ers, the Labor Department canceled the program in 1981 but 
revived it three years later. Currently, 30 centers contract with a 
variety of private vocational schools and community colleges to 
train about 2 percent of corpsmembers at an annual cost of $1.5 
million.
Health and Consumer Instruction
In addition to math and reading courses, Job Corps centers 
provide health and "World of Work" education. The latter pro 
gram offers training in job search skills and consumer education, 
typically beginning at the same time as the math and reading classes 
and lasting 30 to 40 hours over a two- to eight-week period. Because 
the World of Work program is typically completed within a few 
months of enrollment, most centers offer a 5-15 hour refresher 
course for corpsmembers preparing to leave the center.
Although the curriculum is standardized, the health education 
program offers group rather than individualized instruction de 
signed to help enrollees make informed decisions about their health 
needs. The program usually begins within a month and a half after 
corpsmembers arrive at the center, and provides 27 lessons for an 
average of 32 hours instruction.
Instructors
Job Corps teachers' salaries and benefits are inferior to working 
conditions in local schools. Entry-level teacher salaries at the 
centers are 15-20 percent below starting wages at area schools, 
although corps instructors face a longer workday and a 12-month 
working year. However, centers report few difficulties in recruiting 
competent instructors because many teachers are attracted by a 
program that offers a strict disciplinary system and the challenge of
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teaching students who failed in or were failed by the established 
educational system. An oversupply of qualified teachers in recent 
years has also benefited the program.
As government civil service employees, teachers at civilian con 
servation centers are better paid than contract center instructors, 
but civil service procedures delay processing of hiring new teachers 
by as much as two to six months. The lowest paid CCC instructor 
makes about as much as the highest paid teachers at contract 
centers. The latter usually leave after three to five years for a better 
paying job, while many CCC instructors have over 10 years tenure.
Vocational Training
Job Corps enrollees' work histories are commensurate with their 
limited educational achievements. Seventy percent have never held 
a full-time job, and another 12 percent have previously worked full 
time but not within six months of enrollment. Half of those who 
had held full-time jobs earned the minimum wage or less.
Shortly after enrolling, each corpsmember participates in a three- 
to five-day vocational orientation program and learns about the 
training opportunities at the center. However, fewer than half of the 
centers provide new enrollees with some hands-on exposure to 
various trades, and instructors believe that a more intensive orien 
tation is necessary to allow enrollees to make informed vocational 
choices. Vocational assignment is generally determined by corps- 
member preference, and four of five corpsmembers are assigned to 
their first vocational choice. 18
The Job Corps offers training in about 120 occupations, although 
each center typically offers only 8-10. Four of five corpsmembers 
are trained for one of eleven occupations:
clerk typist or secretary 9.3%
cook or baker 9.1
welder 8.8




general or sales clerk 8.0




The remainder of the training opportunities represent a wide variety 
of occupations. About half of these require relatively few skills, such 
as keypunch operator, warehouseman and receptionist, while the 
others are more skilled jobs, such as accountant or appliance repair 
person.
Occupational enrollment reflects traditional gender patterns. 
Most women are trained to be clerk typists, nurse's aides, cooks, or 
clerks. Greater variety is generally available to men, in addition to 
the listed occupations. The Labor Department's comprehensive 
review of the program's offerings in 1983 concluded that Job Corps 
trades correlated well with occupational demand projections. The 
review panel recommended 12 new offerings, including computer 
and health-related trades, and several of these occupations were 
added by 1987. High initial investment costs inhibit new vocational 
offerings.
Center operators provide most of the training. In addition, the 
Washington Job Corps office selects national contractors, usually 
labor unions, to provide some training. Each service provider offers 
training for distinctly different occupations. For example, almost 80 
percent of national contractor training is for construction trades, 
provided primarily by carpenters', masons' and painters' unions. In 
1982 contract center instructors provided training for 75 percent of 
the 32,000 enrollees who spent over three months in the program, 
national contractors taught 16 percent, and civilian conservation 
center instructors trained the remaining 9 percent of enrollees. 
CCCs rely heavily on national contractors to provide training, while 
the contract centers commonly use in-house staff. Both kinds of 
centers also use local subcontractors for a small proportion of 
training. 19
Like Job Corps education courses, much of the vocational 
training program is individualized and self-paced, consisting of a 
series of competency-based lessons. The adequacy of facilities and
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equipment varies from center to center, with the larger centers being 
generally better equipped. Some of the smaller centers have out 
dated or insufficient equipment, most commonly for construction, 
clerical, automotive and welding courses. In 1980, the Job Corps 
began a major overhaul of its vocational program to establish 
standardized courses which stress the basic skills necessary to 
perform in each occupation. Industry and training experts as well as 
Job Corps personnel designed the courses, which were then tested at 
selected centers. Implementation of the new system, which will 
encompass all major occupational offerings, is scheduled to be 
completed in 1988.
Although hands-on experience is considered an important ele 
ment of the Job Corps' vocational program, opportunities for 
learning while doing are not uniformly available across occupa 
tions. Corpsmembers training in the construction, automotive, and 
industrial production trades tend to receive the most hands-on 
experience in actual or simulated settings, while health, clerical and 
sales training is more classroom oriented.
The centers generally have little difficulty recruiting and retaining 
vocational instructors, but face somewhat greater problems than 
the education program experiences. Salaries of CCC and national 
contractor instructors are at least comparable with similar private 
sector jobs, which results in extremely low turnover. Although the 
wages offered by contract centers are not as generous, they too 
experience minimal recruitment and turnover problems because the 
steady work hours offered by the program attracts instructors.20
The Residential Living Program
The most unique feature about the Job Corps is its residential 
nature. 21 The program's designers believed that providing a struc 
tured and supportive living environment was essential to break the 
"cycle of poverty" trapping many impoverished youngsters, but this 
theory is by no means universally accepted. Disentangling the 
elements which account for the Job Corps' success is no easy task. 
The most recent net impact study of the program included only 
residential enrollees because, when the study began in 1977, very
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few enrollees lived outside the centers. Moreover, differences be 
tween the two types of enrollees preclude simple comparisons of 
postprogram outcomes.
A demonstration project underway in mid-1987, called Jobstart, 
is designed to replicate the Job Corps approach in a nonresidential 
setting. Seventeen- to 21-year-old dropouts from impoverished 
homes with limited reading skills were randomly assigned to either 
Jobstart training or a control group in late 1985 and 1986. Jobstart 
involves 15 sites, 11 administered by local JTPA Title II agencies 
and 4 by Job Corps centers. All sites are to provide at least 5.5 
months of instruction, significantly less than the Job Corps' average 
in recent years of seven to eight months, which may complicate 
assessments of the project. 22
Operating a residential program poses a severe challenge for both 
Job Corps staff and participants. Corpsmembers must adjust to 
living in a new environment away from home while pursuing a 
disciplined education and training program, an especially difficult 
challenge for troubled youngsters lacking self-confidence. Many 
corpsmembers fail again, and either drop out or are dismissed from 
the program.
Corpsmembers receive living allowances of $40 to $100 monthly 
based on duration of enrollment as well as performance.
Monthly Proportion
allowance Duration of enrollees
(November 1986)
$ 40 Entry to 2 months 32%
$ 60 2-6 months 32
$ 80 After 6 months 14
$ 90 Merit allowance 7
$100 Merit allowance 14
Success or failure in the program often hinges upon whether new 
enrollees can adjust to group living. Housing accommodations in 
various centers range from a barracks to college-type dorm rooms. 
Anywhere from 2 to 42 enrollees sleep in a single room, although 8 
or less is typical. Staff and corpsmembers share housekeeping 
chores. A staff of resident advisers (RAs) living in the dorms is 
responsible for acclimating enrollees to center life and minimizing
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behavioral problems, including drinking and fighting. The RAs play 
a crucial role in maintaining discipline. Center officials report that a 
drop in the number of RAs below a critical threshold is associated 
with unacceptable levels of misbehavior.
Extensive counseling also helps corpsmembers adjust to center 
life. Homesickness is a universal problem, and enrollees also receive 
individual and group counseling for a wide variety of personal, 
educational and vocational difficulties. Most contract centers sched 
ule regular group counseling sessions fairly often, usually every 
week, which are supplemented with monthly individual counseling. 
In contrast, at CCCs most counseling is provided informally by 
RAs. Formal counseling is generally used only when a corps- 
member requests it or a teacher or RA makes a referral.
Job Corps staff consider the recreational program a vital tool in 
channeling the energy of enrollees into acceptable activities. Corps- 
members themselves plan and operate most recreational activities 
— which include team sports, dances, parties, and center stores or 
snack bars — to ensure that they are appealing.
All centers have elected corpsmember governments, varying from 
moribund bodies to those extensively involved in almost all facets of 
center activities. Not surprisingly, corpsmember governments are 
most interested in recreational programs and food service. The 
Labor Department also requires each center to encourage leader 
ship potential. More gifted corpsmembers are enrolled in a leader 
ship training course lasting from 6 to 40 hours, and then assigned 
work as aides in classrooms, recreational facilities, offices and 
shops. In return for extra responsibilities and work, the individual 
receives special privileges such as living in an honor dorm, use of 
recreational facilities outside normal hours, and passes to leave the 
center.
Corpsmembers receive comprehensive health care to ensure that 
medical problems do not inhibit their progress in the program. Each 
center has a full-time nurse or medical technician, and those centers 
without a staff doctor establish consulting arrangements with 
outside physicians. In addition to routine medical services, almost 
all centers operate alcohol and drug abuse and pregnancy pro 
grams. Job Corps staff at various centers estimate that 1-10 percent 
of female participants arrive pregnant at centers, and a small
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proportion become pregnant while enrolled. Pregnant corpsmem 
bers generally remain in the program until the seventh month of 
pregnancy.
Life at the centers is fairly regimented. Attendance is carefully 
monitored, and enrollees must obtain passes to leave the center for 
any reason. Staff conduct periodic inspections of both living and 
storage areas, and about half the centers routinely search all 
packages coming in or out of the facilities to keep out alcohol and 
drugs. If a crime is committed, most security officers try to handle 
the matter internally unless it involves a serious offense. Centers 
which rely on informal procedures have some difficulty levying 
consistent sanctions for like offenses.
Almost all centers use trained security personnel. Demands on 
these employees vary greatly between centers, with some expected 
to provide counseling while others merely follow formal security 
procedures. Because salaries are not competitive with local security 
agencies, the Job Corps experiences difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining qualified security personnel.
Running the residential program is a demanding job requiring a 
diversity of skills. The staff is primarily composed of residential 
advisors and counselors, although the duties associated with each of 
these positions vary greatly across centers. There is approximately 
one residential staff member for every eleven enrollees, a ratio which 
varies little among centers.
RAs at some centers (especially CCCs) do a great deal of 
counseling, while others primarily perform custodial work. In 
contrast to most positions at Job Corps centers, RAs and related 
jobs such as dorm attendants are subject to fairly high turnover. 
Salaries are generally low, and many RAs are college students or 
else take the position as a second job. Almost half the centers 
examined in 1984 experienced an average annual RA turnover rate 
of 35 percent.
Job Corps counselors are better paid but face diverse duties. 
Counselors are supposed to advise corpsmembers on their educa 
tional and vocational goals as well as personal problems. In 
addition to their therapeutic duties, counselors also typically man 
age the performance evaluation panels which monitor corpsmember 
progress. Professional qualifications are minimal considering the
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demands placed on counselors. Only 1 of 23 centers examined in 
1984 required a master's degree — a bachelor's degree in psychol 
ogy or sociology was usually acceptable. To assist counselors, the 
national office requires each center to hire a mental health consult 
ant to be available for a few hours a week to advise or train 
counselors and to accept referrals of particularly difficult cases.
The Dropout Problem
Ensuring that as many new entrants as possible complete the 
program is critical to the success of the Job Corps. Over the years, 
the Job Corps has greatly diminished the proportion of early 
leavers, but the problem remains serious. The Job Corps is a 
voluntary program, and enrollees are free to leave when they wish. 
The average stay in the centers is 7.2 months, but a third of 
participants leave within 3 months, half of these within the first 
month. By minimizing early departures and providing more inten 
sive training, the Job Corps has nearly doubled average training 
duration since the program began (figure 6.5). Program completers 
now stay, on average, over a year in the Job Corps.
Figure 6.5 
The average stay in the Job Corps has increased significantly.
7.9
7.2
Months of training 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Despite the improvements, only a third of enrollees completed 
the program in 1985 (table 6.4). Women are more likely to leave for
Table 6.4 


























































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Details do not total 100 percent because reasons for 0.5 percent of terminations are unrecorded.
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medical reasons (primarily due to pregnancy) and less likely to 
depart for disciplinary infractions than men. Nonresidents are 
much more likely to complete the program than residents, partly 
because they do not face the pressures and regimentation of center 
life. In 1985, 35 percent of residents compared with 25 percent of 
nonresidents remained less than three months in the Job Corps. 
Residents are more likely to depart for disciplinary reasons because 
most serious incidents occur after hours when nonresidents have left 
for the day.
Corpsmembers who leave without notice usually stay in the 
program for less than three months and constitute the bulk of the 
early leaver problem. Corpsmembers have indicated the following 
principal reasons for early departures:23
• homesickness;
• an inability to adjust to the Job Corps' structure and rules;
• insufficient pay;
• poor screening by recruiters; and
• enrollees' inability to make decisions about their interests 
and goals.
Interviews with center staff confirm many of these impressions. Staff 
view homesickness as the most important reason for dropping out 
within the first month, and an inability to adjust to center life as the 
principal explanation for those leaving in the second or third 
month. Lack of privacy, racial and ethnic animosities, regimenta 
tion, and bullying or assaults are the most common adjustment 
problems.
Younger Corpsmembers are more prone to drop out early, and 
the likelihood decreases with age. During 1984, 34 percent of 
16-year-olds compared with 23.5 percent of 21-year-olds left the 
program within three months. Similarly, only two-fifths of the 
youngest Corpsmembers stay over six months, compared to three- 
fifths of the 21-year-olds. Job Corps administrators have long 
known that younger enrollees are prone to drop out, and over the 
years the average age of the Corpsmembers has increased: a little 
over a decade ago nearly two-thirds of enrollees were under 18, 
compared with 40 percent currently. To improve the cost efficiency
148 CHAPTER 6
of the Job Corps, a persuasive case can be made for excluding 
16-year-olds from the program.
Whites — who are a minority in the centers — are much more 







The likelihood of whites dropping out is increased for those 
assigned to predominantly black centers. Over a quarter of the 
whites assigned to centers with over 70 percent black enrollment 
leave within the first month, compared to 16 percent of the whites 
assigned to other centers. Interestingly, the white dropout rate does 
not differ for the two types of centers in the second and third month 
of enrollment, which may indicate that white dropouts are uncom 
fortable in a black environment rather than that racial tensions 
constitute a persistent problem.
Enrollees at civilian conservation centers are more likely to stay 
in the program over three months than those at contract centers. 
The size and location of a center, corpsmember gender, and whether 
enrollees are assigned to their preferred occupational training 
program apparently have little impact on the dropout problem.24
The Labor Department and center operators have reduced the 
numbers of early leavers through various techniques. Recruiters are 
expected to carefully screen potential enrollees for serious medical 
and behavioral problems, and the Labor Department audits recruit 
ers who refer too many unsuitable applicants. The referral of clearly 
ineligible applicants to centers is apparently not a serious problem. 
The 2.5 percent of corpsmembers terminated for medical reasons 
had been in the program for an average of four months, making it 
unlikely that many of these medical problems predated admittance 
to the Job Corps. Similarly, since the 1.5 percent of enrollees 
terminated for administrative reasons (including ineligibility as well 
as a failure to make sufficient progress) had also typically been in 
the program for four months, it is doubtful that many were
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admitted due to poor screening. Moreover, some screening errors 
are attributable to false information provided by applicants who 
conceal mental health problems or criminal records from recruiters. 
Legal restrictions often prevent recruiters from independently ver 
ifying this kind of information.
While recruiters apparently enlist few ineligible applicants, they 
often fail to fully explain the program to applicants, which signifi 
cantly contributes to the dropout problem, according to both center 
staff and corpsmembers. A recent evaluation found significant 
variations between recruitment agencies in the accuracy and com 
pleteness of information they possessed concerning individual cen 
ters. The recruiters were generally knowledgeable about center 
training programs, but often lacked information about center living 
conditions, recreational programs, health facilities, and the sur 
rounding community. Many recruiters had not visited the centers 
for which they solicited applicants, and were therefore dependent 
upon the centers' promotional literature, hardly an unbiased 
source. Some recruiters did not even possess copies of the corps- 
member handbooks produced by each center.
Job Corps centers use various approaches to minimize the 
number of dropouts. Center staff commonly phone prospective 
enrollees to ensure that they have been informed about center living 
conditions, know what training opportunities are available, and are 
genuinely committed to the program. Many centers have a big 
brother or sister program to help orient new enrollees, and several 
make dormitory assignments with an eye toward ensuring racial 
balance and minimizing bullying. Counseling staff try to spot 
problems which might lead to early departures, and minimize 
homesickness by permitting calls and visits home.25
Postprogram Experiences
Placement assistance
Upon leaving a center, corpsmembers are provided job search 
assistance and a readjustment allowance. Until 1985, public em 
ployment offices provided most of the job search assistance in about 
four-fifths of the states, but by competitively bidding placement 
contracts the national office has expanded the role of alternative
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organizations. Job Corps centers, a state human resource depart 
ment, private corporations, Wider Opportunities for Women (a 
community-based organization), and the United Auto Workers 
now augment the employment service network. All agencies are 
now paid a fixed fee for every job placement, replacing the previous 
practice of reimbursing for all expenditures whether or not a 
placement resulted.
Upon a corpsmember's departure, the Job Corps center notifies 
the responsible placement agency that the former enrollee is due to 
arrive in the area. Contact is facilitated because corpsmembers can 
only pick up their readjustment allowance at the agency office, and 
over 90 percent of terminees are located. Corpsmembers who stayed 
in the program at least six months receive $75 for each of the first 
six months, and $100 for each month over six. Terminees who 
remained in the corps more than nine months are paid $100 for each 
month they were enrolled.
Since they are judged partially by their alumni placement record, 
some centers offer placement assistance, complementing the work 
of the placement agencies over which they have little control. The 
remote locations of civilian conservation centers generally render 
placement efforts impractical, but some contract centers use their 
work experience program to generate jobs for graduates. National 
contractors are especially successful at using their local contacts to 
place corpsmembers.
Longer Training Pays Off
Placement agencies report that program completers are relatively 
easy to place, while early leavers require considerable assistance. 
The Job Corps performance standards reflect this fact. Two of the 
standards assess center success in retaining participants. A third 
standard gauges the success of long-term enrollees (over six months' 
time) in finding work or continuing their education. The Labor 
Department has established a range of acceptable performance 
rather than a target figure (table 6.5).
Although the national average performance was within the 
acceptable range for the three targets, a third of the centers had 
overall unacceptable ratings for the year ending in June 1986. 
Despite the Labor Department's tough talk on sanctions, no more
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than four contracts were terminated due to poor performance. Thus 
the standards have been used more as guidelines and have probably 
had limited influence on center operations.
Table 6.5 






















































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration 
*Proportion of 90+day enrollees who remain over 180 days.
The department issued a fourth performance standard in late 
1986 designed to encourage attainment of high school equivalency 
diplomas. Unlike the other benchmarks, the GED standard is 
applied individually to each center and is based on a regression 
model which considers the age and reading level of participants, as 
well as other enrollee and center characteristics. The target gauges 
equivalency attainment among enrollees who enter the program 
with at least a fourth grade reading level and are old enough to take 
the GED test. A model standard of 30 percent GED attainment was 
chosen based on 1984 performance, and each center must meet the 
model-adjusted target plus or minus 9 percentage points, but the 
adjustments cannot lower the standard below a 10 percent GED 
attainment rate. Using 1986 enrollee and center characteristics, the
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model produced performance targets ranging from 10 to 38 percent 
across centers.
A fifth performance standard assessing educational gains was to 
be issued during 1987. Centers are now required to administer a 
standardized test to corpsmembers on three "national test days" 
every year. The department will use the test results to establish 
minimal educational improvement goals for each center.
The Job Corps' national office has used performance standards in 
a more creditable manner than other JTPA programs. Performance 
standards have been applied to accomplishments over which centers 
have more direct control, such as length of training and educational 
progress. The corps' performance standard system is also based on 
more reliable data than that collected in other JTPA programs 
because centers record, for example, the entry reading levels of 
enrollees. The fact that a third of the centers failed the 1985 
benchmarks indicates a need for either greater enforcement or a 
recalibration of the standards. Even the performance of the major 
contractor with the worst record (RCA) was not much different 
from that of the average center. Other JTPA performance systems 
could benefit by adopting some of the Job Corps' practices.
The Job Corps' definition of a successful placement is similar to 
the Title IIA program's positive termination outcome, but without 
the deficiencies that mar that standard. Corpsmembers who acquire 
a part-time or full-time job or an on-the-job training position of at 
least 20 hours a week; enroll full time in a school, training or 
apprenticeship program; or join the military or national guard 
within six months of termination are considered successfully placed. 
Other JTPA programs generally count placements within a three 
month postprogram period.
The Job Corps' placement reporting practices have raised trou 
bling questions. Until the early 1980s, the program only reported 
outcomes for corpsmembers it was able to locate. Currently, the 
corps assumes that unlocated corpsmembers have the same rate of 
placement success as the recorded group of individuals who receive 
no assistance from placement agencies. However, this assumption is 
questionable because performance standards discourage placement 
agencies from submitting records for individuals not placed. A 
more serious problem is the failure of the national office to verify
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reported placements. The Labor Department's inspector general 
found that about one of four reported placements were spurious in 
1982.26 No similar audits of reported performance have been 
performed during the past five years.
For the year ending in June 1986, using the corps' estimation 
procedure, 74 percent of terminees were successfully placed. If only 
those individuals who were located are counted, the positive 
termination rate rises to 81 percent, while discarding the estimation 
technique but including unlocated individuals lowers the rate to 66 
percent. Four-fifths of those placed obtained jobs or joined the 
military, and the remainder entered school. Male enrollees and 
program completers fare best in the labor market (table 6.6). 
Former female corpsmembers are more likely to drop out of the 
labor force to assume family responsibilities, which reduces their 
positive termination rate. Reported Job Corps outcomes are very 
similar to the outcomes for the relatively more advantaged youth in 
the Title IIA program.
Table 6.6 















































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Data reflect authors' adjustment of Labor Department statistics to account for 
unlocated terminees.
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Enrollees who train to become carpenters, masons, and painters 
are generally most successful at rinding relatively high paying jobs 
within six months after leaving the corps (table 6.7). The relatively 
superior outcomes for trainees in these construction trades is 
probably attributable to two factors. First, a sizable proportion of 
construction training is offered by national union contractors who 
have an established employment network for Job Corps graduates. 
Second, union construction programs tend to select older and 
relatively more qualified corpsmembers.27
The likelihood of completing training or positively terminating 
from the program does not vary much by training occupation. Job 
placement and wage rates exhibit more variation; occupations with 
large numbers of women fare worst in the labor market. Except for 
clerk typists and secretaries, trainees who remain for longer periods 
in the program tend to find better paying jobs. Overall, only a third 
of employed terminees find work in their field of training.
Longer Term Impact
The Job Corps underwent a careful assessment during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The findings convincingly demonstrate the 
program's worth in improving enrollees' employment prospects, 
and the evaluations have protected the Job Corps from serious 
budget cuts despite White House efforts in the 1980s to discredit the 
program's established record.
A comprehensive study examined the experiences of a random 
sample of 1977 corpsmembers over a four-year period and a 
comparison group of youth with similar characteristics. The simi 
larity of the two groups was confirmed by the fact that the 
experiences of the early Job Corps leavers paralleled those of the 
comparison group.
The positive impacts of the program, which persisted throughout 
the four-year follow-up period, were striking. Former corpsmem 
bers had significantly greater employment and earnings, more 
education, better health, and less serious criminal records than the 
comparison group. The corpsmembers were also less likely than the 
comparison group to receive cash welfare payments, food stamps or 
unemployment insurance. Former enrollees received on average 
half the amount of cash benefits obtained by members of the
Table 6.7. 







































































































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration 
Note: Table excludes unlocated terminees.
156 CHAPTER 6
comparison group. Despite the program's persistent difficulties in 
securing high school equivalency degrees for enrollees, former 
corpsmembers were much more likely to have earned diplomas or 
equivalency degrees than nonparticipants, and more had enrolled in 
college.
Counting civilian jobs and military enlistments, former corps- 
members worked an average of one and a half weeks more in the 
first follow-up year than the comparison group, and three to five 
weeks more in the second through the fourth years. The civilian 
employment rate was 6 percent higher for corpsmembers. Annual 
earnings, in 1977 dollars, were $262 higher than nonenrollees' 
earnings in the first year and $405 to $652 higher in the next three 
years, about 15 percent higher than the comparison group. Parti 
cipants' higher earnings were primarily attributable to increased 
working time rather than to higher wages. The evidence was mixed 
as to whether the Job Corps' positive employment impact was 
fading toward the end of the four-year follow-up.
Imputing dollar values to Job Corps benefits — admittedly an 
inexact science — analysts concluded that the program yields $1.46 
for every $1 invested. From a societal perspective, benefits exceeded 
costs by over $2300 per corpsmember in 1977 dollars ($4200 in 1986 
dollars), and the program's investment in the average enrollee was 
paid back in just three years. Most of Job Corps' benefits were 
derived from the increased economic output and decreased criminal 
behavior of corpsmembers.28
Interestingly, the program's benefits were not apparent during 
the year after corpsmembers left the centers, as the alumni had some 
difficulty readjusting to the outside world, indicating that short- 
term results may not be a reliable barometer of long-term employ 
ment success. Somewhat surprisingly, the study found that general 
or sales clerk trainees fared best in the long run. Adjusting for 
participant characteristics, individuals trained as clerks, welders and 
electricians had the highest earnings, while former corpsmembers in 
the other principal vocational programs earned at or below the 
average for all corps alumni (table 6.8). Former painter trainees, 
who exhibited nearly the best results in the short term, fared poorly 
in the long run. On the other hand, the former clerk trainees with 
the highest long-term earnings performed below average in the
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immediate postprogram period. The findings, while they do not 
make intuitive sense and bear further investigation, provide further 
support for cautiously interpreting performance measures based on 
short-term results.29
The evaluators also examined the impact of the program from the 
perspective of corpsmembers and the taxpayers who foot the bill. 
Not surprisingly, program participants reap most of the benefits 
from the Job Corps. However, taxpayers also gain from reduced 
social program and criminal justice costs, and from the labor value 
of the projects corpsmembers contribute while enrolled. Overall, the 
cost-benefit ratio for taxpayers is only slightly negative, 98 cents for 
every dollar invested.
Although benefits persisted during the four-year follow-up pe 
riod, the analysts assumed that the benefits of the Job Corps 
diminished after time. However, if the benefits continue throughout
Table 6.8.
Corpsmembers trained as clerks achieve the best long-term labor 
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Source: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
former enrollees' working lives, the program's cost-benefit ratio 
would be much more favorable, $2.11 for every dollar invested — 
over $10,000 per corpsmember in 1986 dollars. 30
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Although the evaluation of the Job Corps reviewed the experi 
ences of enrollees who entered the program a decade ago, there is no 
reason to believe the corps is less effective today. In fact, the current 
program is probably more effective because the proportion of early 
dropouts has declined and average training duration has increased.
A Quarter Century of Progress
Despite some anxious moments, the Job Corps has survived the 
Reagan administration attacks relatively unscathed. Nonetheless, 
staff cuts at the federal level and reduced resources for research and 
development threaten the corps' ability to experiment with new 
approaches to serve severely disadvantaged youth. Contrary to 
fashionable deprecations of Washington, the Job Corps' achieve 
ments are due both to national leadership as well as the dedicated 
center staff which the program has consistently attracted. Since its 
inception, the Job Corps has collected the information necessary to 
pinpoint problems and taken steps to enhance its educational, 
vocational, and residential programs. Other JTPA components 
could benefit greatly by adopting these practices.
Efforts to boost training quality and provide a greater proportion 
of enrollees with high school equivalency degrees are now under 
way. Additional funding would permit expanded use of computers 
in instruction, which showed considerable promise in a late 1970s 
study. However, given the program's high costs, efforts to improve 
cost efficiency should also continue. Increasing individual center 
capacity would undoubtedly reduce unit costs. While reductions are 
possible, as long as the Job Corps operates residential facilities it 





In addition to the Job Corps, Congress retained federal admin 
istration over programs for two special groups who are among the 
poorest members of American society: migrant and seasonal farm 
workers and Indians. Even the Reagan administration acknowl 
edged that the migration patterns of many farmworkers make state 
administration inadvisable, and efforts to aid Native Americans 
have traditionally been the responsibility of the federal government.
Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers
The conclusions of the latest presidential commission which 
examined the problems of migrant and seasonal farm laborers in 
1978 remain valid today.
American farmworkers and their families still live and work 
under conditions which are cruel and harsh by any standard: 
They are ill-housed, ill-clothed, under-nourished, face enor 
mous health hazards, are underpaid, underemployed, undered- 
ucated, socially isolated, politically powerless, excluded from 
much of the work-protective legislation that other American 
workers take for granted, and unable to compete in the labor 
market for the higher wages that would permit them to resolve 
their own problems or ameliorate the bleak reality of their 
existence. 1
Given the nature of their employment, involving geographic 
mobility or intermittent work, estimates of the number of migrant 
and seasonal farmworkers are necessarily subject to significant
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variations. After a drastic decline throughout most of this century, 
the overall hired farmworker population appears to have stabilized 
at roughly 1.5 million in the 1980s. The most disadvantaged of these 
are the approximately 250,000 migrant farmworkers, and the poor 
seasonal farmworkers whose number is uncertain.2 Because of the 
low pay, temporary employment and difficult working conditions, 
migrant and seasonal farm labor is dominated by poor immigrants, 
many from Mexico, who often face even harsher working condi 
tions in their native country.
Federal farmworker employment and training programs date 
back to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, and were incorpo 
rated into CETA with a separate earmarked appropriation. Except 
for the introduction of performance standards, JTPA made no 
significant changes in the program's statutory authority.
Financing
Congress stipulated that annual JTPA farmworker appropria 
tions equal 3.2 percent of Title IIA funding, although actual 
appropriations have sometimes slightly exceeded this amount, as 
follows:
Appropriation






In inflation-adjusted dollars, the 1987 appropriation was a third of 
CETA's 1980 funding level. Farmworker programs operate in 48 
states and Puerto Rico, but nearly two-fifths of the funds are 
allocated to California, Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico and North 
Carolina.
Most projects are administered by community-based organiza 
tions initially established by the antipoverty programs of the 1960s. 
All participating grantees operate statewide projects, except in 
California. Six training contractors administer 23 of the 53 total
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projects, and receive 41 percent of all funds. The average project 
received slightly over $1 million from JTPA in 1986, distributed as 
follows:
Distribution by 
Allocation Number of projects Funding received
Total 53 96.1%
Under $500,000 15 6.4
$500,000 - $999,999 16 21.3
$1 million-$1,999,999 17 39.2
$2 million - $2,999,999 2 9.9
Over $3 million 3 19.3
The Labor Department reserves approximately 4 percent of the 
annual appropriation, primarily for farmworker housing assistance. 
A 1986 analysis sponsored by the Labor Department's inspector 
general concluded that the financial management records of farm 
worker projects were inadequate to ensure that funds were properly 
spent, and that the Labor Department had done little to correct 
previously identified problems. Many of the grantees had not been 
audited in three years. However, most of the problems uncovered 
were resolved, and the inspector general recommended disallowing 
less than 1 percent of total expenditures. 3
Enrollees and Services
JTPA assists some 50,000 farmworkers annually, less than half 
the number served by GET A. Individuals who (1) did a minimum of 
25 days of farm work or earned $400 in farm wages in any 
consecutive 12-month period in the previous two years, (2) obtain at 
least half of their earnings or spend half of their time engaged in 
farm work and (3) belong to an impoverished family are eligible for 
assistance. The average enrollee earned less than $3000 in the year 
before entering JTPA, and nearly two-fifths had eight years of 
schooling or less. Despite their destitution, few farmworker enroll- 
ees receive welfare. Enrollees are about equally divided between 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers (table 7.1).
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Table 7.1
The typical JTPA farmworker enrollee is a minority adult male 


























































Employment and Training Administration
Over three-fourths of program funds are devoted to training, but 
less than half of the enrollees receive any training. The majority 
receive nontraining services, costing an average of $124 in 1985. 
These services are targeted at migrant enrollees, and include health 
care, meals, temporary shelter, child care and transportation (table 
7.2). Enrollees receiving some form of training remain in the 
program for an average of five months. Most classroom training 
probably emphasizes basic education skills, because less than a third 
of farmworker grantees offer occupationally-specific classroom
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training. One analyst concluded that occupational classroom train 
ing is of satisfactory quality, based on teacher qualifications, 
training duration, and the views of former participants and the 
employers who hired them.4 Other "training assistance" — a 
catchall category including job search training, counseling, and 
outreach and eligibility determination costs — is the least expensive 
training-related assistance.
Table 7.2 












































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Expenditures for support services have declined sharply since the 
late 1970s, when CETA allocated over a third of its farmworker 
program budget to support assistance. Emphasizing training, the 
Labor Department limited nontraining-related support services to 
15 percent of a local project's budget. As in other programs under 
JTPA, OJT and job search assistance have increased compared to 
CETA, and the funding of work experience projects has declined.
Outcomes
The Labor Department has issued performance standards gov 
erning expected job placement rates and costs per placement. 
However, the department has relied too heavily upon these mea 
sures to guide the program and paid too little attention to the 
quality of training that enrollees receive.
For 1986, projects were expected to match 1984 performance 
results within a fairly generous 15 percentage point margin, but the 
adjustment margin could not lower the job placement standard
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below a 40 percent rate or raise average costs per placement above 
$8,000. Participants receiving services only are excluded from the 
calculations for the standards, and administrative costs are not 
considered in assessing costs per placement.
For JTPA's first three years, farmworker performance standards 
did not credit youth positive terminations, as did the Title IIA 
program. Consequently, youth enrollees who learned the 3Rs were 
counted as negative terminations, which discouraged remedial 
education programs and increased costs per placement. Although 
beginning in July 1986 youth positive terminations were no longer 
considered a negative outcome, the performance system still does 
not encourage provision of remedial education for youth.
Outcomes for JTPA's first three years follow:
Oct. 1983-
June 1984 1984 1985
Job placement rate 66% 62% 62%
Cost per placement $3556 $4044 $4543 
including administrative costs $4472 $4974 $5548
Anecdotal reports indicate that projects manipulate enrollment and 
termination data to attain prescribed standards. Labor Department 
auditors found that about 5 percent of reported JTPA placements 
could not be verified. 5
Reported job placement rates are comparable with the Title IIA 
program, as is the average hourly wage of $4.58. Costs per 
placement are nearly $2000 higher, probably because training 
duration is longer in the farmworker program. JTPA farmworker 
program performance cannot be directly compared with CETA, 
which did not report results separately for trainees and those 
receiving support services only. Counting all terminees, CETA job 
placement rates during 1982-3 were about 20 percent, compared to 
29 percent for JTPA in 1985. However, since CETA provided a 
larger proportion of enrollees with services only, JTPA and CETA 
placement results probably do not differ significantly. CETA ter 
minees who found work earned slightly over $4 hourly, about the 
same as JTPA terminees after adjusting for wage growth.
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Most job placements are for nonagricultural jobs. About half of 
those who find work do so in occupations unrelated to their 
training. Job holders generally earn higher hourly wages than they 
did in their previous employment.6 White enrollees have the best 
placement results, while those with limited English language skills 
are least successful at finding work (table 7.3). High school drop- 
outs attained a relatively high 59 percent placement rate, but not 
surprisingly fared worse than graduates. Seasonal farmworkers 
have much higher placement rates than migrants.
Table 7.3.
White male high school graduates are most successful 



































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Work experience and classroom training have the highest re 
ported costs per placement, over twice as expensive as OJT or 
training assistance, although significant miscategorization distorts 
the accuracy of these comparisons. OJT placement rates are 
significantly higher than other forms of training.
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Service Placement rate Cost per placement
Total 62% $4543
Classroom training 53 5987
On-the-job training 80 2507
Training assistance 53 2756
Work experience 60 6388
Despite its costliness, effective classroom training, by improving 
participants' education and skills, may achieve the most durable 
employability gains.
Follow-up surveys of former enrollees and their employers 
indicate a need for greater Labor Department attention to local 
operations. Many employers with OJT contracts said they would 
have hired the workers without a subsidy. Eighteen percent of the 
placements were for temporary jobs, and 13 percent for part-time 
work. A large proportion of individuals who are placed remain with 
the same employer for only a short time (about half are let go), 
although most subsequently find work.7 These deficiencies reflect 
the difficulties involved in assisting poor farmworkers as well as 
program inadequacies. In some cases a temporary or part-time 
placement may represent the best alternative. Nevertheless, the 
findings reinforce the necessity for increased Labor Department 
oversight and federal funding to provide more intensive training.
The JTPA farmworker program is seriously overextended in 
attempting to stretch insufficient funds to serve its client population. 
By increasing the number of immigrant farmworkers with legal 
status in this country, the new immigration law has expanded the 
eligible population and placed an even greater burden on the 
program.
Native Americans
Indian families living on or near reservations have average 
incomes only two-fifths as large as the typical American family, but 
must stretch this income to raise an average of twice as many 
children.8 The Indian unemployment rate estimated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs approaches 50 percent.9 Because of their 
extreme poverty andjoblessness, Indians were early beneficiaries of 
federal employment and training assistance and antipoverty pro-
Native Americans 167
grams, but no separate Indian training program existed until the 
enactment of CETA. Except for the introduction of performance 
standards, JTPA made no significant changes in the program's 
statutory authority.
Funding
Congress stipulated that annual JTPA Indian appropriations 
equal 3.3 percent of Title IIA funding, although actual appropria 
tions have sometimes slightly exceeded this amount.
Appropriation






Indian grantees in selected areas also share in the distribution of 
summer youth employment funds, and received $13.6 million in 
1987. Largely because of the elimination of CETA public service 
jobs, Indian employment and training funds have drastically de 
creased since the 1979 peak appropriation of $222 million, over four 
times larger in inflation-adjusted dollars than JTPA's 1987 funding. 
Cuts in related Indian social programs compounded problems 
caused by diminished employment and training assistance.
Indian programs operate in all states, but Arizona, California 
and Oklahoma, where nearly two-fifths of the Indian population 
reside, receive an identical proportion of the funds. For 1987, 190 
grantees — including tribal governments, intertribal consortia, and 
off-reservation Indian organizations — received an average of 
about $325,000 to administer the program, but the average masked 
an incredible degree of diversity (figure 7.1). The plethora of small 
programs is due to the dispersion of small groups of Indians 
throughout the United States, funding cuts since CETA, and a 
governmental decision to maintain separate administrative author 
ity for smaller tribes and bands. To maximize administrative 
efficiency, some tribes consolidate JTPA and other federal program 
funds. The Labor Department recommended disallowing 5 percent 
of the expenditures audited between October 1983 and March 1987,
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a rate significantly higher than the other federally administered 
training programs. 10 However, historically most costs recom 
mended for disallowance have been approved on appeal.
Figure 7.1 









Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Enrollees and Services
Federal regulations permit assistance to nearly any Native Amer 
ican who is unemployed, underemployed or economically disadvan- 
taged, making several hundred thousand Indians eligible for JTPA. 
Some 54,000 Indians enrolled in various JTPA programs in 1985, as 
follows:
Native American programs (Title IV) 
Summer youth programs (Title IIB) 








Because the number of eligible Indians far exceeds available 
JTPA slots, local Indian program administrators adopt a variety of 
screening mechanisms with widely divergent goals. The typical 
JTPA Title IV Indian enrollee is an adult high school graduate who
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earned less than $4000 in the year before entering JTPA. Charac 







High school dropout 27
High school student 8
High school graduate 65
Welfare recipient 22 
Single parent 18
Classroom training, subsidized public employment, and job 
search assistance account for most of the aid received by JTPA 
Indian program participants, who, on average, remain enrolled for 
a little over 3.5 months (table 7.4). Reported data should be 
regarded as, at best, ballpark estimates. Data collection has mea 
surably improved since CETA, when Labor Department records 
were extremely spotty. Major reporting deficiencies continue, how 
ever, due to misunderstanding of reporting terms or deliberate 
misreporting of performance outcomes and the Labor Depart 
ment's inadequate monitoring and technical assistance.
Table 7.4
Unlike other JTPA programs, subsidized public employment remains 
































Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Nearly a third of participants receive classroom vocational 
training. Projects utilize community colleges and private vocational 
schools where available, allowing enrollees a broad selection of 
occupational choices, but classroom training programs on isolated 
reservations are usually limited to secretarial or construction trades.
Unlike other JTPA programs, the use of subsidized public 
employment — including public service employment and work 
experience — remains important in Indian programs, accounting 
for nearly a third of participant enrollment. Because Indians face 
extremely high unemployment and have limited access to jobs on 
the reservation, Congress stipulated that the Labor Department 
could not prohibit local administrators from operating public 
service employment programs. This did not prevent the Labor 
Department from attempting to limit public jobs spending to 10 
percent of a grantee's allocation or to the official unemployment 
rate percentage, whichever is higher, but local programs have 
countered by reclassifying public service employment as work 
experience. Enrollees in subsidized positions primarily perform 
clerical work for tribal enterprises and social programs. With 25-40 
applicants per opening due to severe job shortages on reservations, 
competition for these slots is often severe.
As in the farmworker program, "training assistance" is a catchall 
category including job search assistance, counseling, and outreach 
and eligibility costs. These programs, which typically offer no more 
than a few days of assistance, have significantly increased since 
GET A despite the limited usefulness of job search programs in areas 
where few job openings exist.
On-the-job training remains limited due to insufficient private 
jobs on reservations and persistent bias against Indians off reserva 
tions. Nonreservation OJT participants have more varied voca 
tional options, although most tend to work in fast food restaurants, 
gas stations, and entry level jobs in offices. OJT slots on reservations 
are generally restricted to construction trades. 11
Outcomes
The Labor Department has issued JTPA Indian program perfor 
mance standards governing expected job placement and positive
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termination rates as well as costs per positive termination. The 
positive termination standards reflect an important goal, but are too 
ambiguously defined to adequately assess performance. Reported 
outcomes indicate an improvement compared to CETA's final year.
Oct. 1983-
1983 June 1984 1984 1985 
(CETA)
Job placement rate 33% 49% 47% 47% 
Positive termination rate 66% 80% 80% 79% 
Cost per positive
termination $3003 $2642 $2294 $2250
Trainees who found work earned an average of $4.97 hourly. Since 
few public service employment and work experience enrollees find 
unsubsidized work, these two programs have high costs per entered 
employment, as follows:





Public service employment 15,047
Training assistance and services only 2,469
The Labor Department's overreliance on performance standards 
for reservations illustrates the department's inflexible dedication to 
quantifying results. Before 1987, each project faced standards based 
on its performance in prior years, but the Labor Department then 
implemented standards based on a regression model similar to that 
used in the Title IIA program. Local operators have vigorously 
protested the model's suitability for Indian reservations, as the 
Labor Department's action flies in the face of the well-established 
fact that reservation economic and demographic data are unreli 
able. In the absence of reservation-specific data, the local economic 
factors incorporated in the model use data for the surrounding 
county, which may contain a relatively large non-Indian popula-
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tion. Another problem is that since over half of Indian programs 
have fewer than 100 terminees per year, minor differences in 
enrollee characteristics from year to year can cause significant shifts 
in performance targets. 12
Federal employment and training programs have played an 
important albeit insufficient role in improving the labor market 
prospects of Indians. It would be unrealistic to expect that meager 
employment funds could invigorate the depressed economies of 
most reservations. Nonetheless, funding cuts and lackluster federal 
administration have impaired the effectiveness of JTPA Indian 
programs. The Labor Department's misguided single-minded em 
phasis on performance standards and neglect of more substantive 
oversight has engendered much friction between the department 
and local administrators, to the detriment of the program. 13
8 
Taking Stock
The Job Training Partnership Act has garnered broad political 
support for employment assistance in aid of the unskilled and 
deficiently educated poor. Business representatives and conserva 
tives — including President Reagan — who heaped abuse upon 
GET A, now sing JTPA's praises. The importance of a positive 
image should not be underestimated: for all of CETA's achieve 
ments, its unpopularity doomed the program. Nonetheless, JTPA's 
accomplishments fall short of the claims of the Reagan administra 
tion and many program administrators.
The Last Should Be First
JTPA has stressed training and downgraded support services as 
well as income support. But the quality of training and the selection 
of trainees for the limited available slots have received little 
attention. To attain "success," local programs have tended to 
exclude the functional illiterates JTPA was presumably meant to 
serve. Consideration of applicants' income, employment history 
and educational attainment should be an integral part of the 
training program. To effectively implement the law, the Labor 
Department should require local projects to utilize these criteria as 
well as reading and math skill tests to screen in rather than screen out 
those most in need of JTPA services. Teaching these individuals the 
3Rs should be a priority because basic literacy is a prerequisite to 
gain access to and satisfactorily perform on even entry-level jobs.
JTPA's strict limitations on stipends and support services prevent 
poor individuals from enrolling in or completing training programs.
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An assessment of support needs should be an integral part of each 
new enrollee's employability development plan. Local staff should 
ascertain whether lack of child care, health care, or transportation 
would inhibit the successful completion of training. To enable 
localities to provide essential services, Congress should liberalize the 
15 percent limit on support service expenditures to allow stipends on 
a broader basis, scaled to the income and financial resources of the 
enrollee's family, and the Labor Department should promote in 
creased use of stipends and services. As in the Job Corps, stipends 
should also reward participants who complete training courses. 
Dismissing individuals who make little progress or demonstrate 
insufficient effort would discourage those looking for a handout.
In the absence of careful oversight, contractors may cut corners 
on training quality to increase profits or in response to federal or 
local pressures to reduce costs. Unless enrollees acquire skills which 
are valued in the marketplace, JTPA is unlikely to achieve more 
than fleeting gains in enhancing the employability of the poor. The 
quality of remedial education and occupational training can be 
improved by providing localities with the funds to hire better 
qualified instructors, purchase necessary equipment, and operate 
programs of sufficient length. Job Corps curricula should be tested at 
selected localities and adapted as necessary to enhance the quality of 
education and training in other JTPA components. Local programs 
should exercise greater care in negotiating on-the-job training 
contracts to avoid subsidizing employers for hiring individuals they 
would have engaged without government inducements.
Federal standards for admissions and training quality require 
substantial technical assistance and monitoring to ensure effective 
implementation. New regulations will in turn necessitate significant 
alterations in performance standards, which currently encourage 
both creaming and brief training courses. Without efforts to verify 
the accuracy of reported results, contractors can exaggerate, fudge 
or even falsify their reports with impunity. Thus the performance 
outcomes, which proclaim JTPA's exemplary record, are based on 
data of questionable reliability. The Labor Department should at 
least perform spot-check audits of reported contractor performance. 
Without uniform, enforced federal standards for program content, 
competency-based standards discourage localities from offering
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quality programs because superficial courses produce the best 
results on paper at minimal costs. Meaningful competency bench 
marks should be applicable to deficiently educated adults as well as 
youth. To assist schools and local training programs to reach those 
in need and to help them attain basic educational competency, the 
federal government could fund private organizations that would 
establish networks for implementing the basic competency goals. 1 
Achievement of a high school equivalency diploma should be the goal 
for enrollees who have not completed their secondary education. 
Finally, to reflect the fact that performance standards are far less 
scientifically-derived than the Labor Department pretends, the 
targets should be expressed as a range of acceptable performance 
rather than a specific number.
Despite congressional emphasis on basic education, JTPA's 
summer youth employment program remains primarily a work 
experience activity. Amendments requiring that a fourth of the 
funds be spent on basic education failed to gain congressional 
approval in 1986, but the principle remains sound. While providing 
job opportunities may be necessary to entice disadvantaged youth 
to enroll in a summer educational program, work experience alone 
— especially the payment of the hourly minimum wage to 14- and 
15-year-olds — is not the best investment of three-quarters of a 
billion dollars annually. Localities should also have the authority to 
use summer program funds to serve youth in year-round training 
programs.
Congress is currently considering President Reagan's proposed 
increase in dislocated worker funding together with an expanded 
federal role in administration. States have feebly managed the 
program and left a third of allocated funds unspent, leaving 
thousands of displaced workers without assistance. Specialized 
permanent personnel at the local level to plan and implement timely 
responses to major layoffs and plant closings would be costly and 
not feasible. The Labor Department should assemble teams of experts 
to help states and localities organize dislocated worker projects as 
soon as notice of prospective layoffs becomes available. However, 
even the most efficient dislocated worker project will be handi 
capped by the failure of firms to provide sufficient warning of mass 
layoffs. At present, only half of even large corporations provide any
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advance notice of mass layoffs to workers, and in these cases the 
average length of notice is only a month and a half. Excluding 
special circumstances, Congress should require large firms to provide 
three months advance notice of major layoffs and plant closings.
The exemplary accomplishments of the Job Corps have been 
recognized across the political spectrum. However, personnel re 
ductions during the 1980s have seriously hampered the Labor 
Department's ability to monitor and maintain program standards, 
let alone improve operations. Audits have demonstrated a particu 
lar need to verify results reported by placement agencies.
The seemingly intractable poverty of migrant farmworkers and 
reservation Indians necessitates far more resources and energetic 
efforts than currently provided by JTPA. The Labor Department 
should provide more intensive technical assistance and experiment 
with new approaches for these hard to serve groups. The department 
has funded only one evaluation of the Indian and farmworker 
programs in more than a decade. Without more thorough research, 
departmental efforts to improve the programs will not provide 
optimal returns on the federal investment.
Minding the Store
JTPA's designers assumed that delegating oversight to the states 
would produce better management and more effective results. 
However, in four years of operations, few states have demonstrated 
initiative in administering JTPA, and most are content to follow the 
minimum requirements of the law. Even the Reagan administration 
— by proposing a new dislocated worker program with an ex 
panded federal role — has tacitly acknowledged that state manage 
ment of JTPA's Title III is wanting.
Improving JTPA's operations does not require altering its ad 
ministrative structure. In fact, such a realignment would impede 
necessary reforms. Congress has historically devoted too much 
attention to details dealing with the division of administrative 
responsibility, at the expense of emphasizing and overseeing pro 
gram quality. Dynamic federal action would require few statutory 
changes, but would necessitate a renewed sense of mission by the
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Labor Department. Although the federal government was casti 
gated for allegedly stifling local creativity during CETA, the 
extraordinary diversity of local programs belied this allegation. A 
more vigorous federal role will not hamper states which are dedicated 
to improving JTPA 's performance.
Congressional financial support and constructive oversight are 
critical to undergird increased federal direction of JTPA. Deficit 
concerns made Congress all too acquiescent to the administration's 
sharp curtailment of Employment and Training Administration 
staff. Effective monitoring and technical assistance, as well as greater 
accountability for program expenditures, are not possible without 
more federal personnel. Because states have provided remarkably 
little support for technical assistance, and because the provision of 
assistance by 50 different states is inherently inefficient, funds 
dedicated to technical assistance and incentive awards for superior 
SDA performance (the 6 percent set-aside) should be reallocated to 
the Labor Department. This will not prevent the department from 
reimbursing states that provide useful technical assistance.
Equal congressional attention should be devoted to prodding the 
Labor Department to more energetically monitor JTPA activities. 
Following the law's enactment, states and localities expected and 
sought federal direction and guidance in implementing the new 
program, but the administration shunned its responsibilities. Con 
gress has also remained largely a passive observer of the program's 
evolution, intervening only to block administration efforts to cut 
JTPA's budget and to enact minor amendments in 1986. Oversight 
hearings have been generally superficial, and even the Labor 
Department's failure to submit required annual reports prompted 
no response from Congress. A Congress content to follow the path 
of least resistance will likely cave in to state and local objections to 
stricter federal guidance, even when the complaints are driven by no 
more than turf jealousies or bureaucratic resistance to change.
JTPA stresses the coordination of job training efforts with related 
social programs, but experience has shown that states and localities 
have made little progress since the law's enactment. Moreover, 
SDA administrators are small cogs in the wheels of government, 
lacking the leverage necessary to influence other programs. Closer 
cooperation would undoubtedly enhance JTPA's effectiveness, but
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it cannot mitigate the effects of drastically reduced budgets. A 
broad brush approach to coordination will probably remain inef 
fective. JTPA should instead integrate coordination efforts into 
projects designed to achieve specific ends. For example, increased 
utilization of the community college system would confer main 
stream credentials on poor individuals who successfully complete 
courses. The Labor Department should carefully select attainable 
coordination goals and work closely with states and localities to 
specify the objectives, define the obstacles, and carefully evaluate 
the success or failure of different approaches.
Congress should simplify the 8 percent education set-aside and 
eliminate the 3 percent older worker set-aside. The former should 
remain under state direction, but Congress should restrict its use to 
remedial education and abolish the remaining statutory provisions, 
which complicate administration of the funds. The older worker 
program also unnecessarily complicates administration, and the 
money could be used more efficiently by permitting the Senior 
Community Service Employment Program to operate training 
programs.
The effects of increasing the role of business in JTPA require 
close scrutiny. Although business has played an important part in 
enhancing the legitimacy of job training programs and giving SDAs 
access to additional community resources, private industry council 
business members too frequently demonstrate a shortsighted at 
tachment to "bottom line" performance indicators which may 
poorly reflect the actual effectiveness of JTPA in the long run. 
Revised federal standards and constant monitoring are necessary to 
insure that SDAs pursue federal priorities.
Knowledge is Valuable
Policy shapers and program administrators need operational 
data to run programs effectively. The federal government should 
significantly enhance data collection as well as research efforts at all 
three levels of government. The following information, subject to 
uniform federal definitions, should be collected for each enrollee:
• participant characteristics (including entry reading and math 
attainment as well as employment and earnings history;
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• receipt of training, support services and stipends;
• duration (in hours) and the dollar value of each service;
• educational and occupational achievements in the program;
• reason for termination; and
• postprogram occupational and educational attainments.
To reduce administrative costs and facilitate analysis of the data 
collected, as well as to disseminate the findings, Congress should 
provide funds for compatible computer systems, at least at the state 
level.
If properly executed, the experiment now underway to determine 
JTPA's effectiveness may represent an improvement over previous 
Labor Department evaluations of employment and training pro 
grams. However, the random assignment of individuals to either 
training or control groups will be extremely difficult to implement 
successfully, particularly in the case of on-the-job training pro 
grams. Therefore, these experiments should be considered an 
adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, other methods of evaluating 
JTPA. The Labor Department should reconsider its decision to cancel 
the Census Bureau's longitudinal survey, which was designed to 
provide information about the long-term experiences of former par 
ticipants.
It Can't Be Done With Mirrors
Job training programs have unquestionably enhanced the em- 
ployability of the poor, but they cannot do the job alone. Without 
a sound educational system, enough jobs, adequate wages and strict 
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, JTPA cannot be fully 
effective. During CETA, job creation received at least as much 
attention as training, but Congress could not overcome the Reagan 
administration's adamant opposition to a permanent public service 
employment program even when unemployment reached nearly 11 
percent. In mid-1987, during the fifth year of the economic recov 
ery, a monthly average of 7.3 million Americans who sought work 
were unable to find it. In one of four states, the unemployment rate
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exceeded 8 percent, a level historically associated with a recession. 
Public service employment projects, even if not restricted to the poor, 
would expand total employment and thereby make it easier for the 
disadvantaged to find work.
Improving training quality, targeting the most disadvantaged 
clientele, expanding the use of stipends, and providing public service 
jobs will increase the costs but also the effectiveness of JTPA. 
Reliance on creaming and brief job search programs produces 
superficial and fleeting gains. The lasting results of the Job Corps' 
more intensive instruction suggest that JTPA's reliance on brief 
training will not meet the goals Congress established for the 
program.
Despite persistent budget deficits, Congress appears willing to 
consider increases in funding for employment and training pro 
grams. Opinion polls also indicate that nearly three of four 
Americans regard support of education and training as the best 
means to combat poverty.2 However, new budget authority for 
training welfare recipients may mean a further fragmentation of 
service delivery. It is far more appropriate to boost JTPA funds than 
to create separate training programs for the welfare and the nonwel- 
fare poor, categorizations which have little meaning outside the minds 
of policymakers.
Only a small fraction of the employable poor are served by JTPA. 
Even if Congress raised appropriations to the 1981 level, employ 
ment and training assistance would represent less than two-thirds of 
1978 outlays. Without additional funds, JTPA cannot hope to have 
more than a marginal impact. The proposal to increase employment 
and training assistance by nearly $6 billion annually involves a 
return to the 1981 appropriations level — an approximate doubling 
of current funding (table 8.1). To reap optimum benefits and to 
avoid the administrative difficulties which plagued CETA, the 
expansion should be phased in gradually. This recommended 
increase, while still woefully inadequate in terms of unmet needs, 
will be difficult to enact given present federal budget deficits. 
However, continuing national concern over the problems of dislo 
cated workers, welfare recipients, and the deficiently educated may 
facilitate budget increases for employment and training programs.
The largest proposed increase, over $3 billion, would boost funds for
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occupational training and basic education. The funds would be 
divided among various JTPA training components and the adult 
education program. The 1987 budget currently permits assistance to 
no more than about 1 in 20 eligible persons. Increased funding 
would permit more intensive programs, reaping enhanced long- 
term benefits. Work incentive (WIN) funding should be maintained, 
but incorporated into Title IIA year-round training programs to 
bolster administrative cost efficiency. Enforcement responsibility 
for WIN's nontraining functions (e.g., job search requirements) 
would remain a state responsibility. Providing remedial education 
to a fourth of the summer program's teenage enrollees would cost 
an additional $100 million annually.
The second largest proposed increase would be for job creation to 
ameliorate job shortages which have persisted even during the pro 
longed economic recovery following the two most recent recessions. A
Table 8.1
Substantial increases in employment and training funds are necessary 




Title IIA Adult and youth programs
Title IIB Summer youth programs
Title III Dislocated worker programs
Title IV Federally administered programs
Job Corps
Native American program
Migrant and seasonal farmworker
programs
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$2.5 billion annual appropriation would create about 250,000 job 
slots. Another $100 million would be devoted to the employment 
service or other state-designated agencies to help these public 
workers and other poor individuals find unsubsidized jobs.
Greater funding and federal direction will render JTPA more 
effective, but the task is fraught with difficulties. Ironically, JTPA's 
claimed outstanding performance will impede reforms of the sys 
tem's shortcomings. Making the present standards more rigorous 
and requiring program operators to serve a more disadvantaged 
clientele will likely erode the reported success record, giving the 
appearance that JTPA is deteriorating and fostering potential 
political and public relations problems. Short-sighted policies have 
led JTPA into a blind alley, and at present it is difficult to see an 
easy way out.
Appendices
A. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ABCs
AFDC Aid to Families with Dependent Children
BLS U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
CETA Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
CBO Community-based organization
CCC Civilian conservation center (Job Corps)
ETA Employment and Training Administration 
	(Department of Labor)
GAO U.S. General Accounting Office
GED General education development test
JTPA Job Training Partnership Act
Title IIA Year-round training programs for adults and youth
Title IIB Summer youth employment and training programs
Title III Dislocated worker programs
MDTA Manpower Development and Training Act
OJT On-the-job training
PIC Private industry council
RA Resident adviser (Job Corps)
SDA Service delivery area
SER Service, employment and redevelopment program
TAA Trade adjustment assistance
TJTC Targeted jobs tax credit
UI Unemployment insurance
WIN Work incentive program
YEDPA Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act
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B. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STATE ADMINISTRATORS
1. Targeted assistance. How did the state implement JTPA's 
requirements that programs serve a) individuals "most in need," 
b) dropouts, and c) welfare recipients?
Please provide written state policy related to these requirements.
2. Underspending. Has the state issued any regulations which 
encourage SDAs to fully expend their job training allocation? 
Does the state collect data on the proportion of SDA funds 
obligated within a given program year? 
If so, please attach reports.
3. Services. Did the state require SDAs to implement competency 
programs? If so, were educational competency programs specif 
ically required? Were standards issued detailing the content of 
the educational programs? 
Please attach policy directives.
4. Sanctions. Has the state issued policy directives on sanctions for
a) violations of the law, or
b) failure to meet performance standards? 
Please attach policy directives.
5. Data collection. Did the state add to or modify federal data 
collection requirements? Specifically, did the state require 
SDAs to:
a) Distinguish between part-time vs. full-time, or permanent 
vs. temporary jobs?
b) Collect information on the number of hours participants 
spent in the program?
c) Collect cost data by program activity?
d) Utilize a standard definition for enrollment in or termina 
tion from JTPA?
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SDAs
Federal Role
1. How has federal administration of JTPA changed since Brock 
and Semerad assumed their offices? Are the feds more responsive 
to state and local inquiries? If yes, has this affected SDA 
operations in any significant way?
2. If you thought that the feds would be responsive, what assistance 
would you seek from them?
States
1. What program priorities has the state established?
2. Is 6 percent incentive money influential in determining state or 
local priorities?
3. Have state interventions improved or impeded local programs? 
How are SDA activities constrained by state law or regulations?
4. Has the state rejected or modified any local biennial plans? On 
what grounds? How were conflicts resolved?
5. Did your state appropriate any direct funds to supplement 





Any other part of JTPA
Any program related to JTPA (specify)
6. Please attach copies of state follow-up reports regarding employ 
ment status and wages of former JTPA enrollees.
Local Programs
1. Comparing JTPA with CETA, is the PIC/LEO partnership 
administratively preferable to the prime sponsor system? Why or 
why not?
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2. Selection of clients:
a. To what extent do performance standards determine program 
choices and selection of participants? What other factors are 
important?
b. What criteria are used to screen applicants? 
c. What educational or other tests are given? 
d. During program year 1985, what proportion of eligible 
applicants are turned away? 
Number _______ 
Percentage _______
e. Are service providers represented on PICs? Do they influence 
PIC decisions? Do service providers who are not represented 
influence JTPA planning and services? How?
3. Do federal requirements determine the local data collection 
system? What additional information is collected? What part do 
the data play in subsequent program decisions? Please attach 
state or local evaluations of SDAs.
4. Please attach copies of the local biennial plan.




6. Did the state JTPA administrators audit SDAs? What dollar 
amount of expenditures has been disallowed or questioned? 
Why?
7. Please provide the ___ Adults Youth 








Cost Per Duration 
Placement Of Training
Wks. Hrs.
Cost Per Duration 
Placement of Training
Wks. Hrs.
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8. What percentage of SDA training funds is allocated to each of 
the following entities:
Amount Percentage
Public post-secondary institutions ____ ______
Public high schools _____ ______
Community-based organizations ____ ______
Private vocational schools ____ ______
Employment service ____ ______
The SDA's administrative agency ____ ______
Other (specify) ____ ______
9. What entity is primarily responsible for
a. Outreach and recruitment
b. Eligibility determinations
If more than one entity provides these services, please indicate 
how the funds are proportionately allocated to each.
10. What proportion of terminees receive placement assistance 
from the following entities:
Number Percentage
Total terminees _____ ______
SDAs administrative agency _____ ______
Employment service _____ ______
Community-based organizations _____ ______
Training contractor
(excluding the above) _____ ______
Other (specify) _____ ______
11. What proportion of funds for training is allocated through 
performance based contracts?
Amount ______ Percentage ______
12. What proportion of the SDA's allocation is devoted to 
allowances?
Amount _____ Percentage _____ 
What is the average weekly payment for participants receiving 
allowances?
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14. What were the three leading occupations enrollees were trained 
for?
15. Please attach copies of reports on the post-program experiences 
of JTPA participants.
Future
1. What amendments to JTPA, if any, would you recommend to 
Congress?
2. Would you want to add a job creation component to JTPA? If 
yes, how large? If not, why?
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